The success or failure of land reform programs in the past has been, in general, evaluated on the basis of whether agricultural output increases or decreases following their adoption and the implementation of their principal provisions. Yet this approach ignores other factors, such as the effect of prices on output, making it likely that the influence of land reform is under- or over-estimated. In this paper, we suggest that it is possible to isolate the effect of price on output from those of reform programs by using the Nerlove supply model. By applying this method to periods before and after the initiation of such programs, we can identify any change in the market responsiveness of the affected cultivators. In testing this approach, the output of major crops in Egypt, Syria and Iraq—countries which have seen major land reform efforts in the post-war era—was analyzed. Post-reform responsiveness was compared with that of earlier periods and with that of cultivators in two neighboring countries—Jordan and Lebanon—which underwent little reform.

Anthropological interest in the concept of “class” and in the constellation of related concepts such as class consciousness and class conflict has increased in recent years as part of the upsurge of interest in ideas drawn from the Marxist tradition to analyze and interpret societies that anthropologists have conventionally been interested in. Yet much of this research and thinking has focused on the relevance of the different modes of production for an understanding of cultural history or, more recently, on analyses derived from dependency theory suggesting a global application of the notions of class and class conflict. Both these approaches neglect the usefulness of notions of class derived from the Marxist tradition for providing frameworks for the gathering of anthropological field data or for its analysis. It is true that work in cultural ecology and economic anthropology has frequently had a materialist bias, but it has rarely gone beyond an emphasis on the links of causality running from material factors to the superstructure to a test of the concepts of the Marxist tradition as a model increasing our understanding of the ebb and flow of human life. Even rarer has been the use of anthropological field data to evaluate and refine the concepts themselves.

In a recent book Michael Hudson referred to Lebanon as the “Precarious Republic.” The Lebanese Republic was said to be precarious because its citizens tended to identify more strongly with the ideologies of their various sects than with the state, because of the gulf separating the rich from the poor, and because of the growing restlessness of the latter. It was also said to be precarious because of growing disaffection of most segments of Lebanese society with most areas of government performance.

The term “secularization” is used to qualify that manner of change which occurred in the Islamic system of civil law from 1451 to 1926. It refers to the processes that caused gradual revision and/or change in Islamic Ottoman and Turkish civil law and connotes a departure from the orthodox tenets prescribed by Islamic law. This departure is a process that may create gradual or abrupt change. Also that which in retrospect is classified as a change may not at the outset be classified as such. Specifically, this change may begin in the form of supplementation and continue in this manner without the process taking the form of major change. On the other hand there may be total change within the structure undergoing these experiences. This structure, which is the subject of discussion, is the Islamic Ottoman and Turkish civil law. The secularization process in this case represents: (1) supplementation, (2) reform (Tanzimat and the Mecelle), (3) change (abrogation of the capitulatory system), (4) complete secular change in civil law (adoption of the Swiss Civil Code).

In the summer of 1925, a revolt erupted in the French mandated territories of Syria and Lebanon and rapidly spread throughout the area. The French army of the Levant seemed powerless to halt it. By autumn, no part of Syria or Lebanon was secure against sudden disruption of life and property. Stories of French incompetence, impotence, and arrogance were widely circulated in the Syrian and European press. The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, in a rare exercise of its limited powers, refused to accept the French report for 1925, which covered only the comparatively calm period preceding the revolt, and demanded instead a full account of the disturbances, as well as the restoration of peace in the mandate. In October, when rebels infiltrated Damascus, the French military administration took a drastic step to end the revolt. Without warning, General Sarrail, the high commissioner, ordered the ancient city bombarded continuously for nearly twenty-four hours. When the smoke lifted, much of Damascus was in ruins; the reported loss of life and property appalled world opinion and galvanized Arab dissidents. A torrent of violent and emotional criticism was unleashed. In some quarters it was even hinted that the League of Nations would remove the mandate from French control. Yet less than a year later, the revolt had been quashed and France's hold on the mandate was so secured internationally that it survived into World War II.