1 “Oppression” has been defined in recent philosophical literature as the absence of these three characteristics (Tormey 1973–4, 216; Bartky 1979, 34).

2 The notion is derived from such thinkers as John Stuart Mill (1962, 192) and the existentialists, e.g. Camus (1955, 46–47); Sartre (1969, 67–72) and Kierkegaard (1956, 70–1, 122, 142). Bishop (1979, 68–77) argues that if children are to be able to exercise the right to self-determination as adults they must be trained to develop those personality traits which involve the capacity of making choice autonomously. Carol Gilligan (1982, 78, 82, 85, 165) has recently stressed the importance of a woman's taking responsibility for herself to her moral development.

3 For examples of philosophers’ espousal of the “double standard” of sexual morality see Rousseau (1911, 321ff) and Fichte (1869, 398 ff).

4 Even such a feminist as Mill assumes that this is the best arrangement for married women (1970, 178.-9).

5 Jessie Bernard (1972, 41–43, 56–7) argues that for women marriage involves a “re-definition of the self.” Studies show that personality changes take place involving a “more negative self-image.” See also Seidenberg 1973, 53ff).

6 Mill recognized this particular oppressiveness of the living together situation when he claimed that the slavery to which women are subjected is worse than that of other slaves: “‘Uncle Tom’ has his own life in his ‘cabin’…. But it cannot be so with the wife” (1970, 159–60).

7 Nor are these restrictions merely the same in nature as those which inevitably accompany any choice, as Merrill Ring has brought to my attention. While it is true that any choice which one makes restricts the range of her other choices, the nature of this particular social arrangement is such that it imposes, both by explicit flat and as its unavoidable consequences, a broad range of restrictions on other choices. These restrictions are therefore of a more profound nature than those which are implied in the making of just any choice.

8 This kind of role playing is central to Firestone's critique of “romantic love” (1970, ch. 7). See also Masters and Johnson (1975, 203) on the benefit of the “sense of being mutually commited” with respect to the sexual responsiveness of both partners.

9 These benefits of “committment” for the development of individuality give rise to an argument for marriage over simply “living together.” In marriage the commitment of the partners is recognized and sanctioned by society, and is regarded as a more substantial commitment than simply living together (O'Driscoll 1977, 260–1 and Wasserstrom 1975, 244–5). On the other hand, there are various reasons why living together may be more conducive to the development of autonomy and individuality than is marriage. (1) Since in having such a relationship the individuals are not doing what society wants, they may feel less obligated to live up to society's expectations of the formal which a relationship should take. This would be particularly true of lesbian relationships. (2) The legal restrictions placed by the state on the form a marriage relationship must take may interfere with the development of equality in the relationship. For example, the state does not allow for complete financial independence of married partners from each other. (3) There might be less “falling into bad habits” in the unmarried situation: since each individual is legally free to leave, one would be more careful to behave well towards him or her.

10 Gilligan (1982, 131–2, 156–7, 159–160) discovers a similar duality between male and female constructions of identity, where male identity is built on separateness from others, self-expression and achievement, whereas female identity is based on care and responsibility within the context of relationships.

11 “The ‘they’, which is nothing definite, and which all are … prescribes the kind of Being of every-dayness…. That tendency of Being-with … is grounded in the fact that Being-with one-another concerns itself as such with averageness…. This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the ‘leveling down’ of all possibilities of Being … because the ‘they’ presents every judgement and decision as its own, it deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability…. In these modes one's way of Being is that of inauthenticity and failure to stand by one's Self.” (Heidegger 1962, 164–6).

12 Richards (1980, 184–193, 284) criticizes “feminists” for deliberately making themselves unattractive to men, thereby making feminism an “unpopular movement.” For a critique of Richards’ position, see Weinzweig (1983, 133–135).

13 “Dasein's resoluteness towards itself (its attaining authenticity) is what first makes it possible for it to let the Others who are with it ‘be’ in their ownmost potentiality for being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates…. Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another.” (Heidegger 1962, 344, parenthetical addition mine).

14 This account is based on the model of the Hegelian dialectic, in which the development of self and society proceeds by a series of moves from a given condition to its opposite, and then back again to the first condition but in such a way that a higher position is reached which “synthesizes” the two opposites. See e. g. Kierkegaard (1956); Marx (1961, 1959).

15 According to Bernard (1972, 259–61) these characteristics are necessary to having a good relationship with others. An account of this type could explain Carol Gilligan's analysis of the development of morality and identity in females. Adopting Chodorow's (1978, 174) discovery that the fact that women have been responsible for child care results in females defining themselves in terms of their relations to other people, Gilligan stresses the importance of women's learning to care for themselves as a pre-condition to being able to truly care for others (1982, 78, 82, 85). Until this step is taken, women lose themselves in self-sacrifice and equivocation (84–5, 157, 159). However, Gilligan does not explain how it is possible for females, while still defining themselves primarily in terms of their relationships, to make the move whereby the self acquires importance instead of being subordinated to others. The interposition temporally and logically of my intermediate stage explains how it is possible for a woman to reclaim her self and thus reorient herself in her relationships so as to avoid loss of self.

Although the details of personal development are different for men and women, the formal structure of the development process is the same: the individual first absorbs, then rejects, society's generalized (and gender opposite) expectations for him or her, finally making out of them something of “her own.” At the third stage the results for men and women thus converge, with men appreciating the importance of positive caring in intimate relationships, and women the importance of self assertion and differentiation. Furthermore, if the account of this paper is correct, males also“sacrifice themselves’.’ at the initial stage of their development, denying the emotional and relational sides of their nature, and their true interests, in order to conform to the generalized expectations that they “achieve”, etc. in competitive society.

16 It is the position of this writer that a marriage type relationship is not an appropriate setting for the raising of children, even if both partners have achieved the third stage of autonomy and are thus able to care for chidren with what Ruddick calls “attentive love.” Because children necessarily begin by depending on others for their sense of self, it is important not only that they be provided with a variety of role models and ways to choose autonomy but that they be protected from the pressures of being swept up into the parents’ way of life when that is the only life style practiced in the household. A household consisting of a number of adults is more likely to provide a number of alternative ways of daily living, and thus ways of being, from which the child may choose, and thus to provide the child with some protection from the pressures of conformity to the life style of the couple. In addition to recognizing the danger of such pressures to conformity in a dyad, Chodorow's work points to the importance of having males as well as females in the roles of primary providers of child care (1978, 128, 227). Such an arrangement is more likely to be realized in a household consisting of a number of adults, as described by Firestone.