¹ (l)Flexibility: formulae tied into indicators (such as population or GNP) which vary with time are preferable to an arbitrary assignment of voting weights reflecting today's situation only; (2) Absence of extreme skewness: three or four nations should not between them have more than 50 percent of the total votes; (3) Balance: the main voting blocs (West, Soviet, Afro-Asian) should have a good chance of winning on the issues which are crucial to them, and therefore have about equal voting weights. A study of bloc balances was done previously. See Newcombe, Hanna, Wert, James, and Newcombe, Alan G., “Comparison of Weighted Voting Formulas for the United Nations,” World Politics, Vol. 23, No. 3, (04 1971): 452–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar; (4) Future representation by population: it is desirable for the formula to extrapolate to pure representation by population in a hypothetical future in which all nations will be equally rich, i.e., have the same GNP per capita. (5) Additivity: total voting weight should be unaffected by partitions or fusion among countries; (6) Simplicity of mathematical form is preferable, other things being equal; (7) Accessibility of data for the indicators, for all countries; (8) Incentives: if possible, it would be good to “reward” nations with extra votes for “good” things, such as health and education, not “bad” things, such as military expenditures, energy consumption, or population growth. However, the “good” and “bad” things often grow together, as economic development proceeds; (9) Voting success: in another view of “balance,” the main blocs should have actually won a reasonable number of votes in the past, on the assumption that a weighted voting formula had been in operation. (Hence the title “Alternative Pasts.”)

² This assumption is not, strictly speaking, justified. Nations might very well vote differently if a particular weighted voting formulae were in effect, as preliminary negotiations produced various ad hoc coalitions. It is also probably true that different issues might come up for roll call voting in such a radically reconstituted Assembly. However, such changes are not amenable to study. The simple assumption of “no change” is the only feasible one to make if we are to study “alternative pasts” at all.

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