This Keynote speech examines the implications of the multiplying of judicial institutions and the deepening of international law. Overlapping jurisdiction issues already exist among international courts and tribunals. This raises the question of ‘Whose view prevails?’ But the deepening of international law also requires any given court to ask itself, ‘Which of the many norms now developed are applicable?’ Alternative plausible applicable norms could lead to different solutions. It is ever more apparent that that law is more than ‘bright rules’ that simply need to be applied. This speech discusses potential solutions that have been proposed, such as instituting a judicial hierarchy, using certain provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and invoking a hierarchy of norms. It closes with a call for international judges to regard the multiplication of institutions and applicable norms as an opportunity rather than a problem, to read each other's judgments, respect each other's work and try to preserve unity unless context dictates otherwise.

European farm policy has undergone radical change in recent years, culminating in the Agenda 2000 reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy agreed in 1999 and then their Mid-Term Review in 2003. In particular, subsidy payments have been substantially ‘decoupled’ from production and switched decisively towards providing income support for farmers under a new ‘single farm payment’ scheme. These reforms have been predicated upon the need to win acceptance for Community farm subsidies in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations. This article examines the new law of the Common Agricultural Policy against the background of the domestic support reduction commitments contained in the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. It questions the extent to which the single farm payment scheme fulfils the requirements for ‘green box’ exemption from such commitments. Options for the re-negotiation of the Agreement on Agriculture are discussed, including measures to improve the justiciability of its terms and to exclude discriminatory and trade-distorting domestic support. The article also considers the implications of the recent WTO Appellate Body Decisions in United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton and European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar. It concludes that the Community will have difficulty gaining acceptance for its reforms among WTO Members. Whatever the legitimacy of its subsidy regime within the framework of the current Agreement on Agriculture, the emergence of a strong negotiating position among developing countries, posited on opposition to the volume of farm support maintained by the Community and United States, may present even greater obstacles to the conclusion of a new Agreement on Agriculture in the Doha Round.

Since 1994, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia have adopted new choice of law rules for cross-border torts that, in different ways, centre on the application of the law of the place where the tort occurred (the lex loci delicti). All three countries abandoned some species of the rule in Phillips v Eyre, which required some reference to the law of the forum (the lex fori) as well as the lex loci delicti. However, predictions were made that, where possible, courts in these countries would continue to show a strong inclination to apply the lex fori in cross-border tort cases—and would use a range of homing devices to do so. A comprehensive survey and analysis of the cases that have been decided under the Australian, British and Canadian lex loci delicti regimes suggests that courts in these countries do betray a homing instinct, but one that has actually been tightly restrained by appeal courts. Where application of the lex fori was formally allowed by use of a ‘flexible exception’ in Canada and the United Kingdom, this has been contained by courts of first appeal. Indeed, only the continuing characterization of the assessment of damages as a procedural question in Canada and the United Kingdom, seems to remain as a significant homing device for courts in these countries.

Fifty years after the foundation of the European Communities, the single market for insurances has not yet become a reality. Despite the harmonization of insurance supervision law, insurance companies still essentially refrain from cross-border activity when it comes to small commercial and consumer risks. Since this finding is usually attributed to the lack of common rules on insurance contracts, this article sets out to lay the foundation for the harmonization of the corresponding national laws. By providing a comparative analysis of two of the most pervasive issues in consumer insurance contract law, the article proves that common law and civil law are not as far apart as commonly assumed. It thus refutes the widely held belief that the insurance contract laws of common law and civil law countries are too different to be harmonized.

Private international law deals with problems that arise when transactions or claims involve a foreign element. Such problems are most frequent in a setting that allows for the growth of international relationships, be they commercial or personal. Economic integration provides such a setting and allows for the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital across national boundaries. The facilitation of factor mobility resulting from economic integration and the concomitant growth in international relationships results in problems which call for resolution using the tools of private international law. An economic community cannot function solely on the basis of economic rules; attention must also be paid to the rules for settling cross-border disputes. Consequently, considerable attention is given to the subject within the European Union (EU)1 and other economic communities.2

With its judgment in Leyla Şahin v Turkey,1 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has once again addressed the place of religion within the European Convention system. The Court considers two types of cases. The first focuses on individuals but has repercussions on the relationship between State and religious communities. The Court is much more individualistic in these cases, in that it focuses more on the individual and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Court emphasizes values such as the prevention of indoctrination, neutrality, secularism and laïcité, especially in relation to Islam. The Court tries to promote and enforce a normative order of secularism but this has unfortunate consequences for religious freedom. The second deals with the compatibility of entire domestic regimes regulating religious affairs with the Convention, including questions of legal personality and registration, leadership and property ownership, positive obligations of the State towards the protection of religious communities against third parties, and freedom of religious choice. The aim is to promote tolerance, religious diversity, pluralism and a market place within religious beliefs. It will be shown that these two strands in the caselaw do not always sit happily together.

Since the resumption of China's sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997, academic and policy interest in its unique status has largely subsided. This may be attributed to the fact that the issue has formally been settled and the absence of effective mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement of compliance with the bilateral accord underpinning the new legal order. The marginalization of the subject has arguably left an analytical vacuum as several dimensions of the post-1997 picture merit attention on the part of international lawyers. One topic that continues to be of both practical and theoretical importance—the unconstrained pursuit, within the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ framework, of key strategic goals in the external arena—is addressed in this paper.

There are few more controversial questions in international law than the proper limits of the right of self-defence. The rules are being challenged in the light of what are seen as new threats from terrorism and from the possession of weapons of mass destruction. The UN High-level Panel, in its report to the Secretary-General of 2004, concluded that in all cases relating to decisions to use military force ‘we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is equal to the task’.4 The Principles that follow are intended to provide a clear statement of the rules of international law ‘properly understood’ governing the use of force by states in self-defence.

The goal of constructing an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice across the Union was agreed at the Tampere EU Summit of 1999. The objective was to create the conditions in which EU citizens could exercise their rights of free movement while at the same time addressing legitimate security concerns. Central to this debate has been the need to ensure that not only are the free movement rights granted by the Treaty protected, but that more broadly, the fundamental rights of EU citizens are not infringed. The Tampere programme was a five-year agenda that concluded in 2004. In June 2004, the Commission presented a Communication taking stock of the implementation of the Tampere agenda and setting future guidelines for a new justice and home affairs strategy for the years to come. Following Council discussions in July and October 2004, the Dutch Presidency produced a new programme for justice and home affairs (subsequently renamed as ‘freedom, security and justice’). This will cover the period for the years 2005–2010, and is known as ‘The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years— The Partnership for European Renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice.’1

The Court has continued with its expansive interpretation of the Citizenship provisions in Article 18 EC which it had previously acknowledged as being a fundamental right granted to all EU citizens by the Treaty.1 The case-law of the Court has, in particular, stressed the relationship between the free movement rights under Article 18 EC and preventing discrimination against EU nationals on grounds of nationality and without which the Citizenship provisions would lack force. Two recent judgments of Bidar2 and Ioannidis3 demonstrate the extent to which the Court will prevent covert discrimination on grounds of nationality. In a third judgment, that of Schempp,4 the Court, seemingly sensitive to criticism of interfering in domestic tax policy, adopts a more measured interpretation of discrimination when considering whether the rights granted under Article 18 EC are interfered with.

After a hectic period of law reform, which has also provoked major governance reforms in the form of significantly increased levels of transparency and market consultation and major institutional innovations (with allied accountability and governance risks), the 1999 Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)1 has now been completed. It has radically transformed the regulatory landscape for financial services in the EC, and set a seal on the recharacterization of EC financial services law from a minimum harmonization-based market construction regime to a highly interventionist and increasingly sophisti-cated market regulation system. In particular, the coincidence of legislative reform under the FSAP with the development of a new institutional process for law-making, which has rapidly become embedded in the financial market architecture (the Lamfalussy process),2 produced a reform agenda of immense depth and range. The FSAP period has also seen the use and development of a wide range of regulatory tools in EC financial services policy in line with the growing sophistication of the regulatory regime. While disclosure has long been a key policy tool of EC financial services law, the FSAP saw a closer focus on conflict of interest management across the financial sector, on more interventionist controls such as transparency, suitability, and best execution requirements, and on calibrating regulation to different investor profiles and different market risks. This article considers a selection of key recent developments.