1. Gomułka, S., Growth, Innovation and Reform in Eastern Europe (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1985)Google Scholar, chap. 12.

2. Statistical Yearbook CMEA (Moscow: CMEA, 1984)Google Scholar.

3. Comisso, E. and Marer, P., “Explaining Economic Strategy in Hungary” (Paper presented at the Conference on Foreign Economic Strategies of Eastern Europe, Berkeley, California, 1–2 02 1985)Google Scholar. Significantly, Hungary and Romania also faced serious economic difficulties at the end of the decade as a result of such aggressive investment policies. Unlike in Poland, however, domestic and external political barriers did not undermine regime adjustment strategy.

4. Brus, W., “Economics and Politics: The Fatal Link,” in Brumberg, A., ed., Poland: Genesis of a Revolution (New York: Random, 1982)Google Scholar. Almost none of the top leaders under Gierek possessed the same qualities as the old “watchdogs” of balanced plans under Bołesfaw Bierut (e.g, Mine and Szyr), or Władysław Gomufłca (e.g., Jẹdrychowski and Jaszczuk).

5. See Blazyca, G., “Industrial Structure and Economic Problems of Industry in a Centrally Planned Economy: The Polish Case,” Journal of Industrial Economics, no. 28 (1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6. Fallenbuchl, Z., Polityka Gospodarcze PRL (London: Odnowa, 1980)Google Scholar.

7. Bras, “Economics and Politics.”

8. Staniszkis, J., Self-Limiting Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983)Google Scholar.

9. Ibid.

10. Statistical Yearbook CMEA (Moscow: CMEA, 1981)Google Scholar and national statistics for Hungary.

11. Charemza, W., “The Centrally Plannned Economy in the International Crisis, Poland 1974–1980” (Paper delivered at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, Birmingham, England, 1984)Google Scholar.

12. Fallenbuchl, Z., “The Polish Economy in the 1970's,” in Joint Economic Committee, East European Economies, Post-Helsinki, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1977Google Scholar.

13. Under Gierek Poland not only was relatively more dependent on hard-currency oil imports than were many other East European countries, but its purchases were also cleared mostly with Western countries, whereas other East European countries dealt mostly with the developing nations, particularly Libya and Middle Eastern oil-producing countries. The latter transactions were certainly easier to finance, because many of them were cleared by Eastern Europe with military deliveries. For instance, in 1978, Poland imported 3.6 million tons of hard-currency oil, while Czechoslovakia imported 1.3 million tons. In per capita terms these imports were very similar, but the share of hard-currency imports in Poland's total oil imports was twice as high as that for Czechoslovakia. More than two-thirds of Polish hard-currency imports came from the West, whereas the West provided only one-third of the Czechoslovakian imports. In addition, almost no Polish imports of crude oil were shipped to the West, while almost half of Czechoslovakian hard-currency imports were reexported for hard currency (i.e., practically all oil imports from the developing nations). See Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, “Soviet and East European Trade and Financial Relations with the Middle East,” Centrally Planned Economies: Current Analysis, 11 10 1983Google Scholar.

14. Portes, R., The Polish Crisis: Western Policy Options (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1981)Google Scholar.

15. Kornai, J., Economics of Shortage (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1980)Google Scholar.

16. Fink, G., Economic Effects of the Polish Crisis on Other CMEA Countries (Vienna: Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, 1983)Google Scholar.

17. Tyson, L., Economic Adjustment in Eastern Europe: Hungary and Romania (Santa Monica: Rand, 1984)Google Scholar.

18. Montias, J. M., “Poland: Roots of the Economic Crisis,” Working Paper no. 848, Institute for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., 03–04 1982Google Scholar.

9. K. Poznański, “State Policy towards Technology Transfer in Poland during the 1970's,” Research Policy (forthcoming).

20. Staniszkis, Self-Limiting Revolution.

21. Only the Soviet Union has been receiving larger shares than Poland of its Western credits from government-guaranteed sources in the region. For instance, in 1970 these sources provided 61% of Soviet credit, and 63% of Polish credit, but only 7% of East German and 28% of Czech credit. In 1980 the respective shares were: the Soviet Union, 50%; Poland, 25%; East Germany, 22%; Czechoslovakia, 11%. To give another example, in 1981 59% of Poland's gross debt was accumulated in guaranteed credits, whereas in Romania this share amounted to 22%. See Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, “Lending to the Eastern Bloc by Western Governments,” Centrally Planned Economies: Current Analysis, 25 05 1982, p. 2Google Scholar.

22. Fink, Economic Effects of the Polish Crisis.

23. Mościcki, J., “Po umowie paryskiej,” Zycie Gospodarcze, no. 30 (1985)Google Scholar. See also Roczkowski, S., “Debt Rescheduling: Benefits and Costs for Debtors and Creditors,” in Saunders, C. T., ed., East-West Trade and Finance in the World Economy (New York: St. Martin's, 1985)Google Scholar.

24. Goldstein, E. A., “Soviet Economic Assistance to Poland, 1980–1981,” in Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, pp. 567–69Google Scholar.

25. For details on Yugoslavia's rescheduling agreement see Marer, P., “East-West Commercial Relations and Prospects for East Europe and Yugoslavia” (Paper presented at Allied Social Science Association Annual Meeting, Dallas, 29 12 1984)Google Scholar. For details on Brazil's rescheduling agreement see Cline, W., “Progress on International Debt,” New York Times, 15 04 1985Google Scholar.

26. During 1982-84 Hungary obtained $1 billion in medium-term loans from the IMF. The World Bank arranged the long-term credit of $400 million. The World Bank also helped Hungary to negotiate $800 million in long-term loans from private bank sources. With other creditsincluding some from governmental souces—Hungary received a total of $4.1 billion in these three years. Polityka [Warsaw], 6 04 1985Google Scholar.

27. Fink, Economic Effects of the Polish Crisis. In 1980–81 the total assistance amounted to $3 to $4 billion, which included $ 1 billion in hard-currency credits and a nonrepayable grant of $500 million. The rest consisted of trade deficits not cleared by Poland, which had no direct impact on its ability to service the debt to Western countries. Eastern Europe did not provide any substantial help (the only important exception was a small emergency shipment of goods by East Germany); in fact, East European countries put additional pressure on Poland by reducing exports in order to cut their recent trade surpluses.

28. Hewett, E., “Soviet Current Account Surplus with Eastern Europe” (Mimeo, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1985)Google Scholar.

29. Marrese, M., “Hungarian Agriculture: Drive in a Proper Direction” (Mimeo, Northwestern University, Evanston, III., 1983)Google Scholar. Also, while Poland cleared all its trade with the Soviet Union in nontransferable rubles, Hungary also ran dollar accounts with the Soviet Union. In 1980 these accounts provided Hungary with a surplus of about $500 million, a sum close to the Hungarian trade deficit with Western countries in that year.

30. S. Gomułka, Growth, Innovation, and Reform, chap. 13.

31. Ibid.

32. For more details see Zaleski, E., Kryzys Gospodarki Polskiej: Przyczyny i Srodki Zaradcze (London: Instytut Romana Dmowskiego, 1983)Google Scholar.

33. Nuti, D., “The Polish Crisis: Economic Factors and Constraints,” in The Socialist Register (London: Merlin, 1981)Google Scholar. Also Kemme, D., “The Polish Crisis: An Economic Overview,” in Bielasiak, J. and Simon, M., eds., Polish Politics: Edge of the Abyss (New York: Praeger, 1982)Google Scholar.

34. Staniszkis, Self-Limiting Revolution.

35. This nonrevolutionary and nonpolitical attitude was characteristic of the prewar history of the labor movement in Poland, as Blobaum, R. points out in “The Traditions of Workers' Protest in Poland” (Mimeo, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., 1983)Google Scholar.

36. Staniszkis, Self-Limiting Revolution.

37. This view is shared by Johnson, A., Poland in Crisis (Santa Monica: Rand, 1982)Google Scholar. See also Curry, J., The Polish Crisis of 1980 and the Politics of Survival (Santa Monica: Rand, 1980)Google Scholar.

38. From Staar, R., Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983)Google Scholar.

39. Zaleski, Kryzys Gospodarki Polskiej.

40. S. Gomułka and J. Rostowski, Growth, Innovation, and Reform, chap. 14.

41. The amount of Western credits that Poland received has declined further since the 1981 squeeze. Medium-and long-term credits reached $1.2 billion in 1982, $6 million in 1983, and hit bottom in 1984, with $2 million in Western credits reported (see Mościcki, “Po umowie paryskiej”). On European borrowing see Lenz, A., Controlling International Debt: Implications for East-West Trade, report prepared for the Office of Trade and Investment Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983)Google Scholar.

42. Zaleski, E., “The Polish Economic Crisis and Its Impact on the CMEA” (Mimeo, Centre International de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, 1985)Google Scholar.

43. Fallenbuchl, Z., “The Polish Economy under Martial Law,” Soviet Studies 36, no. 4 (10 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, provides a large number of relevant statistics. According to him, “There is a serious danger that the stabilization of the economy will take place at a very low level of per capita income and consumption, and will be followed by a prolonged period of stagnation,” a view I share.

44. Poznański, “State Policy towards Technology Transfer.”

45. Poznaṅska, J., “Foreign Trade Adjustment of Indebted Countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Far East” (Mimeo, Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 1985)Google Scholar.

46. Vaňous, J., “Polish Foreign Trade Performance during the First Nine Months of 1984,” Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Centrally Planned Economies: Current Analysis, 01 1985Google Scholar.

47. Reportedly, Poland will be able to allocate $2.2 billion to finance its $2.7 billion in debt service in 1985, meaning that the balance of current accounts is going to be negative this year as well (Mościcki, “Po umowie paryskiej”). The increasing Polish debt stays in contrast with debts of other East European countries and the Soviet Union. Reportedly, the whole region reduced its net debt to Western countries from $75.1 billion by the end of 1982 to $65.1 billion by the end of June 1984. Between June 1983 and June 1984, the debt of Bulgaria declined from $1.3 to $1.0 billion; in Czechoslovakia from 2.5 to 2.0; in East Germany, from 8.8 to 7.3; in Hungary, from 7.0 to 6.8; and in Romania, from 8.4 to 7.8. Meanwhile, Polish debt grew from $25.2 to $25.3 billion (these data differ from those provided in Mościcki's article but still show a trend in the same, upward direction).

48. See for instance debt projections for Poland by Crane, K., The Credit-Worthiness of Eastern Europe in the 1980s, R-3201-USDP (Santa Monica: Rand, 1985)Google Scholar.

49. Staniszkis, Self-Limiting Revolution.