This article considers the positive evolution of international law in the past century, and the emergence of a rules-based multilateral system under the UN Charter, which has, inter alia, enabled formerly colonised peoples to exercise their right to self-determination and prohibited the use of force in international relations. The author reaffirms his faith in the ability of international law to provide a common language for the international community to face successfully common challenges, such as poverty, global warming, and the protection of privacy rights in the era of social media and artificial intelligence. Looking beyond traditional beneficiaries and duty-bearers of international obligations, the author makes a case for all actors to engage in respecting, upholding and promoting international law.

Informed by the ‘assembly’ jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, this article addresses fundamental questions about the meaning and scope of ‘assembly’ in Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In seeking to determine when the right of peaceful assembly might properly be engaged, the article explores the interrelationship of assembly with expression and association and proposes a definition of ‘assembly’—for the purposes of its protection—as ‘an intentional gathering by two or more people (including in private and online/virtual spaces)’. Such definitional reflection is particularly timely in light of the Human Rights Committee's drafting of General Comment No 37 on Article 21.

The dyadic rule–exception structure common to many legal systems has posed particular interpretive difficulties in international trade and investment law. Adjudicators have interpreted general and security exceptions in GATT, GATS and cognate provisions of investment treaties in divergent ways, and the analytic character of these provisions is under-theorised in the literature. This article argues that we should understand exceptions from a deontological perspective as permissions that affirm governmental regulatory capacity and thus limit the scope of the commands set out in the treaty. This characterisation of exceptions has both symbolic and practical implications, of which this article discusses two: determining the exception's applicability as a preliminary matter rather than as a defence, which would in turn permit consideration of regulatory purpose at the point of obligation; and whether the applicability of an exception is properly a question of merits or jurisdiction.

This article discusses the current negotiations for an Implementing Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. It discusses, in particular, the issue of the relationship of the new agreement with existing and future relevant regional instruments and bodies and the need for cooperation and coordination amongst them, the guiding principles of the new agreement, and the question of implementation and enforcement of the new agreement. These issues and the choices that delegations will make respectively highlight the controversy on the underpinning tenet of the agreement, ie between the ‘freedom of the high seas’ and the common heritage of mankind. The article concludes with a pessimistic prognosis that, in general, the agreement will fall short of the expectations that many States and international community have had at the early days of the negotiation.

When adjudicating religious disputes, constitutional courts often resort to a particular discursive register. The notions ‘tolerance’ and ‘respect’ are an integral part of this religion-specific constitutional register. But what do judges mean when they deploy the language of tolerance and respect? And what substantive role, if any, do both notions play in the constitutional interpretation of religious freedom? This article seeks to answer these conceptual and substantive questions by comparing constitutional case law on religious freedom from India, Israel and the United States. It also provides linkages to ongoing processes of (alleged) constitutional retrogression in the three jurisdictions.

This article offers a critical assessment of the role of international human rights law in the regulation of genome editing. Given the rapid scientific developments in the field of genetics, it is important to explore the implications of the human rights framework for the research into and the clinical application of genome editing. The broader normative question is whether the existing human rights standards are sufficient to address the challenges posed by this new technology. It will be argued that while international human rights law does not prohibit genome editing, it imposes important restrictions upon it. However, existing human rights are arguably insufficient to regulate germline genome editing as there are significant loopholes in the protection of embryos. Nor do they fully address the wide-ranging implications of the new technology for society and humankind. It will be suggested that new standards are needed, ideally set out in a new international instrument and supported by an institutional framework, which address the specific challenges posed by this new technology.

This article examines the compatibility of the extraterritorial application of unilateral legislation with the project of international law. Focusing on two instruments, the Dodd-Frank Act passed by the United States Congress and intended to regulate the activities of US listed companies operating in the Congo and the EU conflict minerals legislation, the article challenges their underlying premises that revenues from natural resources perpetuate conflict and resulting human rights abuses. In so far as these instruments make no provision for meaningful participation by the foreign populations which are the objects of legislation, it is argued that there is a tension between these unilateral instruments and the basic premises of law-making in international law as a democratic enterprise centred around governmental representation. By exclusively directing sanctions and other disciplinary measures at rebels, both legislative instruments have the problematic effect of strengthening the exploitation of natural resources by kleptocratic regimes and undermining the right of populations in conflict zones to civil disobedience as an inescapable component of their right of self-determination.

The ongoing development of diverse maritime autonomous vehicles for varied ocean activities—ranging from scientific research, security surveillance, transportation of goods, military purposes and commission of crimes—is prompting greater consideration of how existing legal frameworks accommodate these vehicles. This article brings together the core legal issues, as well as current developments in relation to commercial shipping, the law of naval warfare, and maritime security. This article captures how these issues are now being addressed and what other legal questions will likely emerge as the newest technology impacts on one of the oldest bodies of international law.

In its August 2019 decision in Portillo Cáceres v Paraguay, the Human Rights Committee recognised, for the first time, the existence of a connection between environmental protection and the right to life with dignity. This is not only a landmark decision for the Committee but also represents the consolidation of a body of case law and practice from the three regional human rights courts and other UN human rights bodies which has developed over the last quarter of a century. It also shows the potential of two important and widely debated paragraphs in the newly adopted General Comment No. 36 on the Right to Life, which describe environmental degradation as both an enabler of threats and a direct threat to the right to life. Such potential has been confirmed in another landmark decision of the HRC—Teitiota v New Zealand, relating to climate change as threat to life. This article draws on Portillo Cáceres v Paraguay and Teitiota v New Zealand to analyse this wider field of practice in order to clarify the connection between the right to life and environmental protection, as recognised by the Committee, and considers its potential impact on future litigation.