This is a review essay that also serves as an introduction to the other essays in the issue. It discusses feminist theory's relation to Freud, feminist ethical questions on motherhood and sexuality, the historical question of how systems of socially constructed sexual desire connect to male dominance, the question of the role of the body in feminst theory, and disputes within feminism on self, gender, agency and power.

This paper begins with the assumption that the differences among women pose a threat to building a unified feminist theory and practice. Utilizing the work and methods of Michel Foucault, I explore theoretical and practical implications of taking difference seriously. I claim that a politics of difference puts into question the concept of a revolutionary subject and the idea of a social totality. In the final section a brief Foucauldian analysis of the feminist sexuality debates is given.

The author critiques two widely-used works in Women's Studies for their hetero-relational content and the ways in which they minimize the necessity for affinities between women. Dinnerstein and Chodorow give us in theory what movies such as Kramer vs. Kramer depict in the film. It is not co-parenting and the inclusion of the male in an equal parenting role that will remedy present “sexual arrangements,” without first giving attention to women's relations with each other.

My aim is to examine Lacan's views on women's sexuality and desire in general. I use Hawthorne's novel The Blithedale Romance to supply a concrete narrative context in which to understand Lacan's two modes of femininity: the “veiled lady” and the “phallic mas-querader.” I criticize Lacan for holding (like Hawthorne) an essentially Romantic picture of the Ideal Woman who achieves happiness or peace outside the male/phallic sphere of activity and strife.

The purpose of this paper is to offer a critical evaluation of representative positions in the feminst sexuality debate and to suggest that ethical considerations are essential to the complex task of political transformation which is the goal of both sides in the debate. This paper explores both a “rights view” of ethics and a “responsibilities view” and shows, through specific examples, how an appeal to ethics might take feminist sexual politics beyond the current debate.

I argue that both Mary O'Brien's celebratory analysis of motherhood and Simone de Beauvoir's critical one fail, due to biologism and a lack of historical sense. Both approaches, I claim, are complementary: motherhood need be analysed both as alienating—Beauvoir—and as a potential ground for feminism—O'Brien. I conclude by suggesting that feminism can only reappropriate the female reproductive experience in a critical way.

The concept of possessive power as it manifests in reproduction is the focus of criticism in this paper. The analysis utilizes both positive insights and illustrative mistakes from Beauvoir's account of maternity. An alternative notion of power is proposed to replace possessive power as proprietary control.

An exploration of (I) alternative perspectives toward recent innovations in reproductive technology: support for new techniques for the sake of the kind of feminist future they facilitate; unqualified opposition despite therapeutic benefit to individual women; or qualified opposition depending upon specific threats to women's interests and (II) relationships between these positions and values bound up with mothering practices.

Is “living together” in a marriage-like relationship compatible with the feminist ideal of individual self-development? Paradoxically, while the structure and social-historical context of marriage-like relationships seems in fundamental conflict with the goal of autonomous self-development, the development of individuality also seems to be better fostered by living with a significant other in a committed relationship than by living alone. This paradox is resolved through the suggestion of a three-stage account of self-development: inauthentici-ty, autonomous being oneself, and autonomous being with others. At the third stage, living together in a marriage-like relationship is one social format in which autonomous relating to others is possible. Unless the partners have attained the second stage, however, such a relationship will be destructive rather than conducive to individuality.