The article examines how the academic genre called the ‘anthropology of law’ or ‘legal anthropology’ developed under the disciplinary constraints of both the social and legal sciences. It first discusses its historical development and different trajectories and engages in a comparative analysis of similarities and differences between anthropologists, lawyers and sociologists of law. Finally, by looking at the ways in which cognitive and normative categories such as ‘legal anthropology’ are reproduced and changed through time, the article in itself is a legal anthropological exercise. The author concludes that there are hardly any identity markers left that would demarcate legal anthropology in a mutually exclusive way from other (sub)disciplines. The distinctiveness of legal anthropology rather lies in an accumulation of features, which make (legal) anthropology what it is, even if many features may be shared with other disciplines.

This essay argues against the two pillars of current research on law and globalisation, from the perspective of legal theory and political philosophy: first, the distinction between ‘well-ordered’ and ‘not so well-ordered’ societies; second, the sociological model of the subject as pacified, fearful and isolated (to sum up, in harmony). It is argued that mainstream legal theory and political philosophy merely reflects the actual rules of the game of competition, dispute and conflict. In contrast, this essay takes sides with the anthropological and philosophical tradition that conceives the subject as antagonistic and in state of lack, profoundly concerned with the other, whom she imitates and whose standpoint she must be able to share if she is to make sense of the world. Furthermore, it is argued that transitivity or imitation lies at the very origin of conflict and dispute; lack and antagonism remain thus at the core of society, in spite of the surface appearance of harmony that characterises post-modern societies. Because of this, any general theory of law and society that wishes to be relevant at the time of globalisation must make the experience of antagonism and violence, motivated by imitation and envy, and its containment, its object of study. To do this, it must abandon the dualist conception of subjects and societies expressed in the distinction between ‘well-ordered’ (more violent) and ‘not-so-well-ordered’ (less violent) societies that has informed its investigation to this day, in order to declare in the most general terms a critique of violence from the standpoint of the victim, as of a piece with its demand for global social and political justice.

Formality and informality in housing is a continuum, rather than an either/or proposition, with many examples along the continuum. This paper focuses on three examples of housing solutions – Barbados tenantries, Mexican ejidos and Saint Lucia family land – which are situated at the fulcrum of the continuum, at the point where it tips from formality to informality, and attempts to unravel their formal and informal elements. While the starting hypothesis was that each is informal from a public law point of view but formal from a private law one, closer examination suggests that their private law aspects are more nuanced than first appeared.

Personal Action Plans (PAPs) have been used to encourage client self-management within healthcare services, and are a novel innovation within legal services. This paper examines the use of PAPs by publicly funded family lawyers in England and Wales. It was intended that PAPs were written collaboratively between lawyers and clients in order to assist clients to clarify and resolve issues independently, and aid referrals to other service providers. Whereas self-management initiatives work best when service providers take a client-aligned approach, our research demonstrates that the PAPs were used as a means of managing clients’ expectations. We conclude by suggesting that while PAPs and other forms of self-management tools may work well in healthcare, they have limited potential in the provision of legal services for family law clients.

Issues of what personal autonomy and identity means are investigated in the context of the European Court of Human Rights’ development of Article 8’s right to respect one’s private life into a right to personal autonomy, identity and integrity with particular reference to French anonymous birthing as explored by that court in Odièvre v France and feminist literature on mothering and autonomy. Although much critiqued by feminists, personal autonomy has been reconceptualised to mean something of worth to women. Yet, this version of autonomy can diverge into two directions in terms of individual identity as evidenced in Odièvre and in feminist literature: self-determination or self-realisation/authenticity. Conclusions are reached that making autonomy dependent on claims to ‘authenticity’ restricts personal freedom and thus ultimately identity.