¹ For the texts of the ECSC, EEC, and Euratom Treaties, see Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Luxembourg: High Authority, n.d.)Google Scholar; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Brussels: Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common Market and Euratom, n.d.)Google Scholar; and Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) (Brussels: Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common Market and Euratom, n.d.)Google Scholar. The member states are France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.

² For the text of the ECSC–United Kingdom Agreement, see Publications Department of ECSC, Agreement Concerning the Relations between the European Coal and Steel Community and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Luxembourg, n.d.)Google Scholar (hereinafter cited as the ECSC–United Kingdom Agreement).

³ For the text of the Association Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the European Economic Community, see Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, February 18, 1963 (Vol. 6), pp. 293/63–358/63Google Scholar (hereinafter cited as the Greek Agreement). For the Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and the associated African and Malagasy states, see Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, June 11, 1964 (Vol. 7), pp. 1431/64–1471/64Google Scholar (hereinafter cited as the Convention of Yaoundé). For the text of the Association Agreement between Turkey and the European Economic Community, see Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, December 29, 1964 (Vol. 7), pp. 3685/64–3708/64Google Scholar (hereinafter cited as the Turkish Agreement).

It should be noted that the EEC Treaty itself provided in Part 4 for an association of the overseas dependencies of France, Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands with the Common Market. Some features of this association will be discussed later in connection with the EEC agreement with the African states.

⁴ Bulletin of the EEC, March 1964 (7th Year, No. 3), pp. 27–28Google Scholar, and June 1964 (7th Year, No. 6), pp. 10–11. The other states that have expressed an interest in association agreements have been Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, and Tunisia.

⁵ See Article 206 of the Euratom Treaty and Article 238 of the EEC Treaty.

⁶ This provision reflected the disappointment of the framers of the ECSC Treaty that the United Kingdom did not find it possible to join the Community as a member, and it intimated their hope that at least some other means could be found to establish close cooperation between the United Kingdom and the Community. For details, see William, Diebold Jr., The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation 1950–1959 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger [for the Council on Foreign Relations], 1959), pp. 48–60, 502–506Google Scholar; and Jean de, Soto, “Les relations internationales de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier,” Actes Officiels du Congrés International fur la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier (Milan: Centro Italiano di Studi Giuridici, 1958), Vol. 3, pp. 221–226.Google Scholar

⁷ According to Article 6 of the ECSC Treaty, the Community possesses an international legal personality and it has the capacity to act in international relationships insofar as “necessary to exercise its functions and to achieve its purposes.” For a comprehensive discussion of the treaty-making power of ECSC, see Hallier, H. J., “Die Vertragsschliessungsbefugnis der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl,” Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentlichcs Recht and Völkerrecht, 1957–1958 (Vol. 18, No. 3), pp. 428–447.Google Scholar

⁸ Article 228 of the EEC Treaty. The requirement of consultation must not be understood to mean that the Council is bound by the advice of the Parliament. The Council in fact did not consult the Parliament before concluding the Greek and the Turkish Agreements. However, in order to comply at least with the spirit of Article 238 a reservation was added to the Council representative's signature which declared that the Community would be obligated by either of the agreements only after “the procedures described by the EEC Treaty, particularly the consultation of the European Parliament, had been completed.” The Parliament strongly objected to this method of applying Article 238. See Europäischcs Parlament, Sitzungsdokumente 1961–1962, Document 61, September 18, 1961, pp. 4, 5Google Scholar; and Europäisches Parlament, Sitzungsdokumente 1963–1964, Document 94, November 23, 1963, p. 1Google Scholar. See also the resolution of the Parliament approving the Turkish Agreement in Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (hereinafter cited as Amtsblatt), December 12, 1963 (Vol. 6), pp. 2906/63–2908/63Google Scholar. In support of the Council's procedure, see Thomas, Oppermann, “Die Assoziierung Griechenlands mit der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft.” Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 1962 (Vol. 22, No. 3), pp. 498–502.Google Scholar

⁹ See Articles 210 and 211 of the EEC Treaty. For a discussion of the meaning of these two Articles and the problems connected with the international legal personality of the Community, see Pierre, Pescatore, “Les relations extérieures des Communautés Européennes, contribution à la doctrine de la personnalité des organisations internationales,” Recueil des Cours de l'Académic de Droit International, 1961 (Vol. 103), pp. 27–52.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Especially the financial aid undertakings. The breadth of the agreements will become evident later when their details are discussed. See also, Pescatore, Ibid., p. 145. The problem of who would be the proper contracting parties for the accord could also have been solved by submitting this question to the Court of Justice of the European Communities in accordance with Article 228(1). This procedure, however, was considered to be too time-consuming.

¹¹ In order to avoid confusion as to which parties contracting for the Community are to take certam actions or have certain rights under the respective Agreements, an interpretive declaration regarding the notion of “contracting parties” has been annexed to both accords (Annex 2, paragraph 5, of the Greek Agreement and the Annex to the Final Act of the Turkish Agreement).

¹² The African states involved are Burundi, Cameroun, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo (Brazzaville), the Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, and Upper Volta. For a brief account of the negotiations for this agreement, see van Benthem van den Bergh, G., “The New Convention of Association with African States,” Common Market Law Review, 09 1963 (Vol. 2, No. 3), pp. 162–165.Google Scholar

¹³ For details of this association see, apart from Articles 131–136 of the EEC Treaty, the Implementing Convention relating to the Association with the Community of the Overseas Countries and Territories which was signed on March 25, 1957, and which is annexed to the EEC Treaty.

¹⁴ This was indeed the method used for the continuation of the, association with the dependencies. See Amtsblatt, June 11, 1964 (Vol. 7), pp. 1472/64–1483/64Google Scholar. The substance of the Council's decision follows the pattern of the Convention of Yaoundé except for the institutional features which are omitted.

¹⁵ That Article 238 must be viewed as the legal basis of the Convention is also the conclusion reached in the report of the European Parliament's Committee for Cooperation with Developing Countries (Europäisches Parlament, Sitzungsdokumente 1962–1963, Document 77, October 10, 1962)Google Scholar. Both the Community as a legal person and the EEC member states are parties to the Convention.

Article 136 was a convenient handle to temporarily extend the commercial advantages to the African associates when the original association agreement expired at the end of five years. Every effort seems to have been made at that time to avoid the appearance that the association between the Community and the newly independent African states might be interrupted and that the rights and advantages granted the associated states in the 1958 agreement would be terminated. But while these rights and advantages have indeed continued in the Convention of Yaoundé, it is, as the preamble states, a “new Convention of Association” concluded “on the basis of complete equality” and differing in many respects from the original association. See van Benthem van den Bergh, , Common Market Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 163Google Scholar, and the report by Thorn, Gaston in Europäisches Parlament, Sitzungsdokumente 1963–1964, Document 65, 09 13, 1963, pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

¹⁶ It should be recalled that the basis for the association agreement with the United Kingdom was the general mandate for negotiations on coal and steel with third countries, particularly the United Kingdom, contained in section 14 of the now defunct ECSC Convention containing the Transitional Provisions.

¹⁷ Only European states may become members of any of the Communities (Article 98 of the ECSC Treaty, Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, and Article 205 of the Euratom Treaty).

¹⁸ For other possibilities, see the excellent report of the Political Committee presented by Willi Birkelbach in Europäisches Parlament, Sitzungsdokumente 1961–1962, Document 122, January 15, 1962, pp. 18–20.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 15, 16.

²⁰ Article 6 of the ECSC–United Kingdom Agreement. According to Article 14, the Agreement is to run for the duration of the ECSC Treaty which was concluded for a period of 50 years.

²¹ Article 6(2) of the EOSC–United Kingdom Agreement.

²² Article 6(3) of the ECSC–United Kingdom Agreement.

²³ For details, see the text of the accord published by the Service des publications de la Communauté Européenne (Luxembourg, n.d.). The accord was signed on the part of the Community not only by the High Authority but also by the ECSC member states. For the background of the accord, see Diebold, pp. 476, 477, 508–512. For the effects of the accord, see Lister, Louis, Europe's Coal and Steel Community (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1960), pp. 352–357.Google Scholar

²⁴ Article 7 of the ECSC–United Kingdom Agreement.

²⁵ European Community, January 1964 (No. 68), p. 8Google Scholar; and ECSC High Authority, 12è Rapport Général (Luxembourg, 03 1964), p. 50Google Scholar. See also, Amtsblatt, January 22, 1964 (Vol. 7), p. 99/64.Google Scholar

²⁶ European Community, November–December 1964 (No. 78), pp. 7, 18.Google Scholar

²⁷ Article 2(1) of both the Greek and Turkish Agreements.

²⁸ Articles 2(2) and 72 of the Greek Agreement and Articles 4(1) and 28 of the Turkish Agreement.

²⁹ The Association Agreement covers all trade between Greece and the Community except coal, coke, steel, iron ore, and scrap. See Articles 6 and 69 of the Greek Agreement.

³⁰ Articles 12, 15, and 18 and Annex 1 of the Greek Agreement.

³¹ Article 20(1–2) and Protocol 10 of the Greek Agreement.

³² For details, see Articles 22–31 and Protocol 6 of the Greek Agreement.

³³ See Article 3 of the Turkish Agreement and the Provisional and Financial Protocols attached to the Agreement which Contain the details for the preparatory stage.

³⁴ Article 8 of the Turkish Agreement and Article 1 of the Provisional Protocol. The Supplementary Protocol will then replace the Provisional and Financial Protocols.

³⁵ Articles 2(2), 5, and 10 of the Turkish Agreement. The customs union will cover all commodities except those covered by the ECSC Treaty (Article 26).

³⁶ Articles 32 and 33 of the Greek Agreement. Articles 34–43 and Annexes 2 and 3 provide the detailed regulations for the harmonization process.

³⁷ For details, see Articles 58–64 of the Greek Agreement. An interesting provision concerning the harmonization of the foreign-trade policies of the Community and Greece deals with the case of a third country applying to join the Community either as an associate or a full member. In such an event the Community and Greece are to consult each other in order to settle jointly the new relations between Greece and the future associate or member with full consideration of both Greek and EEC interests. This provision, which was applied when the agreement with Turkey was being negotiated, may cause difficulties should the Community want to conclude additional association agreements with other Mediterranean countries. Spain, whose economic structure and interests resemble those of Greece, is at present considering an association with the Community. However, an interpretive declaration in the Greek Agreement specifies that among the interests to be taken into consideration by the Community and Greece is the interest of EEC in permitting friendly third countries to join the Community as members or associates (see Article 64[3] and Annex 2 to the Final Act of the Greek Agreement).

³⁸ Articles 62 and 63 and Protocol 19 of the Greek Agreement.

³⁹ Articles 44–56 of the Greek Agreement provide the details for these arrangements.

⁴⁰ In this sense, see the report of Mr. Kreyssig in Europäisches Parlament, Sitzungsdokuenente 1961–1962, Document 60, September 18, 1961, p. 11Google Scholar; and Pesmazoglu, John S., Deputy Governor of the Bank of Greece, “The Meaning of the Athens Agreement,” Bulletin of the EEC, 09 1962 (5th Year, Nos. 9–10), pp. 7–32Google Scholar. For a different opinion, see Welter, Norbert, “Griechenland und die europäisch Integration,” Europa Archiv, 1961 (Vol. 16, No. 15), p. 424.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Articles 4(1) and II (1) of the Turkish Agreement.

⁴² Articles 17, 18, and 21 of the Turkish Agreement.

⁴³ Articles 12–16 of the Turkish Agreement.

⁴⁴ For additional details, see EEC Information Memo P-34/63 of September 1963.

⁴⁵ Article 1 of the Convention of Yaoundé.

⁴⁶ Articles 2(1) and 3(2) of the Convention. These two provisions closely resemble Article 133 (1–2) of the EEC Treaty.

⁴⁷ Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention.

⁴⁸ The Convention is in the process of being considered by the GATT Contracting Parties.

⁴⁹ Articles 5 and 6 and Protocol 2 of the Convention. In case of serious market disturbances, both the member states and the associated countries may take protective measures which include increased duties and quantitative restrictions (Article 13).

⁵⁰ Articles 2 and 3 and Protocol 1 of the Convention. For a list of the tropical products, see the Annex to the Convention and Amtsblatt, June 11, 1964 (Vol. 7) p. 1487/64Google Scholar. At the same time, the customs duties for these products were reduced for imports from third countries in order to make the new association more palatable to these countries. See Ibid., pp. 1485/64, 1486/64.

⁵¹ Articles 3(1) and 7 of the Convention.

⁵² For details, see Articles 11 and 12 of the Convention.

⁵³ For details, see Articles 15–28 and Protocol 5 of the Convention. See also van Benthem van den Bergh, , Common Market Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 171–173Google Scholar, who provides a concise account of the financial and technical aid provisions of the Convention.

⁵⁴ For details, see Articles 29–33 of the Convention. The most-favored-nation clause must also be applied with regard to the right of establishment.

⁵⁵ For details, see van Benthem van den Bergh, , Common Market Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 156–158, 171, 172.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Euratom has concluded several cooperation agreements with third countries, including the United States and Canada. These agreements are not association agreements because they do not provide for a special institutional structure.

⁵⁷ See in this respect the report of Mr. Duvieusart in Europäisches Parlament, Sitzungsdokumente 1961–1962, Document 60, September 18, 1961, p. 28Google Scholar; and the report of Mr. Birkelbach in Ibid., Document 122, January 15, 1962, p. 21.

⁵⁸ Articles 2(2–3) of the ECSC–United Kingdom Agreement.

⁵⁹ See Articles 6–9 of the ECSC–United Kingdom Agreement and pp. 228–230 above for details.

⁶⁰ Article 4(1) of the ECSC–United Kingdom Agreement.

⁶¹ A second, thus far inconsequential, feature in the institutional framework of the ECSC–United Kingdom association is the “special meeting” between the ECSC Council of Ministers and the United Kingdom government which may be called for deliberations on matters that fall within the specific competences of the Council of Ministers of the governments of member states. A “special meeting” may be requested by the governments of the ECSC member states, the ECSC High Authority, or the United Kingdom government. The institution of the “special meeting” seems to constitute a control on the High Authority most likely motivated by the fear that this organ might exceed its powers when participating in the work of the Association Council. See Article 10 of the ECSC–United Kingdom Agreement and de Soto, p. 234.

⁶² Article 65(3–4) of the Greek Agreement and Article 23 of the Turkish Agreement. Following the ratification of the Greek Agreement, procedures for arriving at a consensus of the Community's representatives had to be determined. The solution agreed upon was a unanimous vote of the EEC Council of Ministers after it had heard the EEC Commission, except in matters pertaining to the Community's commercial policy in which case the voting rules of Articles 110–116 of the EEC Treaty apply. This procedure may be changed at the end of the second stage of the transitional period of the Common Market. Action by EEC organs may also be required with regard to decisions and recommendations of the Association Council since the EEC Council of Ministers is the competent organ for their implementation. Again, a unanimous vote is required in that body after it has heard the EEC Commission. For details of the internal agreement procedure, see Amtsblatt, February 18, 1963 (Vol. 6), pp. 350/63–356/63.Google Scholar

⁶³ Article 66 of the Greek Agreement and Article 24 of the Turkish Agreement.

⁶⁴ Article 65(1) of the Greek Agreement and Article 22(1) of the Turkish Agreement.

⁶⁵ Article 70 of the Greek Agreement and Article 22(3) of the Turkish Agreement. This “gap-filling” provision resembles Article 235 of the EEC Treaty and Article 204 of the Euratom Treaty which bestow similar powers on the Council of Ministers.

⁶⁶ For details, see Articles 8–10, 17, 18, 20–22, 26–29, 31, and 34–40 of the Greek Agreement.

⁶⁷ For details, see Articles 44–50, 52–53, 56–58, 60–61, and 64 and Protocol 19 of the Greek Agreement.

⁶⁸ Article 8 of the Turkish Agreement. For other competences of the Council, see Articles 1, 4, and 6 of the Provisional Protocol attached to the Turkish Agreement.

⁶⁹ Article 71 of the Greek Agreement and Article 27 of the Turkish Agreement. During the preparatory period, however, the Turkish Agreement permits only contacts between the parliaments.

⁷⁰ See also the report by Mr. Duvieusart who holds that actual participation of Greek parliamentarians in the functions of the European Parliament is unthinkable (Europäisches Parlament, Sitzungsdokumente 1961–1962, Document 60, September 18, 1961, p. 30).Google Scholar

⁷¹ Article 66 of the Greek Agreement and Article 24 of the Turkish Agreement.

⁷² Article 67 of the Greek Agreement and Articles 8 and 25 of the Turkish Agreement. Arbitration is not available during the Turkish preparatory period.

⁷³ Articles 40 and 43 of the Convention of Yaoundé. For the provisions of the internal agreement of the Community, see Amtsblatt, June 11, 1964 (Vol. 7), pp. 1490/64–1492/64Google Scholar. These provisions are similar to those of the Greek Agreement but relax somewhat the rule of unanimity for the EEC Council of Ministers' vote when implementing the decisions rendered by the Association Council.

⁷⁴ Articles 40 and 42 of the Convention. The presidency alternates between the Community and one of the associated states.

⁷⁵ See, for example, Articles 2(5), 3(3), 5(2), 6(4), 12(3), 11, and 13(1, 2, and 4) of the Convention.

⁷⁶ For example, the Council may make certain decisions regarding the introduction of the right of establishment in the associated states, and it may institute “suitable measures” if the application of duties levied by an associated state on exports of its products to the member states leads to serious disturbances in the conditions of competition. See Articles 4(2), 29, and 34, and also 12(3) and 27 of the Convention. The Council does not have the “gap-filling” power of its Greek and Turkish counterparts.

⁷⁷ Article 44 of the Convention.

⁷⁸ Articles 45 and 47 of the Convention.

⁷⁹ Article 50 of the Convention.

⁸⁰ Article 51 of the Convention.

⁸¹ See Amtsblatt, July 22, 1961 (Vol. 4), pp. 942/61–943/61.Google Scholar

⁸² The Greek Agreement has 77 Articles and twenty Protocols, the Turkish Agreement 33 Articles and two very long Protocols, and the Convention of Yaoundé 66 Articles and seven Protocols.

⁸³ See above, pp. 228–230, 237–238.

⁸⁴ Pescatore holds that this is the characteristic which distinguishes an association agreement from a commercial accord since the latter is based on the principle of do ut des for the accomplishment of the parties' goals (Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International, Vol. 103, p. 141).

⁸⁵ See Werner, Ungerer, “Die Assoziierungspolitik der EWG,” Aussenpolitik, 10 1964 (Vol. 15, No. 10), pp. 685–687, 896–897.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ See Pescatore, , Recueil des Court de l'Académie de Droit International, vol. 103, p. 141.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ In this sense, see also Oppermann, , Zeitschrift für ausländisches öflentliches Recht und Völkerrechi, Vol. 22, No. 3, p. 503.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ ECSC High Authority, 12é Rapport Général, paragraph 58.

⁸⁹ Lister, p. 352.

⁹⁰ See Neae Zuercher Zeitung, July 2, 1964, p. 2.Google Scholar

⁹¹ See Welter, , Europa Archiv, Vol. 16, No. 15, pp. 421, 428.Google Scholar

⁹² It is doubtful whether any other country would be given a veto power over the common external tariff as was granted to Greece. See above, p. 231.

⁹³ It has been suggested that member states which carry the main burden of the economic and political consequences of a new association should be offered certain compensations by the Community. See Ungerer, , Aussenpolitik, Vol. 15, No. 10, pp. 696–697.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ At the conferences leading up to the conclusion of the Convention of Yaoundé it became obvious that the African states preferred the sheltered climate of the association to the open competition of the world market. See van Benthem van den Bergh, , Common Market Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 177.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ See Welter, Norbert, “Eurafrikanische Entwickelungspartnerschaft,” Europa Archiv, 03 25, 1962 (Vol. 17, No. 6), p. 202.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ See van Benthem van den Bergh, , Common Market Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 156.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1964 (Vol. 50, No. 1295), pp. 657–662.Google Scholar