1. Emery, F. E. and Trist, E. L., Towards A Social Ecology: Contextual Appreciations of the Future in the Present (New York: Plenum, 1975), p. 32Google Scholar.

2. Axelrod, Robert and Keohane, Robert O., “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in Oye, , ed., Cooperation under Anarchy, pp. 226–54Google Scholar.

3. Other noteworthy entries in this emergent literature includeAxelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic, 1984)Google Scholar, and Snidal, Duncan, “Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985), pp. 579–614CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4. The nature of genuine puzzles is elaborated in Rosenau, James N., “Puzzlement in Foreign Policy,” Jerusalem Journal ofInternational Relations 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 1–10Google Scholar.

5. This conception of politics is spelled out in Rosenau, James N., Calculated Control as a Unifying Concept in the Study of International Politics and Foreign Policy, Research Monograph No. 15 (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1963)Google Scholar.

6. I am grateful to Keohane's book for this innovative solution to the gender-bias problem.

7. Kuhn, Thomas S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970)Google Scholar.

8. Kratochwil, Friedrich and Ruggie, John Gerard, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State,” International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9. I am indebted to Peter Katzenstein and Stephen D. Krasner for stressing the need to indicate the underlying presumptions of this article.

10. Holsti, K. J., “The Science of International Politics: Promise, Production, and Problems” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2 09 1983, p. 5)Google Scholar.

11. For a cogent analysis of this issue, see Holsti, K. J., The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1985)Google Scholar. Other recent efforts to tease some order out of the theoretical profusion are provided by Hayward Alker, R. Jr, and Biersteker, Thomas J., “The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archeologist of International Savoir Faire,” International Studies Quarterly 28 (06 1984), pp. 121–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Maghroori, Ray and Ramberg, Bennett, eds., Globalism versus Realism: International Relations Third Debate (Boulder: Westview, 1982)Google Scholar; and Viotti, Paul R. and Kauppi, Mark V., eds., International Relations Theory: Alternative Images (New York: Wiley, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

12. The intellectual roots of criteria #3, 4, and 5 can perhaps be most directly traced to Simon, Herbert, Administrative Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1947)Google Scholar; Parsons, Talcott and Shills, Edward A., eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952)Google Scholar; Easton, David, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: Knopf, 1953)Google Scholar; Snyder, Richard C., Bruck, H. W., and Sapin, Burton, Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (Princeton: Organizational Behavior Section, Princeton University, 1954)Google Scholar; Lindblom, Charles E., “The Science of ‘Muddling through,’” Public Administration Review 19 (Spring 1959)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and McDonald, Neil A., Politics: A Study of Control Behavior (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965)Google Scholar.

13. For a discussion of both the ambiguities of the concept and the reasoning that led me reluctantly to accept them, see Rosenau, James N., “The State in an Era of Cascading Politics: Wavering Concept, Widening Competence, Withering Colossus, or Weathering Change?” (Paper presented at the Congress of the International Political Science Association, Paris, 16 07 1985)Google Scholar.

14. Rosenau, James N., “A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics in an Era of Cascading Interdependence,” International Studies Quarterly 28 (1984), pp. 267–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15. See, for example, Kaplan, Morton A., Macropolitics: Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Politics (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), pp. 30–31Google Scholar, and Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 91, 110Google Scholar.

16. For an analysis in which the micro and macro levels of aggregation are dichotomized according to small- and large-scale motives rather than small- and large-scale units of action, see Chittick, William O., “Macromotives and Microbehavior: A Prescriptive Analysis,” in Bertsch, Gary K., ed., Global Policy Studies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), pp. 205–29Google Scholar.

17. For an elaboration of this point, see Coate, Roger A., “Bridging the Micro-Macro Gap in Global Relations Theory” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D. C, 6–9 03 1985)Google Scholar.

18. In this connection see the work ofAlger, Chadwick F., particularly his more recent articles: “Human Development: A Micro to Macro Perspective” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Mexico City, 5–9 04 1983)Google Scholar; Alger, , “Bridging the Micro and the Macro in International Relations Research,” Alternatives 10 (Winter 1984–1985), pp. 319–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Alger, , “Creating Local Institutions for Sustained Participation in Peacebuilding” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Washington, D.C., 18–21 06 1985)Google Scholar.

19. For an analysis of how the size of social structures and the scope of social processes can have important methodological consequences, see Tilly, Charles, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984)Google Scholar. Other cogent inquiries into macro-micro interactions can be found in Collins, Randall, “On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology,” American Journal of Sociology 86 (1981), pp. 984–1014CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hechter, Michael, ed., The Microfoundations of Macrosociology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983)Google Scholar; Knorr-Cetina, K. and Cicourel, A. V., eds., Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro- and Macro-Sociologies (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981)Google Scholar; and Schelling, Thomas C., Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: Norton, 1978)Google Scholar.

20. In order to avoid losing touch with the premise that the form and direction of action in world politics spring from a combination of rote habits that perpetuate continuity and adaptive habits that accept change, a new term that reflects this synthesis might well be coined: with rote and adaptive actors as ideal types at each end of the continuum, those who empirically populate the world between the two hypothetical extremes could usefully be called “habdaptive-driven” actors. I am persuaded that eventually the utility of this terminology as a reminder of the prime components of action would outweigh its initial offensiveness, but this is not an appropriate place to develop my argument further.

21. For an application of the habit-driven actor approach that generates a research agenda as well as anticipates outcomes with respect to a central problem of our time, see Rosenau, James N., “Learning in East-West Relations: The Superpowers as Habit-Driven Actors” (Paper presented at the Conference on East-West Conflict: Elite Perceptions and Political Options, sponsored by the Seminar für Politische Wissenschaft, University of Bonn, and the Center for International and Strategic Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles, 15–19 06 1986)Google Scholar.

22. For a discussion of the distinction between parametric and variable changes in world politics, seeRosenau, James N., “Breakpoints in History: Nuclear Weapons, Oil Embargoes, and Public Skills as Parametric Shifts,” Institute for Transnational Studies, University of Southern California (Mimeo, 11 1983)Google Scholar.

23. For a discussion of three micro dynamics that may operate as sources of basic global change, see Rosenau, James N., “Micro Sources of Macro Global Change,” Institute for Transnational Studies, University of Southern California (Mimeo, 05 1986)Google Scholar.

24. For a recent assessment of this evidence, see Rosenau, , “A Pre-Theory Revisited,” especially pp. 290–98Google Scholar.

25. Keohane acknowledges that the contrast between egoistic self-interests on the one hand and altruistic and empathic actions on the other can be misleading (pp. 122–23), that when they look across the long term “governments and other actors in world politics may define their interests so that they are empathically dependent on those of others” and thus much readier to engage in cooperative behavior (p. 125). See also Margolis, Howard, Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality: A Theory of Social Choice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982)Google Scholar. For a formulation that conceives of altruistic and empathic orientations as leading to forms of action very different than those associated with cooperation, see Rosenau, James N., ’The Civic Self in Transnational Perspective,” in Gillespie, J. A. and Zinnes, D. A., eds., Missing Elements in Political Inquiry (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), pp. 167–72Google Scholar.

26. Kindleberger, Charles, “Hierarchy versus Inertial Cooperation,” International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 841–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27. Russett, Bruce, “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?” International Organization 39 (Spring 1985), pp. 207–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Strange, Susan, “Still an Extraordinary Power: America's Role in a Global Monetary System,” in Lombra, Raymond E. and Witte, William E., eds., Political Economy of International and Domestic Monetary Relations (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1982)Google Scholar. For a somewhat different assessment of the issue, seeRupert, Mark E. and Rapkin, David P., “The Erosion of U.S. Hegemonic Leadership Capabilities” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, 28–31 03 1984)Google Scholar.

28. See, for example, Deutsch, Morton, The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973)Google Scholar.

29. An introduction to this literature could well begin with Barnes, John A., “Networks and Political Process,” in Swartz, Marc, ed., Local-Level Politics (Chicago: Aldine, 1968)Google Scholar; Barnes, John A., Social Networks (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1972)Google Scholar; Boissevain, J. and Mitchell, J. C., eds., Network Analysis: Studies in Human Interaction (The Hague: Mouton, 1973)Google Scholar; and Leinhardt, S., Social Networks: A Developing Paradigm (New York: Academic, 1977)Google Scholar.

30. Interestingly, even though Keohane has since moved on from puzzles involving the absence of hegemony, his analysis continues to presuppose a basic condition that is not present. Now the focus is cooperation under anarchy, by which is meant “the lack” of a governing authority in world politics (see Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” p. 226)Google Scholar. A juxtaposition of the two factors whose absence puzzles Keohane leads to the inference that he conceives of the hegemon as the functional equivalent of an international government.

31. Indeed, it is clear throughout that the contributors are partly energized by a hope that the cooperative strategies they highlight will be appreciated in high places and employed in international bargaining, thereby lessening the prospects for violence among states. Plainly, puzzlement is not a spirit conducive to the generation and presentation of policy recommendations.

32. I interpret the discrepancy between Keohane's expression of doubt about the prospects for systematic inquiry in his book, on the one hand, and the exuberance in his co-authored conclusion to the Oye volume over the systematic support uncovered for its organizing hypotheses, on the other, as a measure of the degree to which his studies of cooperation have led him away from a metatheoretical commitment to a complex interdependence approach and toward a rational-actor perspective.

33. Snidal, Duncan, “The Game THEORY of International Politics,” in Oye, , ed., Cooperation under Anarchy, p. 56Google Scholar.

34. Ibid., p. 36.

35. See, for example, Stewart, Michael, The Age of Interdependence: Economic Policy in a Shrinking World (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984)Google Scholar, and Harold, and Sprout, Margaret, The Context of Environmental Politics: Unfinished Business for America's Third Century (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1978)Google Scholar.

36. This dynamic is elaborated in Benjamin, Roger, The Limits of Politics: Collective Goods and Political Change in Postindustrial Societies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)Google Scholar, and Benjamin, , “Some Misplaced Comparisons: Comparative and Foreign versus Domestic Public Policy” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 12–14 04 1984)Google Scholar.

37. Rosenau, James N., “The Microelectronic Revolution and the Conduct of Foreign Policy” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 30 08 1984)Google Scholar.

38. Rosenau, James N., “Authority Structures in North-South Relations: A Search for Conceptual Uniformity” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 30 08 1985)Google Scholar.

39. Rosenau, , “A Pre-Theory Revisited,” pp. 245–306Google Scholar.

40. Rosenau, “The State in an Era of Cascading Politics.”

41. Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” p. 228Google Scholar.

42. Ibid., pp. 238–43.

43. Oye, Kenneth A., “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” in Oye, , ed., Cooperation under Anarchy, p. 19Google Scholar.

44. Gilpin, Robert, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic, 1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45. For an elaboration of these linguistic parameters of power analysis, seeRosenau, , Calculated Control as a Unifying Concept, pp. 44–45Google Scholar.

46. Rosenau, James N., “Capabilities and Control in an Interdependent World,” International Security 1 (10 1976), pp. 32–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For similar and even more elaborate treatments of the uses-and pitfalls-of the power concept in the study of international phenomena, see Hart, Jeffrey, “Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations,” International Organization 30 (Spring 1976), pp. 289–305CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Baldwin, David A., Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 18–24Google Scholar.

47. The others may be geographically close or physically proximate, as when heads of state confer in summit meetings, but are functionally distant in the sense that they occupy roles in distinctly different and competitive systems. See Rosenau, , Calculated Control as a Unifying Concept, pp. 12–15Google Scholar.

48. For a collection of essays written by a number of analysts of international regimes who have integrated their perspectives on and share an enthusiasm for the regimes concept, see Krasner, Stephen D., ed., special issue on international regimes, International Organization 36 (Spring 1982)Google Scholar, subsequently enlarged and published as a book under the same title by the Cornell University Press (Ithaca, 1983).

49. For a recent book-length study that treats both dictatorial and democratic governments as regimes but stops short of extending the concept to the international realm, see Macridis, Roy C., Modern Political Regimes: Patterns and Institutions (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986)Google Scholar.

50. Krasner, Stephen, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” special issue, International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), p. 186Google Scholar. This formulation of the regime concept can be viewed as definitive in the sense that the contributors to the symposium converged in a conference lasting several days, during which they discussed their papers and appear to have agreed to use the same definition.

51. Ruggie, John Gerard, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), p. 380CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52. For an enlightening assessment of the concept of authority in which compliance with the injunctions of regimes and international organizations is conceived to involve “the authoritative”–“a wider set of values, beliefs, arrangements, and practices”–rather than authority, see Flathman, Richard E., The Practice of Political Authority: Authority and the Authoritative (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 50Google Scholar.

53. For a lengthy analysis of how one such organization, the International Labour Organisation, pressed its members to report on their record of compliance with the organization's directives, see Haas, Ernst B., Beyond the Nation-state (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964)Google Scholar.

54. For a dissenting view on the value of the regime concept, see Strange, Susan, “Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), pp. 479–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

55. Kratochwil, and Ruggie, , “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State,” pp. 765–66Google Scholar.

56. It is important to note that studying cooperation from the perspective of an ever-present possibility of systemic collapse is quite different from studying it in the context of international anarchy. In the Oye volume the problem is posed as comprehending the strategic and institutional bases of international cooperation under the condition of “perpetual anarchy,” by which is meant the absence of any “central authority [that] imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests” (Oye, , “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy,” p. 1)Google Scholar. Axelrod and Keohane stress that treating anarchy as “a lack of common government in world politics” is not meant to imply that the international system lacks established structures, norms, organizations, or stable expectations. All of these systemic attributes are acknowledged and seen to vary from one issuearea to another. Nevertheless, as simply the lack of common government, anarchy is “a constant,” a context within which politics unfolds (Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” p. 226)Google Scholar. The assumption of an ever-present potential for collapse, on the other hand, involves positing a continuum, a wide range across which systems can vary depending on the degree to which their mechanisms and institutions promoting cooperation offset the tendencies toward breakdown. Such a perspective seems preferable to the anarchy-as-aconstant approach since it allows for a lack of government without conceptually ignoring the other types of authority structures that can and do prevail in world politics. (For an effort to draw a map of the world which depicts authority structures rather than countries and states, see Rosenau, “Authority Structures in North-South Relations.”)

57. The decision to use Kiev in this comparison was made some six months prior to theaccident at Chernobyl and the subsequent evidence that Kiev's stability was susceptible toconsiderable fluctuation. I have not altered the example because Kiev's present problems poignantly highlight the exact point the comparison seeks to establish.

58. Viewed in this way, it is not surprising that one of Keohane's earliest works dealt with the U.S.-Canadian relationship (see Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., “Introduction: The Complex Politics of Canadian-American Interdependence,” International Organization 28 [Autumn 1974], pp. 595–607CrossRefGoogle Scholar) and that subsequently he treated the relationship as a prime example of complex interdependence (see Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition [Boston: Little, Brown, 1977], chap. 7)Google Scholar.

59. Destler, I. M. and Odell, John S., “The Politics of ‘Anti-Protection’: Pro-Trade Groups in US Policymaking” (Paper presented at a study group of the Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 28 10 1985, p. 34Google Scholar; italics in the original).

60. Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” p. 247Google Scholar.

61. Snidal, , “The Game THEORY of International Politics,” p. 40Google Scholar.

62. Ibid.

63. An illustration of our ignorance of the dynamics of habit in world politics concerns the differences among observers over whether the structures of international systems-those patterns that recur so often as to be the product of learned habits rather than calculated strategies -are “deep” or “shallow.” The issue here is how rooted into the orientations of actors do the principles, norms, rules, and procedures of the system become? Does the learning of them stick close to the surface and thus allow for swift changes? Or are they so embedded that traumatic circumstances are needed to induce change? In thinking about such questions it is provocative to recall how quickly predispositions toward former enemies in international wars can change relative to the inclinations toward adversaries in civil wars. Such a comparison suggests that habits in international systems may not be nearly as deep as structuralists assume; or at least they are not as deep-seated as is the case in domestic systems. An effort to extend understanding of the role of habits in world politics would, doubtless, lead to the literature on belief systems, cognitive balance, and the scattered works on how the “lessons of history” get selected and acquired. My first attempt to break into the problem can be found in “Breakpoints in History: Nuclear Weapons, Oil Embargoes, and Public Skills as Parametric Shifts.”

64. Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. Jr, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

65. For a conception of regimes corresponding to my own, See Puchala, Donald J. and Hopkins, Raymond F., “International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis,” special issue, International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), p. 247Google Scholar.

66. It may be more than nit-picking to note that in his work with Axelrod, Keohane departs from the intergovernmental conception and explicitly presumes that private actors are regime members by citing the activities of bankers and creditor committees in “the international lending regime” (p. 237). Keohane is not alone in his lack of precision on regime membership. The literature of the field is far from clear and consistent on the identity of regime members. Some observers confine membership to states; others allow for private members and still others waver on the distinction. Oran Young, for example, insists on a public membership even as he acknowledges the relevance of activity by private actors: “the members of international regimes are always sovereign states, though the parties carrying out the actions governed by international regimes are often private entities (for example, fishing companies, banks, or private airlines)” (Young, , “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” World Politics 32 [04 1980], p. 333)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the other hand, Ernst Haas suggests that one's conception of an “appropriate membership for a regime” depends on a choice between “centralization and decentralization” as the focus of concern and action (Haas, , “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics 32 [04 1980], p. 404)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

67. McClelland, Charles A. and Hoggard, Gary D., “Conflict Patterns in the Interactions among Nations,” in Rosenau, James N., ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, rev. ed. (New York: Free, 1969), p. 715Google Scholar.

68. Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” p. 227Google Scholar.

69. Rosenau, , “A Pre-Theory Revisited,” pp. 256–62Google Scholar.

70. Snidal, , “The Game THEORY of International Politics,” p. 56Google Scholar.