The goal of focal articles in Industrial and Organizational Psychology: Perspectives on Science and Practice is to present new ideas or different takes on existing ideas and stimulate a conversation in the form of comment articles that extend the arguments in the focal article or that present new ideas stimulated by those articles. The two focal articles in this issue stimulated a wide range of reactions and a good deal of constructive input.

Credibility and trustworthiness are the bedrock upon which any science is built. The strength of these foundations has been increasingly questioned across the sciences as instances of research misconduct and mounting concerns over the prevalence of detrimental research practices have been identified. Consequently, the purpose of this article is to encourage our scientific community to positively and proactively engage in efforts that foster a healthy and robust industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology. We begin by advancing six defining principles that we believe reflect the values of robust science and offer criteria for evaluating proposed efforts to change scientific practices. Recognizing that the contemporary scientific enterprise is a complex and diverse network of actors and institutions, we then conclude by identifying 12 stakeholders who play important roles in achieving a culture of robust science in I-O psychology and offer recommendations for actions we can take as members of these groups to strengthen our science.

The focal article (Grand et al., 2018) addresses one of the most important issues across virtually all areas of science (Goldstein, 2010): the trustworthiness and credibility of a scientific discipline. Once these attributes are lost, it is difficult to regain them within a reasonable time frame, if ever. In contrast to previous articles on this topic (e.g., Kepes & McDaniel, 2013), the authors of the focal article provide a detailed review of the stakeholders surrounding industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology, including their potential effect on the robustness and trustworthiness of our scientific discipline. In essence, the focal article describes I-O psychology's ecosystem responsible for fostering robust and credible science. The authors should be commended for their comprehensive undertaking, and we have no substantive disagreements. However, implicitly, as with most articles on this vital topic, the focal article tends to take a bottom-up approach to decision making and change. The bottom-up approach is an emergent process where the individuals involved in the day-to-day activities are primarily responsible for the decision-making process and resulting change (Kindler, 1979). Thus, changes resulting from this process are incremental and typically involve making minor adjustments to existing processes (Bartunek & Moch, 1987).

The focal article (Grand et al., 2018) provides an exemplary roadmap for improving the practice of robust science in industrial-organizational (I-O) psychology, which includes recommendations for authors such as practicing robust science, even in the absence of reward. However, authors are faced with practical constraints; to succeed in our field, we must publish, at least occasionally, in prestigious journals to secure scholarships, awards, employment, grants, and tenure. We can practice robust science (commonly referred to as “open science” or “reproducible research”) without reward—but only to some extent, if there is no support from our gatekeepers. After all, it is difficult to influence the field without a job and research funding.

Grand et al. (2018) provide a critical treatment of the need for industrial and organizational (I-O) psychologists to take active steps to ensure that ours is a robust and reliable science of organizations, the spirit of which the present authors wholeheartedly agree. One path toward ensuring that I-O psychology is rightly recognized as a robust science is by embracing the principles of Open Science. We argue that the move toward Open Science is beneficial for all six of the defining principles outlined by Grand et al. Open Science increases transparency, facilitates replication, and contributes to the accumulation and integration of research by increasing accessibility. Each of these factors helps to foster systematic, rigorous scientific practices, which, in turn, can lead to greater insights and understanding of organizational phenomenon through deductive, inductive, and abductive approaches to theory generation and refinement, ensuring that our field remains relevant for the foreseeable future. In this commentary, we highlight several initiatives that already exist to promote Open Science and explore others only alluded to by Grand et al.

One of the key characteristics of a rigorous and robust science is that it has the ability to self-correct when mistakes are made. The focal article by Grand et al. (2018) has plenty to say about what faithful actors can do to ensure a more robust industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology literature, but we were surprised at how little attention the issue of correcting the research record was given. To be clear, the target article mentions the issue of research misconduct and even cites an article from Leadership Quarterly (Atwater, Mumford, Schriesheim, & Yammarino, 2014) that deals specifically with the issue, but it does not include guidance on this issue for editors or publishers. This is not surprising. The issue of misconduct is one that produces a great deal of discomfort in academic circles (Wager, 2015), and when it is discussed, it is usually only in the vaguest terms (e.g., Banks et al., 2016). Moreover, as Grand and colleagues point out, it could be argued that the “gathering storm” of questionable research that has enveloped other fields such as social psychology seems distant. Perhaps to reassure us, the authors point to several articles showing that results of our field seem to be replicable, robust, and relevant. But are they?

As a practitioner with 25 years of experience applying industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology concepts to address business challenges, I want to expand upon the point that “robust science is relevant” (Grand et al., 2018, p. 10)—specifically, that making two changes in the field's research direction could greatly increase the impact, value, and credibility of I-O psychology in the broader world of work.

Grand et al. (2018) address an important and timely concern with scientific research with implications well beyond industrial and organizational (I-O) psychological science. As they describe a comprehensive ecosystem responsible for robust science, they have alluded to the notorious scientist–practitioner gap in our field. In this commentary I propose how that gap relates to the various stakeholders in Grand et al.’s ecosystem, and suggest professional associations take on an elevated role in the communication of science.

Science is a complex task. It involves the creation and dissemination of knowledge. The creation of knowledge requires identifying and abstracting patterns (i.e., identifying phenomena and theorizing about the processes that bring it about), as well as systematically observing to better see and quantify the patterns (e.g., effect size estimating) or assess the validity of the abstractions used to explain the patterns (i.e., theory testing). To help (a) hone in on what observations would be useful and (b) communicate what the patterns mean, we are encouraged to develop and report hypotheses. That is, strategically, hypotheses facilitate the planning of data collection by helping the researcher understand what patterns need to be observed to assess the merit of an explanation. Meanwhile, tactically, hypotheses help focus the audience on the crucial patterns needed to answer a question or test a theory. When the strategic hypotheses are not supported, it raises a question regarding what to do tactically. Depending on the result (i.e., different direction; null), one might construct a hypothesis to facilitate dissemination without reporting this post hoc construction or remove mention of a hypothesis altogether. This practice is called HARKing (i.e., hypothesizing after results are known). HARKing has been so disparaged as to be considered a “detrimental research practice” (Grand et al., 2018, p. 6). As such, the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology's (SIOP) Robust and Reliability Science task force appears to be recommending that HARKing not be taught by educators, encouraged by reviewers or editors, or practiced by authors. I do not agree with those recommendations, and I elaborate on my position below.

Theories of human aggression can inform research, policy, and practice in organizations. One such theory, victim precipitation, originated in the field of criminology. According to this perspective, some victims invite abuse through their personalities, styles of speech or dress, actions, and even their inactions. That is, they are partly at fault for the wrongdoing of others. This notion is gaining purchase in industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology as an explanation for workplace mistreatment. The first half of our article provides an overview and critique of the victim precipitation hypothesis. After tracing its history, we review the flaws of victim precipitation as catalogued by scientists and practitioners over several decades. We also consider real-world implications of victim precipitation thinking, such as the exoneration of violent criminals. Confident that I-O can do better, the second half of this article highlights alternative frameworks for researching and redressing hostile work behavior. In addition, we discuss a broad analytic paradigm—perpetrator predation—as a way to understand workplace abuse without blaming the abused. We take the position that these alternative perspectives offer stronger, more practical, and more progressive explanations for workplace mistreatment. Victim precipitation, we conclude, is an archaic ideology. Criminologists have long since abandoned it, and so should we.

Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland (2018) have cogently suggested that workplace mistreatment should be viewed through a “lens” that squarely implicates the perpetrator (i.e., the perpetrator predation framework) rather than through a lens that at least partially absolves the perpetrator while blaming the victim for inviting, or not actively resisting, the mistreatment (i.e., the victim precipitation framework). We agree that the perpetrator predation framework provides a better basis for policy, practice, and law. Furthermore, however, the perpetrator predation framework provides a better basis for science. Whereas Cortina et al. allude briefly to the scientific benefits of a perpetrator-focused framework, the current commentary fleshes out these benefits and outlines an agenda for future perpetrator-focused research on workplace mistreatment.

Victim precipitation is embedded deeply within industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology. Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland (2018) are right to challenge the assumptions that have perpetuated victim blaming in our discipline (consciously and unconsciously); however, a significant source of victim precipitation discourse within our field was strikingly absent in their discussion: construct measurement. The nature of how we measure most of our workplace aggression and mistreatment constructs (e.g., incivility, abusive supervision, bullying) have potential to negate the experiences of targeted employees as well as the unique impact of various perpetrator behaviors. Furthermore, how we interpret these measures can result in researchers and practitioners privileging the experiences of some individuals and dismissing the experiences of others. How can we hope to achieve a progressive approach to mistreatment in our disciplines if our measures do not keep pace?

We applaud the efforts of Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland (2018) in their development of perpetrator predation as a sensitizing concept (see also Cortina, 2017) for future work in workplace aggression and mistreatment (hereafter workplace mistreatment). The importance of being mindful of the manner in which we frame our arguments is both highly relevant and well-articulated by the authors. We further believe that the transfer of focus from that of blaming victims to placing the onus for workplace mistreatment on the actor him/herself is an important idea as our field continues to develop into the 21st century.

We acknowledge and agree with Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland (2018) that the tendency to focus on victims as precipitators of their own negative workplace experiences (e.g. abusive supervision) presents a problematic theoretical paradigm. Using organizational justice as an illustration, we note that even in fields with an orientation toward victims, similar trends with regard to victim precipitation have still emerged. However, we also argue that although the perpetrator predation approach may help to avoid this tendency and encourage a better understanding of the responsibility for and origins of certain organizational experiences, it may fall short when examining complex phenomena that involve more than the dyad of perpetrator and victim. We suggest that industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology scholars might be better served by abandoning the language of victim and perpetrator altogether. Though we invoke these two terms when discussing organizational justice, we ultimately come to argue that researchers should utilize different language that better captures the experience and role of employees in these phenomena.

Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland's (2018) perspective on studying victimization in organizations is a welcome contribution to workplace aggression research. We share their believe that considering a perpetrator predation paradigm may advance and proliferate research on issues related to gender harassment, bullying, mobbing, and other explicitly overt forms of victimization where the intent to harm is supposedly clear. However, we propose that, if blindly adopted, neither the dominant victim precipitation paradigm nor the suggested perpetrator predation paradigm will improve research on incivility or other more covert and indirect forms of victimization. In fact, we suggest in our commentary that both models may be counterproductive for understanding and remedying incivility in organizations.

We unequivocally agree with the root of Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland's (2018) argument about the danger in focusing mostly on the victim in situations of workplace aggression. Workplace aggression is indeed initiated by the perpetrator (or perpetrators if there are two equally responsible parties in enacting the aggression). Where we believe Cortina et al.’s arguments are lacking is the hard-drawn line that the perpetrator should be the only subject of study. No, the victim should not hold any blame nor insinuations of blame. However, we hold the premise that both sides (i.e., perpetrator and victim) must be considered, and thus both are inherently subjects of interest in order to thoroughly capture the essence of these scenarios. Therefore, our position is that a focus on the victim is not only important, but it is actually an essential component when contemplating workplace aggression. Furthering research in this area will only be successful if we have candid conversations around the inappropriate nature of a solely victim-focused approach to workplace aggression and discuss the explicit differences (or nuanced ones) that may exist across varying perspectives on workplace aggression in order to more fully understand it. Therefore Cortina et al. have rightly initiated an important conversation within industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology.

Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland (2018) make a compelling case for shifting away from a victim precipitation perspective in industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology. In addition to noting that victim precipitation potentially violates ethical principles, the authors suggest that such paradigms shape attributions of blame and implications for practice within organizations. This commentary builds upon the ideas discussed in the focal article by encouraging I-O psychologists to collect data on the extent to which victim precipitation appears in the field and experimentally examine how and why the paradigms we use to explain workplace mistreatment might affect attitudes and behavior.

Cortina, Robello, and Holland (2018) advance a case for the danger of using the victim precipitation model in industrial-organizational (I-O) psychology—a model that is interpreted as suggesting that characteristics and behaviors of victims may influence criminals to select them as targets, in effect blaming victims for crimes committed against them. This “victim blaming” found its way into criminology, criminal justice, sociology, and other disciplines, resulting in revictimization and in the exoneration of violent criminals, among other undesirable outcomes. We agree with Cortina and colleagues that these outcomes, then and now, are unacceptable: Victims cannot and should not be blamed for their aggressors’ actions, and aggressors should unequivocally be held accountable for their crimes. This extends to workplace mistreatment. Using the operationalizations of generalized workplace harassment, workplace incivility, sexual harassment, and abusive supervision as guides (Rospenda & Richman, 2004, as cited by Cortina et al., 2018; Magley, Williams, & Langhout, 2001; Tepper, 2000; Walsh & Magley, 2014), we define workplace mistreatment as any interpersonal interaction in the workplace that creates an oppressively intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment that extends beyond acceptable evaluative and professional actions given situational demands (e.g., poor performance reviews, layoffs during downsizing/mergers/acquisitions, discipline, etc.). Although an unpopular point of view, we maintain that whether or not victims influence the contexts that facilitate victimization in the workplace is an empirical question. This research continues to be scientifically valuable, relevant, and practical, and it is necessary to more fully understand workplace mistreatment (Barling, 1996; Cortina, Magley, Williams, & Langhout, 2001). Two principal reasons drive this position: (a) the lack of scientific, data-driven evidence to support the exclusion of the victim precipitation model and (b) the potential harmful premise of its replacement, the perpetrator predation model. Elucidating our thoughts on these reasons will occupy our commentary.

As researchers who have advanced victim precipitation arguments in our own work on victimization and job performance (Jensen, Patel, & Raver, 2014), we agree fully with this statement made by Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland (2018): “A victim's traits or behaviors might help us understand why the instigator chose that particular person for abuse, but we must always emphasize that it was the instigator, not the victim, who did the choosing and abusing” (p. 93). An overemphasis on victim characteristics does deflect attention away from wrongdoers, and theory that encourages us to consider perpetrator motivation and the social environment is needed.

Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland (2018) accurately cite the general public's overuse of victim precipitation ideologies, or the notion that victims engage in actions that directly bring about their unfortunate circumstances. These ideologies also have permeated industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology and the study of people in the workplace (e.g., women's choice in clothing leads to sexual harassment, certain target characteristics and actions incite workplace bullying). We agree with Cortina et al. that this ideology unintentionally benefits the perpetrator by placing blame and responsibility for nonoptimal workplace situations directly on the target. The field of I-O psychology needs to move away from this model of victim blaming as a remediation for workplace disparities.