This article seeks to explore and subsequently critique the International Organisation of Securities Commissions's (IOSCO) attempt to devise a globally recognized set of benchmarks of good practice in valuing hedge fund assets as set out in its recent Principles For the Valuation of Hedge Fund Assets (A Consultation Report, March 2007). The outcome of the IOSCO's consultation process is almost certain to have an important bearing on the future provision of hedge fund valuation services globally and, thus, is likely to be viewed with great interest by regulatory and industry bodies throughout the world.

The recognition of foreign judgments lacking reasons raises several policy issues. Reason-giving is perceived by the European Court of Human Rights as critical to ensure an effective access to justice. Yet, foreign judgments often lack reasons because the defendant failed to appear before the foreign court, and it may be right to sanction this strategy of foreign court avoidance. Finally, the European Union has begun to implement its policy of efficiency of cross-border enforcement, which commands states to recognize such judgments irrespective of any other consideration. This article explores whether these conflicting issues can be reconciled.

Between 2002 and 2007, the Council of the European Union has entered into more than 70 international agreements with third parties pursuant to Article 24 of the Treaty on European Union in order to address various legal and practical matters relating to the conduct of EU crisis management missions in third countries. The purpose of this article is to examine the Council's practice in the implementation of Article 24 of the Treaty and to assess the widely held view that the international agreements concluded under this provision offer conclusive proof of the EU's status as an independent subject of international law. Even though the Council's recent practice does indeed suggest that it concludes international agreements on behalf of the Union as such, this does not lay to rest all uncertainties surrounding the EU's nature as an international legal person.

Applying the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to immigration cases has always been a balancing exercise between the effective protection of human rights and the Contracting States' autonomy to regulate migration flows. In its recent case law, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECtHR) has considerably extended the protective scope of Article 8 ECHR by granting autonomous human rights protection to the long-term resident status independent of the existence of family bonds under the heading of ‘private life’. This has important repercussions for the status of legal and illegal immigrants across Europe, since the new case law widens the reach of human rights law to the legal conditions for leave to remain, effectively granting several applicants a human right to regularize their illegal stay. The contribution analyses the new case law and develops general criteria guiding the application of the ECHR to national immigration laws and the new EU harmonization measures adopted in recent years.

This article will question the legality of measures of environmental ‘conditionality’ in the Generalized System of Preferences [GSP] of the European Community [EC].1 The GSP is a GATT/WTO2 authorized scheme which permits developed nations to grant non-reciprocal tariff preferences in favour of developing countries.3 The objectives of the GSP are primarily development-oriented in that it aims to increase the export earnings of developing countries, promote their industrialization and accelerate rates of economic growth.4 A recent case taken in the WTO examined the legal contours of the grant of tariff preferences and it is in the light of this that this article will examine the so-called ‘special incentive arrangements’ of the reformed EC GSP which offers additional tariff preferences to developing countries on the ‘condition’ that they adhere to specified standards of environmental protection.