The aim of this article is to provide an overview of the European Court of Justice's (‘ECJ’) past and present contribution— both procedurally and substantively—to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. While it is too early to speculate what the ECJ's contribution to this area will be under the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, the latter's modifications to the ECJ's jurisdiction merit close attention. After describing how the procedural limitations that were imposed on the ECJ's jurisdiction by ex Title IV of Part Three of the EC Treaty and by ex Title VI of the old EU Treaty have been almost entirely eliminated by the Treaty of Lisbon, this article posits that not only does the latter Treaty improve significantly the judicial protection of private individuals, but it also facilitates the dialogue between the Union and the national judiciaries in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Next, the article briefly explores the special ECJ procedures which may be followed in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in cases where time is of the essence. There, it is argued that, when having recourse to these procedures, the ECJ strives to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, swift judging and, on the other hand, the preservation of a qualitative and fair judicial procedure. As to substantive issues, drawing on examples from the fields of judicial cooperation in civil matters, asylum and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, it is argued that the ECJ's contribution to this area is largely grounded in the protection of fundamental rights. Finally, a brief conclusion supports the contention that the ECJ's contribution to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has favoured a ‘mutual borrowing’ of concepts and principles as between this area and other fields in relation to which the EU has competences, such as the internal market and competition. The Treaty of Lisbon having entered into force, an unprecedented level of coordination between different areas of EU law on both the procedural and substantive levels is to take place. Respect for fundamental rights will definitely be a unifying factor binding them all together.

The judgment of the European Court of Justice in Cartesio was eagerly awaited as a clarification of the questions concerning the scope of the right of establishment (articles 49, 54 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), (ex-articles 43, 48 EC) that remained after previous landmark decisions such as Centros, Überseering, and Inspire Art. This article analyses the implications of Cartesio in light of different scenarios of transfer of the registered and the real seat within the European Union. It assesses the interrelations of right of establishment and private international law rules for the determination of the law applicable to companies and concludes that the case law of the European Court of Justice after Cartesio, rather than providing for a coherent system of European company law, leads to arbitrary distinctions and significantly impedes the free movement of companies.

This article examines the impact of international law on the ability of States to mitigate the effects of financial crises. It focuses on the invocation of investment treaty disciplines in the aftermath of the 2001–2002 Argentine financial crisis, and the adjudication of Argentina's defence of a state of necessity under both subject treaties and at customary international law. The article uncovers three interpretative methods in the jurisprudence on the relationship between the treaty exception and customary plea of necessity: methodologies I (confluence), II (lex specialis) and III (primary-secondary applications). Method I is the dominant approach in the jurisprudence and the most restrictive of the three readings. The article argues that method I is mistaken both on a careful interpretation of the two legal standards and on a broader historical analysis of the emergence of investment treaty norms. Given these substantive flaws, the article isolates the motivations to account for the popularity of this method through a close reading of the awards. These reveal continuing tensions in the field, not least the problematic suggestion that a single value of protection should exclusively inform our understanding of the purpose of investment treaties. These sociological features of investor–State arbitration should, it is suggested, inform our choice on other interpretative methods. This comes down to an election between methods II (lex specialis) and III (primary–secondary applications). Method III is the most convincing and coherent reading of the relationship between the two legal standards. The article concludes by offering a framework to address the key interpretative questions implicated in that method: (a) the identification and scope of the notion of ‘public order’ and a State's ‘essential security interests’; and (b) the appropriate test of ‘necessity’ or means–end scrutiny.

While the public nature of investment treaty arbitration has been increasingly recognized, its procedures are modelled on those of international commercial arbitration. This creates a gap between (public) substance and (private) procedure in investment treaty arbitration. Against this background, this article examines the increasing acceptance of amicus curiae submissions in investment treaty arbitration. It argues that investment treaty arbitration tribunals should make effective use of amicus curiae submissions in order to include neglected perspectives of the issues raised in arbitration, which may bridge this public/private gap.

Since many offensive and defensive wars or acts of terrorism, such as the atrocities of 11 September in the United States and the July 2005 bombings in London, are committed under the banner of Islam and the duty of jihad, it is important to shed some light upon the Islamic laws of war in general, and the controversial concept of jihad in particular. This article traces the origins of, and rationale for, the use of force within the Islamic tradition, and assesses the meaning and evolution of the contentious concept of jihad within its historical context. Following an analysis of the opposing doctrinal views on the potential implications of jihad, the study argues that the concept of jihad should not be interpreted literally, but be adjusted in accordance with new historical and international conditions, and conducted by peaceful means, rather than by the sword.