¹ “Petroleum Politics: Volatile Arab Weapon,” The Middle East, Congressional Quarterly, second edition (Washington D. C.: October 1975), p. 28.Google Scholar

² The Shah on Oil, (Teheran, Iran: Focus Publications, April 1977), p. 4.Google Scholar

³ See for example, Bernard, A., “World Oil and Cold Reality,” Harvard Business Review, 58 (11/12 1980), pp. 91–101;Google ScholarSolomon, S., “What the Oil Shock is Doing to the World,” Fortune, 102 (12 29, 1980), pp. 9–10;Google ScholarOrtiz, R. G., “Facing up to an Energy Crisis: An OPEC View,” Public Utilities Fortnightly, 106 (10 9, 1980), pp. 66–69;Google ScholarLindsay, F. A., “Plan for the Next Energy Emergency,” Harvard Business Review, 152 (09/10 1981), pp. 152–154+;Google ScholarDowns, J. R., “Canada's Trade with OPEC Members: Potentials to the 1980's,” The Canadian Business Review (Winter 1976), p. 45;Google ScholarKaikati, Jack G., “Doing Business in Iran: The Fastest Growing Import Market Between Europe and Japan,” Atlanta Economic Review (09–10 1976), pp. 15–20Google Scholar; Turner, Louis and Bedore, James, “Saudi and Iranian Petrochemicals and Oil Refining: Trade Warfare in the 1980's?” International Affairs, 53, 4, (10 1977), pp. 572–577;CrossRefGoogle ScholarFederal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Five Percent Solution (01 7, 1977), p. 1;Google ScholarWarsh, David, “The Great Hamburger Paradox,” Forbes, 120 (09 15, 1977), p.212;Google Scholar“Oil and the Real Crunch,” Journal of Business Administration (Fall 1975), pp. 175–180;Google ScholarLandberg, Martin, “Black Gold and the Reemergence of the Dollar Standard,” The Review of Radical Political Economics (Spring 1975), pp. 69–78;CrossRefGoogle ScholarFarmer, Richard N., “Profiles of the Future: Long-Term Future of the Arab Oil States,” Business Horizons, 20 (02 1977), p. 76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ To illustrate this point, it should be noted that in 1976, OPEC's accumulated surplus funds amounted to approximately $95 billion. In an instant and without extensive prior planning, OPEC members found themselves planning under crisis circumstances. Result was possible costs that could have been avoided with more objective-oriented and long-term insightful planning. For a report on how some of the surplus has been used, see Reed, Stanley, “Sheik Investing,” Barron's (09 13, 1982), pp. 8–9, 34–35.Google Scholar

⁵ See for example, Veriager, P. K. Jr, “Determinants of Official OPEC Crude Prices,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 64 (05 1982), pp. 177–83;Google ScholarWillenborg, John F. and Pitts, Robert E., “Gasoline Prices: Their Effect on Consumer Behavior and Attitudes,” Journal of Marketing, 41, 1 (01 1977), pp. 24–31;CrossRefGoogle ScholarKormen, Joseph M. and Torman, Robert J., “Psychophysics of Prices,” Journal of Marketing Research, 7 (02 1970), pp. 27–35;Google ScholarSabin, Sharon, “With Gasoline Higher, Motorists Buy Less, Surprising Experts,” The Wall Street Journal, 08 1, 1974, pp. 1 and 16;Google Scholar“Reassessing the Impact of Gasoline Prices,” Business Week (07 27, 1974), pp. 58–59;Google Scholar“How Willing to Pare,” Time (03 7 1977), p. 63.Google Scholar