In this paper, I assert that the prohibition on the death penalty brings with it an obligation on abolitionist States to refrain from assisting the use of the death penalty in retentionist States. By considering the law on complicity and State responsibility, the obligation to protect under international human rights law, and the practice of States, I argue that although there are jurisdictional issues and although the death penalty is not prohibited under general international law, an obligation to refrain from being complicit in the death penalty is developing in international law.

Is legal transplant possible? The stark bipolarity of a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer attracted by such a question is much less interesting and revealing than the question: what shapes the life of legal transplants? The answer to the latter question is contingent on a wide range of variables triggered by the particular transplant; the result can occupy any point along the spectrum from faithful replication to outright rejection. This case study of the transplant of the English doctrine of undue influence into Singaporean law asks why the Singaporean courts have applied the doctrine in family guarantee cases to such divergent effect, when they profess to apply the same law. The answer owes less to grand theories than to a careful examination of the nature of the transplanted law and the relationship between the formal and informal legal orders of the originating and the recipient society raised by the particular transplant.

Over a decade ago, an important debate began concerning the proper role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in an international legal universe characterized by a large and rapidly increasing number of specialized courts and tribunals. What functions can and should the Court perform in response to the fragmentation of international law, and the proliferation of international tribunals? Initial proposals, especially those emerging in the late 1990s, were hierarchical and centralist in their orientation, and have justifiably fallen out of favour. This article uses the current international legal disputes about Australia's plain packaging tobacco legislation as the basis for an exploration of the possibilities for an alternative, non-centralist vision for the ICJ, which is sensitive both to the institutional limits of the international judiciary, and to the benefits of a fundamentally pluralist international legal order.

This article seeks to explore the way in which the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) has interpreted and applied the principle of democracy. It examines first the democratization process upon which the EU has embarked since the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht and how that transformation was a positive reaction to those voices arguing that the EU suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’. Next, it is argued that the CJEU has understood the principle of democracy in a way which is respectful of the two sources of democratic legitimacy at EU level, namely the Member States and the peoples of Europe. Accordingly, that understanding of the principle of democracy is illustrated by some relevant examples taken from the case law of the CJEU and the European General Court (‘EGC’). Those examples show that the CJEU has strived to protect the prerogatives of the European Parliament, the only political institution of the EU whose members have, since 1979, been elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. Yet, they also show that the principle of democracy is not limited to protecting parliamentary prerogatives. That principle, like all EU constitutional principles, pervades the whole of EU law and, as such, must be read in light of societal changes. As democracy within the EU is not limited to the participation by the European Parliament in the legislative process but also encompasses other forms of governance, in particular rule-making by administrative agencies and the achievement of consensus by social partners, it is for the EU judiciary to make sure that those other forms of governance remain as democratic as possible. This can be achieved, inter alia, by making sure that they enjoy sufficient representation or are subject to parliamentary control. Furthermore, the CJEU and the EGC also take into account new mechanisms which seek to strengthen the principle of democracy, such as the principle of transparency. In so doing, they aim to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU by providing sufficient means for EU citizens to hold their representatives accountable. Finally, it is contended that the principle of democracy, as interpreted by the CJEU, draws inspiration from national democracies. In so doing, the CJEU strives to place national and supranational democracies in a mutually reinforcing relationship.

A burgeoning international interest in Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) as a means of mitigating the effects of climate change has raised a number of novel legal issues, one of which concerns ownership of the underground sites in which captured carbon dioxide can be stored. This paper considers the extent of a surface landowner's rights above and below land and explores the treatment of underground space within the context of CCS in relation to differing jurisdictions. Particular attention is paid to legal principles applied in the United Kingdom and the United States, and consideration is also given to relevant legislation in Australia and Canada.

The debate on the recognition of Indigenous Australians in the Australian Constitution is more about how, than whether, this should occur. The two main proposals involve the use of a preamble. One proposes symbolic recognition in a new constitutional preamble with a clause prohibiting use of the preamble in constitutional interpretation. The other would give Parliament power to make laws with respect to Indigenous Australians, but qualify it in a preamble so that it could only be exercised for their ‘advancement’. This article draws on comparative experience of the use of preambles in other common law countries to challenge the assumptions underlying each proposal.

Why have attempts to bring development aspirations to bear on international law over a period of 50 years come to far less than any reasonable person would hope? The early claims for a New International Economic Order and permanent sovereignty by developing countries over their natural resources, efforts to delineate a body of international development law, followed by the affirmation of a human right to development, were all attempts to have economic justice reflected in international law. Figures on world poverty and inequality suggest that international law accommodated no such restructuring. This article explores why it is international law has failed the poor of the world, and what interests it has served in their stead.

This article examines whether there are any limitations on constitutional amendment powers that are external to the constitutional system and above it—‘supra-constitutional’ limits. It considers the theory and practice of the relationship between natural law, international law or other supranational law, and domestic constitutional law in a comparative prism. After considering the alleged supremacy of supranational law over constitutional amendments, the author explores the problem of the relationship between the different legal orders in the external/internal juridical spheres, and the important potential and actual role of national courts in ‘domesticating’ supranational law and enforcing its supremacy. It is claimed that despite the growing influence of supranational law, state practice demonstrates that constitutional law is still generally superior to international law, and even when the normative hierarchical superiority of supranational law is recognized within the domestic legal order, this supremacy derives not from supranational law as a separate legal order, but rather from the constitution itself. Therefore, it is claimed that existing practice regarding arguments of ‘supra-constitutional’ limitations are better described by explicit or implicit limitations within the constitution itself, through which supranational standards can be infused to serve as valid limitations on constitutional amendment powers.

The article analyses the trends in continental shelf boundary agreements that extend beyond 200 nautical miles. The focus is on three issues: first, the delimitation method; second, whether States have acted on the basis that they have to delineate the limits between the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and the international seabed area before they engage in a boundary delimitation with neighbouring states; and third, how the end point of the boundary line has been defined. The goal of the analysis is to find out whether any rule of customary law has emerged which seems not to be the case.

It is trite to observe that the past three decades have seen an ‘explosion’ in comparative law. Equally well-worn territory is the fact that constitutional law has been a particular beneficiary of the comparative trend, despite the fact that for much of the twentieth century comparative lawyers tended to avoid public law topics. However, one field of law that has been conspicuously absent from the boom in comparison, at least outside of Europe, is administrative law. This article analyses why the use of comparison has been so vastly different between the two areas of public law. It then surveys some recent developments in administrative law and points to a number of aspects of the field that would benefit from the wider use of comparative methods across the world.

While the rights of domestic workers are expanding in international law, including through the adoption of the ILO Domestic Workers Convention in 2011, migrant domestic workers remain particularly vulnerable to employment-related abuse and exploitation. This article explores the intersection of the employment law and migration law regimes applicable to migrant domestic workers in the United Kingdom, France and Ireland. The article suggests that the precarious immigration status of many migrant domestic workers renders employment protections, such as they exist in each jurisdiction, largely illusory in practice for this group of workers. The labour standards contained in the Domestic Workers Convention, together with the recommendations of the UN Committee on Migrant Workers on the features of an appropriate immigration regime for migrant domestic workers, are identified as providing an alternative normative model for national regulatory frameworks.

Through the joint ‘North Seas Countries Offshore Grid Initiative’ the states bordering the North Seas are establishing shared large-scale offshore electricity infrastructure in order to exploit their offshore wind energy resources. The article argues that this international governance of oceans space comes about legally because international law, European law and national law each fulfil a specific function. The climate regime provides the normative impetus, the law of the sea allocates competences, and European law contains principles of cooperation, which are then implemented through coordinated national law. International law, European law and national law thus become functionally integrated. This analysis has significance beyond shared offshore electricity infrastructure. It illustrates the way in which the functional integration of international law, European law and national law is emerging as a distinct legal institution in its own right, separate and distinct from the various legal orders themselves.

Neither in England, nor in Germany, nor in all Canadian provinces, does the law provide specific rules for the redistribution of property for unmarried cohabitants after the breakdown of their relationship. Instead, courts apply the law of trusts, contract and unjust enrichment with an eye to the characteristics of intimate relationships, as, for example, in decisions like the English Jones v Kernott ([2011] UKSC 53) and the Canadian Kerr v Baranow (2011 SCC 10). This article compares English, Canadian, and German case law and evaluates it both from a doctrinal perspective and as a part of a general approach towards cohabitation. The article concludes with an appeal for legislative action that strikes the right balance between party autonomy and protection of the weaker party.

This article scrutinizes the last ten years of the academic debate on EU citizenship law taking nine fundamental disagreements among scholars as starting points. It explores EU citizenship's relationship with three groups of issues of fundamental importance, including the place of this concept within the fabric of EU law, the influence of this concept on the essence of the Union as a system of multi-level governance, and its impact on the lives of ordinary Europeans. A large number of key works which influenced the Court and the legislator in the recent years is assessed to outline the likely direction of future research, as well as EU citizenship's future development. Although the literature on the subject is overwhelmingly rich and diverse, this article aspires to provide a representative sample of issues of interest for the framing of the concept at issue from a supranational perspective, necessarily leaving national literatures aside.

The WTO Agreement on Agriculture was designed to maximize trade flows at a time of surplus agricultural production. It required Members to open markets and to reduce domestic and export subsidies. Proposals for reform in the Doha Round negotiations largely adopt the same pattern. Yet, as surplus is replaced by shortage, Members are increasingly concerned about food security and the impact of agriculture on climate change. And contemporary agricultural policies crystallize around ‘sustainable intensification’, where domestic production is promoted, but not at the expense of future production. This article suggests that, although both the Agreement on Agriculture and the Doha Round proposals do provide some scope for measures to address this new policy paradigm, there are instances where they may work actively against it.

In both the EU and the WTO there are currently pending cases on the legality of EU Regulation 1007/2009 on trade in seal products and its Implementing Regulation 737/2010. While seals seem to be very attractive to the public so that raising arguments against these EU measures are not popular, the Regulations do raise concerns about competences, subsidiarity and proportionality which are relevant for compliance with EU primary law. They also raise concerns about possible protectionism, the use of public morals, coherence and necessity with regard to compatibility with WTO law. This paper seeks to examine all these issues.

The legal framework pertaining to the use of private armed guards protecting merchant ships from Somalia-based piracy is complex, sometimes ambiguous, and currently in a state of flux. Against the background that commercial shipping increasingly relies on Private Maritime Security Companies and that various regulatory projects on the subject matter are underway, this article sketches out what domestic and international rules govern the use of force and firearms by private armed guards on board merchant ships today. It concludes that at this juncture an effort to coordinate this legal framework is necessary, both regarding the interpretation of existing rules and the creation of new norms.

This article seeks to consider the EU's new approach to arbitration as set out in Recital 12 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). The article first considers the Court of Justice of the European Union's West Tankers decision and the foremost English authority applying that case (The Wadi Sudr) in order to provide some background to the problem which gave rise to Recital 12. Following this, the article goes on to consider whether Recital 12 does in fact act as a solution to the problem created by the West Tankers decision.

This article examines UNCITRAL's draft Rules for Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) and argues that in low-value e-commerce cross-border transactions, the most effective consumer protection policy cannot be based on national laws and domestic courts, but on effective and monitored ODR processes with swift out-of-court enforceable decisions. The draft Rules propose a tiered procedure that culminates in arbitration. Yet, this procedure neither ensures out-of-court enforcement, nor does it guarantee compliance with EU consumer mandatory law. Accordingly, this article argues that the draft Rules may be inconsistent with the European approach to consumer protection.

In 2010, China's Legislature adopted a reconstructed new private international law which makes habitual residence the principal connecting factor of lex personalis. Prior to the new law, lex personalis had followed a mixed model that included the law of domicile, the law of nationality, the law of the country where a Chinese person resides, and the law of the place of an act. The reconstruction of lex personalis improves China's opportunities for accession to international conventions and for the adoption of common international measures to better protect the interests of Chinese citizens, especially children. However, China's legislature and its courts still have much to do in order to decrease and eliminate many conflicts among the previous and current provisions regarding lex personalis. Among other things, criteria need to be established for application in defining, judging and establishing habitual residence, especially with regard to appreciable period of time and settled intention.