The religious epistemology of John Henry Newman offers an avenue, unexplored by scholars, for interpreting moral doctrine today. Although he did not write any work on moral theology, a systematic account of the interaction between conscience and moral law in his writings can illumine foundational concerns about personal morality and episcopal authority in the Roman Catholic Church. In reaction to the rationalism of the Enlightenment Newman had remarkable confidence in the capabilities and trustworthiness of the personal, historical reasoning of individuals and ecclesial communities alike—a type of reasoning that he recognized as the driving force for the genesis and the application of moral law. Not surprisingly, his concern for historical moral consciousness, with its emphasis upon subjectivity, generated a significant shift from abstractness to concreteness in theological method, a shift that would later influence the thought of Bernard Lonergan. To illustrate the contemporary relevance of Newman's commitment to personal reasoning in theology, his explanation of the legitimate authority of conscience and doctrine provides the basis for an instructive critique of the document On the Interpretation of Dogmas (1989) from the International Theological Commission.

One major source of conflict in contemporary sexual ethics (e.g., artificial contraception and abortion) is the implicit difference in the worldviews represented by the terms “pro-life” and “pro-choice.” Those who are pro-life support the notion of human personhood as a fixed and unchanging reality from conception to death; those who are pro-choice, in contrast, support the notion of human personhood as developmental, never fully realized. The pro-life position basically reflects the worldview of classical metaphysics; the pro-choice position is logically grounded in process philosophy and theology. The aim of the present article is to compare and contrast these two worldviews so as to see whether or not there is unexpected common ground between the two that could logically justify a consensus position on the more specific moral issues.

In an age of environmental crisis, ecological theologians call for the “ecological conversion” of humanity. This article, a work of practical theology, plays on the grammatical ambiguity of Mark 10:15, in which disciples are told to “receive the kingdom as a child,” to argue that ecological conversion is a twofold conversion to the child. One conversion is a turn to the well-being of children in an age of climate crisis, which involves an adult personal transformation into the role of caregiver—and thus greater maturity. The other conversion is a recovery of certain childlike capacities, including presence in the moment, interdependence in relationship, urgency, animism, and love of the small. The article draws on Pope Francis’ encyclical Laudato Si’, discussions of childhood by the nineteenth-century Protestant theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher, and contemporary explorations of children and childhood, including the author's own experience of caregiving with children.

This roundtable grew out of the 2017 meeting of the Catholic Theological Society of America (CTSA), for which Karen Enriquez organized a panel on the topic of contemplative pedagogy for the Buddhist-Christian Studies Group. As part of that session, Maureen Walsh and Anita Houck presented early versions of two of the essays that follow. That session inspired some members of the College Theology Society to organize a pedagogical lunch on the topic of contemplative pedagogies for the 2018 CTS convention. Given the significant interest shown by CTS members, and the longstanding commitment to pedagogy in the CTS and Horizons, further conversation led to the idea of publishing a roundtable focused on contemplative approaches in Catholic institutions. The authors are grateful to Elena Procario-Foley for her support and guidance.

This essay explicates a contribution of developmental moral psychology to religious ethics in the task of interpreting the relationship between religion and morality. It argues that a criterion of self-transcendence is implicit in the developmental perspectives of major psychological theorists, and from this that the same drive for self-transcendence which grounds religious experience also constitutes the dynamic factor in moral consciousness—that both authentic morality and genuine religion are expressions of a single radical dynamism of the human spirit.

The paper traces the emergence of the concept of “World Christianity” to designate a new academic discipline beyond ecumenical and missiological discussions. It then elaborates the implications of “World Christianity” for the History of Christianity in contrast to Church History and for the study of Christianity as a “world religion.” The paper argues for an expansion of the “cartography” and “topography” of Church History to take into account the contributions of ecclesiastically marginalized groups and neglected charismatic/pentecostal activities. Furthermore, it is urged that in the study of Christianity as a world religion greater attention be given to how local communities have received and transformed the imported Christianities, the role of popular religiosity, and the presence of Evangelical/Pentecostal Churches. Finally, it is suggested that “World Christianity” requires the expansion of theological method and reformulation of some key Christian doctrines.

Commentators have concluded that frequent reference in Veritatis splendor to Gaudium et spes demonstrates a continuity of thought with the pastoral constitution, characteristic of a reiterative model of the use of prior magisterial teaching, one continuous teaching applied to additional issues. Recent centuries have shown that the encyclical teachings are often a vehicle for papal reinterpretation or recontextualization of previous teachings. This paper contends that the use of Gaudium et spes in Veritatis splendor follows this second model. The study demonstrates: first, that the theological anthropology of Gaudium et spes is recast in a dualist, individualist concept in Veritatis splendor, and second, that Veritatis splendor has re-contextualized quotations from Gaudium et spes on change, conscience, human autonomy, and human anthropology into teachings on law and precept. Thirdly, reliance on selective wording from Gaudium et spes enables Veritatis splendor to transform the role of the moral theologian into that of exclusively a disseminator of magisterial teaching.

The Bible has two different ways of speaking about two objects of God's love: Israel and Zion. Israel is masculine, and Zion/Jerusalem is feminine. The difference between the two is more visible in Hebrew which distinguishes masculine and feminine in the verbs as well as in the adjectives. Neglect of this gender distinction by calling Israel “she” leads to distortion of biblical speech and thought, and to misunderstanding the Bible's image for the relation between God and Israel. Recognition of biblical usage and its gendered expression ought to precede theological reflection.

Who are today's martyrs? Many Salvadorans call Archbishop Romero and the Jesuits and the two women killed at Central American University martyrs. Should they be numbered among the martyrs of the church? The author contends that it would be fitting for the Catholic Church to do so, based on the contemporary church teaching on martyrdom. Tracing the origin and development of the notion of Christian martyrdom from the New Testament to the present day, the author shows how Thomas Aquinas, the Second Vatican Council, Karl Rahner, and Pope John Paul II have contributed to the enlargement of the concept of the Christian martyr that fittingly describes the Salvadoran witnesses. Moved by love of God and neighbor, the martyr courageously endures death for bearing witness to the Christian faith that includes speaking the truth and doing justice.

This essay presents a psychological approach to understanding the creative functioning of imagination in art and religion. This approach drawn from psychoanalytic object relations theory further illuminates how the classics of art and theology engage the imagination and how distortions of the products of the creative imagination occur. Discussion of a particular innovative theme found in an artwork and related theological reflection in early Christianity exemplifies how both art and theology guide the religious imagination. Finally, various influences on the formation of personal God-imagery are assessed in the light of a case illustration, and the ongoing need for art and theology as tutors to the religious imagination is underscored.

In a painful paradox the word “good” has become forever attached to “Samaritan” by Jesus' Lucan parable (Lk 10:29-37; see 17:16), even while bitter Jewish hostility to this group has continued over the centuries: through the highly redacted polemic against the Samaritans of 2 Kgs 17 (see Sir 50:26) and through Talmudic commentary on it such as that in bKiddushin 75. Dan Jacobson in his recent The Story of the Stories: The Chosen People and Its God sees a “propagandistic … intention” in the parable of the Good Samaritan:

In the first century, as now, the praise accorded this separated Jewish group in the Christian writings must have rankled those Judean, Galilean and diaspora Jews to whose notice it came. It would have confirmed them in their view of the noṣrim as incorrigibly deviant from halakah. The principle of the ancient world was, “Your friends are my friends and your enemies are my enemies.” The favorable notice given to these enemies of the Jews by Jesus' followers could only have set the movement back in Jewish eyes.

What it means to be a person is a key issue in contemporary bio-ethical issues. A new socially ordered metaphysics with greater emphasis on the long-range interests of the community might provide common ground for resolving points of difference. Colin Gunton's trinitarian approach to contemporary social issues and a somewhat modified notion of “society” in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead are used in this essay to sketch such a new social ontology and to indicate how its use might at least change the tone of the current debate.

Genuine objectivity, says Bernard Lonergan, is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. Certainly, the two are closely linked. In this essay, I propose that authentic subjectivity consists, not in overcoming the particularities of one's subjective standpoint in order to embrace a hypothetical universal viewpoint shared in common with other individuals, but in getting more deeply in touch with the unique particularity of one's own perspective in order better to appreciate both the similarities with and the differences from the standpoints of other individuals. Genuine objectivity, then, consists in recognizing that there neither is nor ever will be a universal standpoint. All standpoints by definition are particular. This is not to deny, of course, that at any given moment there is an objective state of affairs, quite apart from any one's subjective perception of it, but only to affirm that no one (not even God) has a totally objective grasp of that same state of affairs.