1. This article is part of a growing body of literature on the role of ideas in foreign policy. With regard to the former Soviet Union, see in particular Breslauer, George and Tetlock, Philip, eds., Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991)Google Scholar; Checkel, Jeff, “Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution,” World Politics 45 (01 1993), pp. 271–300Google Scholar; Evangelista, Matthew, “Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy,” in Tetlock, Philip and Jervis, Robert, eds., Behavior, Society and Nuclear War, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Matthew Evangelista, Taming the Bear: Transnational Relations and the Demise of the Soviet Threat, forthcoming; Herman, Robert, “Soviet New Thinking: Ideas, Interests, and the Redefinition of Security,” Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., in preparationGoogle Scholar; Mendelson, Sarah E., “Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” World Politics 45 (04 1993), pp. 327–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System,” and Janice G. Stein, “Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner,” both in this issue of International Organization; and Richard N. Lebow, “Why Do Leaders Seek Accommodation with Adversaries,” in Richard N. Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, forthcoming. On ideas and foreign policy in general, see Adler, Emanuel, The Power of Ideology: The Quest of Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Goldstein, Judith, “Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 179–217CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Goldstein, Judith and Keohane, Robert, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993)Google Scholar; Haas, Ernst, When Knowledge Is Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Haas, Peter, ed., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, special issue, International Organization 46 (Winter 1992)Google Scholar; Odell, John, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Sikkink, Kathryn, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991)Google Scholar.

2. I use the term “common security” (in Russian, vseobshaia bezopasnost') throughout the article, even though Soviet/Russian and American authors frequently speak of “mutual security” (vzaimnaia bezopasnost') or “equal security” (bezopasnost' dlia vsekh). I do this for two reasons. First, each term refers to the same concept. Second, common security is the generic term for the concept as it was originally used in the German security debate (gemeinsame Sicherheit) and later in the Palme commission's report. See Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982)Google Scholar. On the various Russian terms, see Arbatov, Georgii, Zatianuvsheesia vysdorovlenie (1953–1988 gg.), Svidetel'stvo sovremennika (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1991), pp. 240–41Google Scholar (This appeared in English as: The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics [New York: Random House, 1992].)Google Scholar. I thank Matt Evangelista for clarifying the Russian terms for me and for alerting me to Arbatov's book.

3. On epistemic communities, see P. Haas, Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination; and E. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power. On transnational relations, see Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971)Google Scholar.

4. The following discussion is based on Grunberg, Isabelle and Risse-Kappen, Thomas, “A Time of Reckoning? Theories of International Relations and the End of the Cold War,” in Allan, Pierre and Goldmann, Kjell, eds., The End of the Cold War: Evaluating Theories of International Relations (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, 1992), pp. 104–46Google Scholar.

5. Kenneth Oye, “Explaining the End of the Cold War: Morphological and Behavioral Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace,” in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War. For a critical discussion of this argument see Evangelista, Matthew, “Internal and External Constraints on Grand Strategy: The Soviet Case,” in Rosecrance, Richard and Stein, Arthur, eds., Beyond Realism: Domestic Factors and Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

6. Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7. For excellent surveys of strategies of reassurance see George, Alexander, “Strategies for Facilitating Cooperation,” in George, Alexander, Farley, Philip, and Dallin, Alexander, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 692–711Google Scholar; Lebow, Richard N. and Stein, Janice G., “Beyond Deterrence,” Journal of Social Issues 43 (Winter 1987), pp. 5–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stein, Janice, “Reassurance in International Conflict Management,” Political Science Quarterly 106 (Fall 1991), pp. 431–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8. See, for example, Gaddis, John Lewis, “Hanging Tough Paid Off,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 45 (01 1989), pp. 11–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar; d'Estaing, Valéry Giscard, Kissinger, Henry, and Nakasone, Yasuhiro, “East-West Relations,” Foreign Affairs 68 (Summer 1989), pp. 1–21, and especially pp. 8–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Einhorn, Robert, Negotiating from Strength: Leverage in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control (New York: Praeger, 1985)Google Scholar.

9. For empirical evidence see Chernoff, Fred, “Ending the Cold War: The Soviet Retreat and the U.S. Military Buildup,” International Affairs 67 (01 1991), pp. 111–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ted Hopf, “Peripheral Visions: Brezhnev and Gorbachev Meet the ‘Reagan Doctrine,’” in Breslauer and Tetlock, Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy; Mendelson, “Internal Battles and External Wars”; and Risse-Kappen, Thomas, “Did ‘Peace Through Strength’ End the Cold War,” International Security 16 (Summer 1991), pp. 162–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a general discussion of Western leverage on the Soviet Union, see Snyder, Jack, “International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change,” World Politics 42 (10 1989), pp. 1–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10. For evidence see Mendelson, , “Internal Battles and External Wars,” p. 334Google Scholar.

11. I am referring to West German enthusiasm for Gorbachev in 1987 and 1988, that is, two years before the Soviet leadership consented to German reunification.

12. For a similar point see Checkel, , “Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution,” pp. 274 and 279–80Google Scholar.

13. Waltz seems to acknowledge this point when he writes that “any theory of international politics requires also a theory of domestic politics.” See p. 331 of Waltz, Kenneth, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in Keohane, Robert, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 322–45Google Scholar. On the indeterminate nature of realism see also Robert Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics,” in ibid., pp. 1–26; Haggard, Stephen, “Structuralism and Its Critics: Recent Progress in International Relations Theory,” in Adler, Emanuel and Crawford, Beverly, eds., Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991)Google Scholar; and Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism,” in this issue of International Organization.

14. For examples of efforts at systematizing liberal thinking in international relations, see Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, Friedensstrategien (Strategies for peace) (Paderborn, Germany: Schöningh, 1986)Google Scholar; Keohane, Robert, “International Liberalism Reconsidered,” in Dunn, John, ed., The Economic Limits to Modern Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 165–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moravesik, Andrew, “Liberalism and International Relations Theory,” working paper no. 92–6, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1992Google Scholar; and Russett, Bruce, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993)Google Scholar.

15. Deudney, Daniel and Ikenberry, G. John, “The International Sources of Soviet Change,” International Security 16 (Winter 1991–1992), pp. 74–118CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Deudney, Daniel and Ikenberry, G. John, “Soviet Reform and the End of the Cold War: Explaining Large-scale Historical Change,” Review of International Studies 17 (Summer 1991), pp. 225–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a critique of the argument, see Mendelson, , “Internal Wars and External Battles,” pp. 330–31Google Scholar.

16. For an extreme version of this argument see Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1991)Google Scholar.

17. Grieco calls this perspective “neoliberal institutionalism,” while Jack Snyder uses the term “defensive realism.” See Grieco, Joseph M., “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 485–507CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Jack Snyder, “Myths, Modernization, and the Post-Gorbachev World,” in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War. See also Oye, Kenneth W., ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986)Google Scholar. This approach also influenced much of the original arms control literature. See, for example, Schelling, Thomas and Halperin, Morton, Strategy and Arms Control, 2d ed. (New York: Pergamon and Brassey, 1985)Google Scholar; and Bull, Hedley, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961)Google Scholar.

18. The bible of that approach is Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues Common Security. See also Bahr, Egon, Was wird aus den Deutschen? (What will happen to the Germans?) (Reinbek, Germany: Rowohlt, 1982)Google Scholar; and Lutz, Dieter S., ed., Gemeinsame Sicherheit (Common security), 2 vols. (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 1986)Google Scholar.

19. For this argument see Snyder, “Myths, Modernization, and the Post-Gorbachev World.”

20. See Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and the End of the Cold War,” in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War; Doyle, Michael, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80 (12 1986), pp. 1151–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace.

21. For the most recent data on the democratic peace see Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace. See also the special issues of the Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (06 1991)Google Scholar and of International Interactions 18 (02 1993)Google Scholar; and Maoz, Zeev and Russett, Bruce, “Alliances, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict Among Democracies a Statistical Artefact?” International Interactions 17 (1992), pp. 245–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22. Compare Kant, Immanuel, “Zum Ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf” [1795] (Perpetual peace: A philosophical sketch), in Weischedel, Wilhelm, ed., Immanuel Kant: Werke in sechs Bänden (Immanuel Kant: Works in six volumes), vol. 6 (Frankfurt: Insel-Verlag, 1964), pp. 193–251Google Scholar.

23. See Evangelista, “Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy”; Mendelson, “Internal Battles and External Wars”; Lebow, “Why Do Leaders Seek Accommodation With Adversaries?”; and Stein, “Political Learning by Doing.” See also Robert Legvold, “Soviet Learning in the 1980s,” in Breslauer and Tetlock, Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy; and Snyder, Jack, “The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism,” International Security 12 (Winter 1987–1988), pp. 93–131CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24. See Gorbachev, M. S., “Speech in the British Parliament,” 18 12 1984Google Scholar, in Gorbachev, M. S., Speeches and Writings (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1986), pp. 123–30Google Scholar; and Gorbachev, M. S., “Report to the Twenty-seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” 25 02 1986Google Scholar, in ibid., pp. 1–109. (In particular, see pp. 5–21 of the latter for an example of “old thinking,” which emphasized the world class struggle, and pp. 70–85 for a mix of “old” and “new thinking.”)

25. Shevardnadze is quoted in Checkel, , “Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution,” p. 294 (particularly footnote 78)Google Scholar.

26. I hesitate to use the term “epistemic communities,” since Peter Haas's definition emphasizes policy-relevant knowledge and shared causal beliefs as their primary source of authority. While the intellectual community in the former Soviet Union shared certain knowledge claims about international politics, their internal consensus derived mostly from shared principled beliefs or values. To put it differently, their “knowledge claims” made sense only if one shared their values. Moreover, their “expertise and competence in a particular domain” was only “recognized” (another part of Haas's definition) when Gorbachev came into power and increasingly relied on their ideas. Finally, their competence remained contested in the Soviet domestic debate. On the definition of epistemic communities, see Haas, Peter, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” in Haas, P., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, pp. 1–35 and especially p. 3Google Scholar. For a discussion, see Keck, Margaret and Sikkink, Kathryn, “International Issue Networks in the Environment and Human Rights,” paper prepared for the seventeenth International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, 24–27 09 1992, Los AngelesGoogle Scholar.

27. Checkel, “Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution.”

28. Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977)Google Scholar.

29. Mendelson, “Internal Battles and External Wars.”

30. See Goldstein, Judith and Keohane, Robert, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in Goldstein, and Keohane, , Ideas and Foreign Policy, pp. 3–30Google Scholar.

31. The quotation is from ibid., p. 3.

32. On the term “strategic prescription,” see Checkel, , “Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution,” p. 281Google Scholar. Strategic prescriptions contain both values (such as peace and security) and assumptions about causal relationships between ends and means. Thus, they do not fall neatly in one of the two categories of principled or causal beliefs identified by Goldstein and Keohane.

33. For the evolution of Soviet security thinking see Kull, Stephen, Burying Lenin: The Revolution in Soviet Ideology and Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992)Google Scholar; and Lynch, Allen, Gorbachev's International Outlook: Intellectual Origins and Political Consequences, Institute for East-West Security Studies Occasional Paper no. 9 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989)Google Scholar.

34. Checkel, , “Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution,” pp. 291–94Google Scholar.

35. For overviews see Adler, Emanuel, “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,” in Haas, P., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, pp. 101–45Google Scholar; Krell, Gert, “The Problems and Achievements of Arms Control,” Arms Control (12 1981), pp. 247–86Google Scholar.

36. On the domestic arms control debate during the Reagan administration see Caldwell, Dan, The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Debate (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Krepon, Michael, Arms Control in the Reagan Administration (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1989)Google Scholar; Kubbig, Bernd W., Amerikanische Rüstungskontrollpolitik: Die innergesellschaftlichen Auseinandersetzungen in der ersten Amtszeit Ronald Reagans (U.S. arms control policy: The domestic debates during Reagan's first term) (Frankfurt M.: Campus, 1988)Google Scholar; Meyer, David, A Winter of Discontent: The Freeze and American Politics (New York: Praeger, 1990)Google Scholar; and Schrag, Philip G., Listening for the Bomb: A Study in Nuclear Arms Control Verification (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989)Google Scholar.

37. On the German debate see Boutwell, Jeffrey, The German Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; and Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Die Krise der Sicherheitspolitik: Neuorientierungen und Entscheidungsprozesse im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1977–1984 (The crisis of security policy: New orientations and decision-making processes in the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1977–1984) (Mainz, Germany: Grünewald Kaiser, 1988)Google Scholar.

38. See p. 108 of Bahr, Egon, “Sozialdemokratische Sicherheitspolitik” (Social Democratic security policy), Die Neue Gesellschaft no. 2 (1983), pp. 105–10 (my translation and emphasis)Google Scholar. See also Bahr, Was wird cms den Deutschen? Bahr, Egon, “Gemeinsame Sicherheit: Gedanken zur Entschärfung der nuklearen Konfrontation in Europa” (Common security: Thoughts on the de-escalation of the nuclear confrontation in Europe), Europa-Archiv 37 (1982), pp. 421–30Google Scholar; and Lutz, Gemeinsame Sicherheit.

39. For details see Risse-Kappen, , Die Krise der Sicherheitspolitik, pp. 110–18 and 152–71Google Scholar.

40. See, for example, Afheldt, Horst, Defensive Verteidigung (Defensive defense) (Reinbek, Germany: Rowohlt, 1983)Google Scholar; Boserup, Anders and Mack, Andrew, Krieg ohne Waffen (War without weapons) (Reinbek, Germany: Rowohlt, 1974)Google Scholar; Boserup, Anders, Foundations of Defensive Defense (New York: Macmillan, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Muller, Bjorn, Non-offensive Defense: A Bibliography (Copenhagen: Center for Peace and Conflict Research, 1987)Google Scholar; Muller, Bjorn, Common Security and Non-offensive Defense: A Neorealist Perspective (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishing, 1992)Google Scholar; Studiengruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitik (Study Group on Alternative Security Policy) Strukturwandel der Verteidigung (Structural change of defense) (Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984)Google Scholar; Müller, Albrecht A.C. von, “Integrated Forward Defense,” manuscript, Starnberg, Germany, 1985Google Scholar. On the security dilemma see Jervis, Robert, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (01 1978), pp. 186–214CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

41. Evangelista, Taming the Bear; and Matthew Evangelista, “Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in the U.S.S.R. and Russia,” in Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In.

42. See Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security.

43. Arbatov, , The System, pp. 311–12Google Scholar. Milstein frequently published in Western journals. See, for example, Milstein, Mikhail, “Problems of the Inadmissability of Nuclear Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly 20 (03 1976), pp. 87–103CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44. The most far-reaching agreement was the SPD–Polish Communist Party declaration entitled “Criteria and Measures for Establishing Confidence-Building Security Structures in Europe,” Warsaw, signed 2 February 1988. For details see Kux, Stephan, “Western Peace Research and Soviet Military Thought,” manuscript, Columbia University, New York, 20 04 1989Google Scholar.

45. On the history of Pugwash, see Rotblat, Joseph, Scientists in the Quest for Peace: A History of the Pugwash Conference (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1972)Google Scholar.

46. For details, see Kux, “Western Peace Research and Soviet Military Thought”; and Evangelista, Matthew, “Transnational Alliances and Soviet Demilitarization,” paper prepared for the Council on Economic Priorities, 10 1990, manuscript pp. 33–41Google Scholar. See also Boserup, Anders, “A Way to Undermine Hostility,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 44 (09 1988), pp. 16–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the various Pugwash meetings, see Rotblat, Joseph and Valki, Laszlo, eds., Coexistence, Cooperation, and Common Security: Annals of Pugwash 1986 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Rotblat, Joseph and Goldanskii, V.I., eds., Global Problems and Common Security: Annals of Pugwash 1988 (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47. For the initial Soviet reactions, see Tiedtke, Stephan, Abschreckung und ihre Alternatives Die sowjetische Sicht einer westlichen Debatte (Deterrence and its alternatives: The Soviet view of a Western debate) (Heidelberg, Germany: Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft, 1986)Google Scholar.

48. Tracing the policy impact of transnational coalitions requires extensive data on decisionmaking processes in order to allow for causal inferences. Compared with these requirements, the evidence presented below still is not satisfactory. For further and more detailed studies see Evangelista, Taming the Bear; Evangelista, “Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in the U.S.S.R. and Russia”; and Herman, Soviet New Thinking.

49. Gorbachev, , “Report to the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” pp. 71 and 74Google Scholar. For a more coherent and less ambiguous argument about common security see Gorbachev, Mikhail, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), pp. 140–44Google Scholar. For comprehensive analyses of the new Soviet thinking about security, see Kull, Burying Lenin; Garthoff, Raymond, Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990)Google Scholar; and Segbers, Klaus, Der sowjetische Systemwandel (The Soviet system change) (Frankfurt M.: Suhrkamp, 1989), pp. 299–330Google Scholar.

50. See, for example, Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security, pp. 6–11Google Scholar.

51. Compare Gorbachev, , Perestroika, pp. 206–7Google Scholar; see also p. 196 regarding the Brandt commission on North–South issues.

52. Pravda, 6 April 1988, as quoted in Kux, , “Western Peace Research and Soviet Military Thought,” p. 13Google Scholar. See also Evangelista, , “Transnational Alliances and Soviet Demilitarization,” pp. 29–31Google Scholar. As Georgii Arbatov put it: “We do not claim to have invented all the ideas of the new thinking. Some of them originated outside the Soviet Union with people such as Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, and Olof Palme. We are developing them, along with our own ideas, into a full program for international conduct.” See Cohen, Stephen F. and Heuvel, Katrina Vanden, eds., Voices of Glasnost (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), p. 315Google Scholar.

53. Arbatov, , The System, p. 171Google Scholar.

54. See Arbatov, , The System, pp. 311–12Google Scholar; Checkel, , “Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution,” pp. 291–94Google Scholar; Mendelson, , “Internal Battles and External Wars,” p. 340Google Scholar; Lynch, , Gorbachev's International Outlook, pp. 56–58Google Scholar; and Litherland, Pat, “Gorbachev and Arms Control: Civilian Experts and Soviet Policy,” Peace Research Report no. 12, University of Bradford, 11 1986Google Scholar. As regards Alexei Arbatov, see his book Lethal Frontiers: A Soviet View of Nuclear Strategy, Weapons, and Negotiations (New York: Praeger, 1988)Google Scholar, which first appeared in Russian in 1984 and shows a superb knowledge of the American strategic debate.

55. Gorbachev, , Perestroika, pp. 142–43Google Scholar. See also his “Report to the Twenty-seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” p. 74.

56. For details of these arguments, see Garthoff, , Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine, pp. 149–85Google Scholar; Meyer, Stephen M., “The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security,” International Security 13 (Fall 1988), pp. 124–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Phillips, R. Hyland and Sands, Jeffrey I., “Reasonable Sufficiency and Soviet Conventional Defense,” International Security 13 (Fall 1988), pp. 164–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Frank, Willard C. and Gillette, Philip S., eds., Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915–1991 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1992)Google Scholar.

57. See, for example, Kokoshin, Andrei and Larionov, Valentin, “Confrontation of Conventional Forces in the Context of Ensuring Strategic Stability,” in Brauch, Hans Günter and Kennedy, Robert, eds., Alternative Conventional Defense Postures in the European Theater, vol. 2 (New York: Crane Russak, 1992), pp. 71–82Google Scholar. The Russian original of this article first appeared in 1988. See also Kokoshin, Andrei, “Restructure Forces, Enhance Security,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 44 (09 1988), pp. 35–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kokoshin, Andrei and Larionov, Valentin, Prevention of War: Doctrines, Concepts, Prospects (Moscow: Progress, 1991)Google Scholar; and Valentin Larionov, “Soviet Military Doctrine: Past and Present,” in Frank, and Gillette, , Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, pp. 301–19Google Scholar.

58. For details of these exchanges, see Evangelista, , “Transnational Alliances and Soviet Demilitarization,” pp. 31–37Google Scholar.

59. Frank, and Gillette, , Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, p. 397Google Scholar.

60. Other examples include arms control proposals on test ban negotiations and the ABM treaty (as indicated by Evangelista, “Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in the U.S.S.R. and Russia”) and ideas about the “common European home” and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. See Gorbachev, , Perestroika, pp. 194–98Google Scholar. I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for alerting me to this.

61. See Litherland, “Gorbachev and Arms Control: Civilian Experts and Soviet Policy”; Lynch, Gorbachev's International Outlook; and Zisk, Kimberley Martin, “Soviet Academic Theories on International Conflict and Negotiation: A Research Note,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 34 (12 1990), pp. 678–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

62. What follows is rather sketchy. However, there are enough empirical analyses available to support the argument. For example, see the literature quoted above in footnote 36. See also Kubbig, Bernd W., Die militärische Eroberung des Weltraums (The military conquering of space), vol. 1 (Frankfurt M.: Campus, 1990)Google Scholar. The best narratives of arms control under the Reagan and Bush administrations are Talbott, Strobe, Deadly Gambits (New York: Knopf, 1984)Google Scholar; Talbott, Strobe, The Master of the Game (New York: Knopf, 1988)Google Scholar; and Talbott, Strobe and Beschloss, Michael, At the Highest Levels (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993)Google Scholar. See also Shultz's, George memoirs, Turmoil and Triumph (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993)Google Scholar.

63. The best analysis of the freeze campaign is Meyer, A Winter of Discontent.

64. See Kubbig, Militärische Eroberung des Weltraums; and Garthoff, Raymond, Policy Versus the Law: The Reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987)Google Scholar.

65. For details on this case see Flournoy, Michèle, “The NRDC/SAS Test Ban Verification Project: A Controversial Excursion in Private Diplomacy,” manuscript, Washington, D.C., 1989Google Scholar; and Schrag, Listening for the Bomb. For a discussion of the Soviet involvement in these activities see Evangelista, “Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in the U.S.S.R. and Russia.”

66. The cautious and reactive U.S. approach to the revolutionary changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is well-documented in Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels.

67. This discussion builds on my earlier work, in particular Die Krise der Sicherheitspolitik. See also Boutwell, The German Nuclear Dilemma; and Blechman, Barry and Fisher, Cathleen, The Silent Partner: West Germany and Arms Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988)Google Scholar. On the evolution of European public opinion on security policy see Eichenberg, Richard, Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

68. See, for example, Herf, Jeffrey, “War, Peace, and the Intellectuals: The Long March to the West German Peace Movement,” International Security 10 (Spring 1986), pp. 172–200CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

69. Details about this support can be found in Risse-Kappen, , Die Krise der Sicherheitspolitik, pp. 43–89Google Scholar.

70. See Risse-Kappen, Thomas, The Zero Option: INF, West Germany, and Arms Control (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1988)Google Scholar; and Talbott, Deadly Gambits.

71. See, for example, Katzenstein, Peter, ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978)Google Scholar; Katzenstein, Peter, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984)Google Scholar; Gourevitch, Peter, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Ikenberry, G. John, Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of the American Government (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; and Ikenberry, G. John, Lake, David, and Mastanduno, Michael, eds., The State and American Foreign Economic Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988)Google Scholar. For examples of attempts to apply the approach to other issue-areas, see Barnett, Michael, “High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967–1977,” World Politics 42 (07 1990), pp. 529–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Evangelista, Matthew, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Matthew Evangelista, “Domestic Structures and International Change,” in Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., New Thinking in International Relations Theory, forthcoming; and Risse-Kappen, Thomas, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,” World Politics 43 (07 1991), pp. 479–512CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the following see also my “Introduction,” in Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In.

72. See, for example, March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P., Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Ikenberry, G. John, “Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy,” in Ikenberry, G. John et al. , State and American Foreign Economic Policy, pp. 219–43Google Scholar; and Kratochwil, Friedrich, Rules, Norms, and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For various applications, see Katzenstein, Peter and Okawara, Nobuo, “Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Politics,” International Security 17 (Spring 1993), pp. 84–118CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Katzenstein, Peter and Okawara, Nobuo, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993)Google Scholar; and Berger, Thomas, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism,” International Security 17 (Spring 1993), pp. 119–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73. It is thus important to distinguish between consensual ideas that are stable over time and those that are altered frequently and are promoted by specific groups. The strategic prescriptions discussed in this article are examples of the latter type of ideas. I thank John Odell and an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to this point.

74. See Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race; and Evangelista, “Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in the U.S.S.R. and Russia.”

75. A domestic structure approach explains why cognitive and learning theories are so widely used to explain the Gorbachev revolution. See Breslauer and Tetlock, Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy; and Stein, “Political Learning by Doing.” For a similar point see Peterson, Sue, “Strategy and State Structure: The Domestic Politics of Crisis Bargaining,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, New York, 1993Google Scholar.

76. I owe the following argument to Steve Ropp.

77. Of course, U.S. autonomy is greater in national security affairs than in other issue-areas. But compared with the former Soviet state, the difference is still striking.

78. On the “cold war consensus” in the United States and its limits see Russett, Bruce, Controlling the Sword (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), chap. 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wittkopf, Eugene, Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

79. See Katzenstein, Peter, Corporatism and Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984)Google Scholar; and Katzenstein, Peter, Policy and Politics in West Germany (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989)Google Scholar.

80. For a further evaluation of this approach see the chapters in Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. See also Sikkink, Kathryn, “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America,” International Organization 47 (Summer 1993), pp. 411–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

81. See, for example, Checkel, “Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution”; Goldstein, “Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy”; Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy; Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy; and Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions.

82. Goldstein, and Keohane, , “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” p. 26Google Scholar.