The aim of the present essay is to explore some of the relations between the socioeconomic and political transformation which occurred in Syria during the eighteenth century and the development of a new view of the world and the self as it came to be expressed in the writings of several Arab historians at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Of particular interest in this context is the question of whether and when a clear departure from traditional patterns of society and thought can be discerned.

During the 1960–1972 period Egypt was committed to a socialist, centrally planned model of economic development. Economic growth goals were expounded in optimistic consecutive five-year plans. When it became apparent that these goals would not be achieved, the second five-year plan was expanded to seven years (1965–1972). private investment had been effectively discouraged after the nationalization of privately owned industry during 1960–1963. In order to finance ambitious development plans, Egypt borrowed heavily during 1960–1972. Approximately $2.3 billion was borrowed mainly from the U.S.S.R., the European Economic Community, and the United States. The plans' large capital development projects were undertaken with dismal results. A major factor causing these failures was the low absorptive capacity of Egypt during that time. This severely restricted the amount of capital that could be put to constructive use in any given time period and prevented Egypt from realizing her goal of doubling national income in ten years (1960–1970).

The myopia of nations regarding the availability of petroleum in unlimited amounts led to an irrepressible conflict between oil-producing and oil-consuming nations. This conflict, culminating with the energy crisis of 1973, created both benefits and costs for all parties dealing in oil. In the future, OPEC and the consuming nations will have to resolve the conflicts between costs and benefits resulting from any strategy chosen concerning the future price and quantity of oil.

The change from an agriculturally based economy to one based primarily on industrial and services sectors requires a complex transformation in technology of productions, physical and human capital structure, social and political institutions, and cultural attitudes. Although broad similarities exist, no two countries have traced an identical path. One major economic and ideological concern in such a transformation is the fate of private property in general and land ownership in particular. Furthermore, the degree of redistribution of political power and material wealth of existing or emerging groups constitutes an important characteristic of the transformation itself. Thus, an important and interesting link in the chain of probable events is the occurrence or non-occurrence of land reform. The nature and degree of land reform, if it happens, or the variety of its substitutes, if it does not, provide vital clues to the specificity of the political economy of development.

The conventional wisdom regarding the cultivation of cash crops (such as opium) is based on the assumption that raising a cash crop implies a certain degree of development of the productive forces of the economy. Having reached that degree, it is argued, the economy is better able to release portions of its land and labour from the production of basic necessities, i.e., food crops, and allocate them to the production of crops which are not immediately and directly consumed, but rather are produced to be exchanged in the market. This approach presupposes a relatively well-developed market economy and the existence of a relatively efficient transport system, both being, among other preconditions, essential for the emergence and development of an economy based on exchange. The main objective of this paper is to show that this model, despite being applicable to the Western European economies at an earlier stage of their industrialization, does not necessarily explain the situation in Iran during 1850–1906 (the period under review). We further argue that the production of opium or other cash crops had little to do with the development of Iranian agriculture or the development of the productive forces in the economy as a whole.

Over recent years, scholars and politicians have grown to recognize the increasing obsolescence of models and patterns applicable to the development crisis. This crisis affects both ‘liberal’ capitalist systems and state-controlled ‘socialist’ systems, and can be analyzed on two levels. On the theoretical level, the development crisis is one aspect of the crisis of paradigms in social sciences, especially in economics. New ways of thinking originate with the denial of all those dogmatic approaches which have flourished in the realm of economic development for the last three decades. However, we cannot be satisfied with a predominantly empirical investigation devoid of theoretically explicit background. On the empirical level, some sweeping situations emerge; development processes, either unpredicted by, or contradictory to theoretical forecasts have arisen.