¹ Compare this view with Stanley Hoffmann's identification of Monnet with the concept of “painless Federalism,” in his “Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System,” in Wilcox, Francis O. and Haviland, H. Field Jr. (ed.), The Atlantic Community: Progress and Prospects (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 12–13.Google Scholar

For Monnet's views, see his Les Etats-Unis d'Europe Ont Commencé (Paris: Robert Laffert, 1955)Google Scholar. For the best analysis of Monnet and of his action committee for the United States of Europe, see Walter, Yondorf, Europe of the Six: Dynamics of Integration (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Chicago, 1962), Chapter 5.Google Scholar

² It is “the specific policy context … [that] determines what is desired by governments and tolerated by them in terms of integrative accommodations.” (“International Integration: The European and the Universal Process,” International Organization, Summer 1961 [Vol. 15, No. 3], p. 376.)Google Scholar

³ Lindberg, Leon N., The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 6.Google Scholar

⁴ Ibid., pp. 10–11, 27–43, and 283–295.

⁵ Pluralism of social structure, homogeneity among important elites, and a common universe of concerns are not enough. Even in a pluralistic society, political power can come to be exerted by a political group that comprises a minority among all governing elites but that either has a majority in the one “elite group” which matters above all (Parliament) or can rule without Parliament. … Too “deep” an explanation may explain nothing at all; to put the spotlight on values and social structure may be necessary, but to put it on the specialized political sector (“who governs?”) may well be sufficient. (Hoffmann, , op. cit., p. 11.)Google Scholar

⁶ “Comparison of Intranational and International Politics,” American Political Science Review, June 1963 (Vol. 57, No. 2), pp. 406–419.Google Scholar

⁷ Gabriel, Almond and Coleman, James S. (ed.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960).Google Scholar

⁸ For a discussion of the possibility that “supranationalism” might be a viable form of government, see Haas, Ernst B., “Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe” in Graubard, Stephen R. (ed.), A New Europe? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), pp. 67ff.Google Scholar

⁹ I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Penrose Fund of the American Philosophical Society, the University of Wisconsin Graduate Research Committee, and the University of Wisconsin Ford Area and International Grant.

¹⁰ For details, see Lindberg, , op. cit., Chapters 11 and 12.Google Scholar

¹¹ A full analysis will be presented in a book now in preparation, provisionally entitled The European Community as a Political System.

¹² For details, see Lindberg, op. cit., Chapters 4 and 13.

¹³ For an interesting discussion, see Boulding, Kenneth, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).Google Scholar

¹⁴ In much of this, Mansholt's approach is similar to that of Jean Monnet, though his style is decidedly different.

¹⁵ In many of its features this pattern bears a striking resemblance to certain kinds of collective bargaining negotiations. See Stevens, Carl M., Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963)Google Scholar and Douglas, Ann, Industrial International Peacemaking (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).Google Scholar

¹⁶ So can any government, of course.

¹⁷ I owe this point to Karl Kaiser.

¹⁸ Where conclusions of the Council require a qualified majority, the votes of its members are weighted as follows: Belgium, 2; Germany, 4; France, 4; Italy, 4; Luxembourg, 1; and the Netherlands, 2. (Article 148 of the Rome Treaty.)

¹⁹ Boulding, , op. cit., p. 324.Google Scholar

²⁰ Common Market, July 1963, p. 131.Google Scholar

²¹ Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, Les conséquences d'ordre interne de la participation de la Belgique aux organisations Internationales (Brussels, 1964), p. 63.Google Scholar

²² Loc. cit.

²³ For details, see Lindberg, , op. cit., pp. 79–83.Google Scholar

²⁴ See, for example, the reactions of French agricultural leaders, as reported by De, Virieu in Le Monde, 10 23, 1964Google Scholar; by Deleau, in Le Monde, 10 24, 1964Google Scholar; and by Drouin, , “Si le pire arrivait,” Le Monde, 11 7, 1964.Google Scholar

²⁵ Even here we ought to note that French “threats” have been phrased very circumspectly. Exaggerations by the press, especially the American press, of course heighten the atmosphere of crisis, which is what the French have in mind anyway.

²⁶ Cf. Hoffmann, , op. cit., p. 12.Google Scholar

²⁷ These points will be elaborated in subsequent publications.

²⁸ That the French have been most skillful in exploiting this situation in what may seem a cynical manner should not obscure the fact that others have similar possibilities once they learn how to capitalize on them. Nor should it lead us to forget that France too is highly dependent on the Community politically and economically, even if de Gaulle does not share its developing ethos.

²⁹ Kenneth, Boulding, The Skills of the Economist (Cleveland, Ohio: Howard Allen, 1958), pp. 4–7.Google Scholar

³⁰ Recent reports of French threats to “leave the Community” seem to have been much exaggerated. (If the French asserted only that the Community could not go on if there were no common market in agriculture, then most would agree with them.) Withdrawal from the Community, it seems to me, would be tantamount to an admission by General de Gaulle that his entire policy had failed and would be likely to precipitate a serious domestic crisis.