‘If one seriously wanted to prepare the tribes for assimilation with France instead of reconstituting the government of Arabs by Arabs, would it not be wise to disorganize them, to multiply the little sheikhs and to replace the big leaders with French officers…?’ This candid question was asked by a French colon in 1847 shortly before the surrender of ‘Abd al-Qadir Ibn Mahi ad-Din, the most formidable Arab leader opposing the French establishment in Algeria. The question reflects the increasing impatience, self-confidence, and, one is forced to add, arrogance of the French colonialists. After many years of struggling against a largely indifferent French Chamber the colons had finally become a sizable and vociferous minority which could command a hearing in the halls of the Monarchie du Juillet.

The most important and undoubtedly the most fateful period in Ottoman history is the Young Turk or Union and Progress era in 1908–18. The final disintegration of the Ottoman empire, the rise of independent states in the Middle East, the intensification of conflicts over Macedonia, the full emergence of Turkish and Arab nationalisms, the start of the Muslim anti-imperialist mobilization through struggle in Libya in 1911, and other events of vital importance in the social and political history of the area occurred during the Young Turk era. It was a historical watershed which marked simultaneously the end of an imperial form of political organization in the Middle East and the beginning of a new political existence in the form of national states. The Young Turks affected profoundly the course of history among the peoples of the Middle East and the Balkans. Moreover the Young Turks were the first group in the Ottoman state to approach the social, political, and cultural transformation of their society in the spirit of modern politics. Yet the Young Turks remain the least studied and understood and the most distortedly portrayed power group in the history of the Balkans and the Middle East. Most of the existing works on the Young Turks, consisting mainly of memoirs, were written by their authors to credit themselves with political roles and achievements which did not always correspond to reality.

Students of nineteenth-century Ottoman political history have concentrated on the central provinces of the Empire. Students of Arab political history of the same period have concentrated on anti-Ottoman nationalism centered in Cairo and Beirut. Relatively little work has yet been done to illuminate the nature of Ottoman government in the Arab provinces. The picture that is presented by Western travelers, Arab nationalists reminiscing about their youth, and diplomatic reports has been incomplete, biased against the Imperial government, and sometimes factually inaccurate.

In Part I of this article I noted that the farming out of capital resources to an entrepreneur for a share of the profits, which has always played a very important role in the Middle Eastern economy, never won unqualified approval by the jurists of medieval Islam; for on the one hand farming out on shares was held to be closely allied to the sharika (an institution of broad scope corresponding to the partnership) yet on the other it did not meet all the criteria by which a sharika was accounted valid by the sharî'a. The requirement it did not meet, the jurists felt, was full contractual equality between the parties — in this case the owner of the resources and his working partner or entrepreneur. Owing to the pressure of necessity, farming out on shares was validated, but on the rather shaky grounds of custom and precedent.

Diglossia has been the subject of attention of many linguists and philologists dealing with Arabic for many decades. The term itself was coined by W. Marçais (1930) and was brought to the attention of general linguists and ethnologists (socio-linguists in particular) by Ferguson in 1959. Diglossia is also a well-known phenomenon in Modern Greek, Swiss German, and Haitian Creole. Fishman (1967) and Valdman (1968) deal with it in terms of methodology and theory. Kaye (1970, 1972a) deals with it in the light of modern linguistic theory and is restricted (not entirely though) to a discussion of Arabic. The monograph under review is an attempt to survey the diglossia situation using Classical Arabic and colloquial Iraqi (almost entirely Baghdadi) data. Much of the work can already be found in Altoma (1957, 1966).