1. Christopher Eisele, J., “John Dewey and the Immigrants,” History of Education Quarterly, 15 (Spring 1975): 67.Google Scholar

2. Karier, Clarence J., “A Revisionist Response to Maxine Green's Identities and Contours: An Approach to Educational History,” Champaign, Illinois (Unpublished).Google Scholar

3. See Eisele, , “John Dewey and the Immigrants”: 68.Google Scholar

4. Karier, Clarence J., Violas, Paul C., Spring, Joel, Roots of Crisis (Chicago, 1973), p. 97.Google Scholar

5. Mayhew, Katherine and Edwards, Anna, The Dewey School (New York, 1966), p. 472.Google Scholar

6. Karier, , Violas, , Spring, , Roots of Crisis, p. 98.Google Scholar

7. Zerby, Charles L., “John Dewey and the Polish Question: A Response to the Revisionist Historians,” History of Education Quarterly, 15 (Spring 1975): 17.Google Scholar

8. See Karier, , Violas, , Spring, , Roots of Crisis, pp. 92–93. Zerby also misquotes me, accidently I suspect, by substituting “which” for “that.”Google Scholar

9. See Bourke, Paul F., “Philosophy and Social Criticism: John Dewey 1910–1920,” History of Education Quarterly, 15 (Spring 1975): 8.Google Scholar

10. Ibid.: 11.Google Scholar

11. Karier, Clarence, “Liberalism and the Quest for Orderly Change,” History of Education Quarterly, 12 (Spring 1972): 64.Google Scholar

12. Ibid., p. 76.Google Scholar

13. Lawson, Alan, “John Dewey and the Hope for Reform,” History of Education Quarterly, 15 (Spring 1975): 61.Google Scholar

14. Commanger, H. S., The American Mind (New Haven, 1950), p. 100. I am indebted to David Hogan for calling my attention to this quote.Google Scholar

15. While Charles L. Zerby asserts that Walter Feinberg is an historian, it is my understanding that Feinberg has never made such a claim. He is by training and career an accomplished social philosopher.Google Scholar

16. Karier, , Violas, and Spring, , Roots of Crisis. Google Scholar

17. Paul Violas, in a chapter entitled, “Americanization,” in his forthcoming book on twentieth century urban education, perceptively identifies at least four major positions on assimilation; first was the exclusionist who argued for closing the gates for a variety of reasons; second was the “erase and color variety” who wanted to wipe out the ethnic past and replace it with another set of values, usually, but not always Anglo-Saxon; third was the liberal position which attempted to assimilate the immigrants to a common set of emerging values while at the same time preserving what they viewed as important ethnic differences; and the fourth was represented by those like Kallen who opted for a cultural pluralism. One might suggest even a fifth view, that being essentially one of the anarchist “hands off” variety.Google Scholar

18. Dewey as well as others often noted the marked increase in crime rate among the first generation immigrant children. It was believed that this was caused by the impact of Americanization programs upon the authority structure in the immigrant family.Google Scholar

19. Eisele, , “John Dewey and the Immigrants”: 75; and Zerby, “John Dewey and the Polish Question: A Response to the Revisionist Historians”: 28.Google Scholar

20. Eisele, , “John Dewey and the Immigrants”: 71.Google Scholar

21. Ibid.: 71.Google Scholar

22. For some critical differences between Kallen, and Dewey, , see, Harvey Wissot, Jay, “A Critical Evaluation of the Origins, Meaning and Implications For Education of Horace M. Kallen's Cultural Pluralism.” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1974).Google Scholar

23. To borrow a Violas phrase.Google Scholar

24. Dewey, John, Democracy and Education (New York., 1916), p. 100.Google Scholar

25. Eisele, , “John Dewey and the Immigrants”: 74.Google Scholar

26. Dewey, John, “A New Social Science,” The New Republic, Vol. 2, no. 143: 299.Google Scholar

27. Dewey, John, “Confidential Report: Conditions Among the Poles in the United States,” 1918.Google Scholar

28. Dewey, John, “Second Preliminary Memorandum—Confidential Polish Conditions in This Country,” August 23, 1918. This report is found in the appendix of a book by Gerson, Louis L., Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland 1914–1920, (New Haven, 1953), pp. 154–157.Google Scholar

29. Ibid., p. 155.Google Scholar

30. For reiteration of this theme, see Dewey, , “Confidential Report,” pp. 4, 81, 36, and 67.Google Scholar

31. Ibid., p. 36.Google Scholar

32. Ibid., pp. 3–4. He did note, however, anti-Semitism in both camps.Google Scholar

33. Ibid., p. 42.Google Scholar

34. Ibid., p. 42.Google Scholar

35. Ibid., p. 72.Google Scholar

36. Gerson, , Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland, 1914–1920, p. 152. Underlining for emphasis mine.Google Scholar

37. The overall thrust of the arguments of Bourke, Zerby and Eisele seems to suggest that Dewey's chief interest in the Poles was to provide more democratic leadership when, in fact, had they merely taken Dewey's and Barnes' own words such as “eliminate alien forces” seriously, they might have come closer to what Dewey himself said he was doing.Google Scholar

38. Here it should be noted that my critics seem to make much of Dewey's statement in the final report that Dewey was open and above-board with all this material because first, he confronted his opposition in the War Department meetings, and secondly, in the end he submitted the report as open to future test and subject to revision. Both arguments rest on a feeble reed. Neither argument makes Dewey any more disinterested or open. In the first case, we do not know exactly with what Dewey confronted the Paderewski group, and in the second case, a willingness to re-examine intelligently his scenario in light of new evidence should not be confused with either disinterestedness or openness. I suspect that most Rand confidential scenarioes end with the caveat that they are tentative, subject to test and future revision.Google Scholar

39. See Gerson, , Woodrow Wilson, pp. 154–157. Dewey's, John “Second Preliminary Memorandum—Confidential Polish Conditions in This Country,” subtitled, “Publicity,” August 28, 1918.Google Scholar

40. Here Dewey was very close to the role many liberal intellectuals later played in the emergence of “think-tank operationalism” and the management of public opinion via information control and press release. The roles Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Walt Rostow played in recent government activities immediately comes to mind. For an extended discussion of this problem see: Chomsky, Noam, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals,” in The Dissenting Academy, Roszak, Theodore, editor. (New York, 1967), p. 256. Also, Chomsky, Noam, American Power and the New Mandarins (New York, 1967), p. 325.Google Scholar

41. Gerson, , Woodrow Wilson, pp. 152–153.Google Scholar

42. Ibid., p. 153.Google Scholar

43. Ibid., p. 153.Google Scholar

44. Eisele and Zerby have difficulty determining both the meaning of the word manipulation and finding evidence to indicate that Dewey was engaged in manipulation. The Webster Collegiate Dictionary defines manipulation as: “To treat or manage with the intellect … to control the action of, by management; as to manipulate a convention; also to manage artfully or fraudulently.” I submit that the Urgent Confidential Memoranda plus the Polish study clearly reflect Dewey's manipulative involvement in Polish affairs.Google Scholar

45. Gerson, , Woodrow Wilson, pp. 156, 157. The second report has some puzzling characteristics. After his recommendation, Dewey listed the names of three U.S. Senators, eight Congressmen, one former Congressman and a democratic leader from Indiana. After each name is a quotation describing what percent of the Polish community voted for Wilson in the congressional district or the state represented by that person. There is also a listing of four states with indication of the Polish population therein, the number of Polish votes for Wilson, and the plurality that Wilson obtained in each state. I have no explanation for this other than that Dewey must have been trying to impress someone, perhaps Wilson himself, as to the significance of the Polish vote for his political fortune. This listing, however, makes one wonder whether or not Dewey ever confused the goal of making the “world safe for democracy” with the political fortunes of President Wilson.Google Scholar

46. Gerson, , Woodrow Wilson, p. 156.Google Scholar

47. Dewey, , “Confidential Report,” p. 30.Google Scholar

48. Ibid., p. 30.Google Scholar

49. Ibid., p. 30.Google Scholar

50. Ibid., p. 42.Google Scholar

51. Ibid., p. 76.Google Scholar

52. Ibid., p. 79.Google Scholar

53. Ibid., p. 73. Zerby's claim to discount this quote because it appeared in a discussion of the Polish Army is without foundation. Some of the most significant manpower channeling studies in the last decade have been made by the United States Army for the United States Army.Google Scholar

54. Gerson, , Woodrow Wilson, p. 154. Underlining for emphasis mine.Google Scholar

55. Karier, . “Liberalism and the Quest for Orderly Change”: 64.Google Scholar

56. Paraphrased from Bourke, , “Philosophy and Social Criticism”: 9.Google Scholar

57. See Ann Boydston, Jo, gen. editor, John Dewey: The Early Works, 1882–1890, Vol. I. (Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1969).Google Scholar

58. Bourke, , “Philosophy and Social Criticism”: 8.Google Scholar

59. Wright Mills, C., Sociology and Pragmatism (New York, 1966), p. 320.Google Scholar

60. Ibid., pp. 464–467.Google Scholar

61. Bourke, , “Philosophy and Social Criticism”: 12.Google Scholar

62. Resek, Carl, War and the Intellectuals, Essay by Randolph Bourne, “Twilight of Idols” (New York, 1964), p. 61.Google Scholar

63. Mills, , Sociology and Pragmatism, p. 422.Google Scholar

64. Bourke, , “Philosophy and Social Criticism”: 13.Google Scholar

65. Ibid., p. 13.Google Scholar

66. Zerby, , “John Dewey and the Polish Question”: 17.Google Scholar

67. Ibid., p. 17.Google Scholar

68. One might note that Dewey was supporting the radicals whom he saw as organizationally in the minority against the conservatives he knew to be organizationally in the majority.Google Scholar

69. Zerby, , “John Dewey and the Polish Question”: 19.Google Scholar

70. Mills, , Sociology and Pragmatism, pp. 422–423. Early in his career, Mills coined the phrase, “technologism,” while critically analyzing Dewey's essay on “Force and Coercion.” Interestingly enough, technologism, as Mills analyzed it, comes very close to what has become the standard mode of thought used at the major think tank centers in the 1960s and 1970s.Google Scholar

71. Lawson, , “John Dewey and the Hope for Reform”: 36–37. Lawson cites this quote to have come from Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York, 1927), pp. 126–127. A reading of these pages does not reveal this quotation, hence the error.Google Scholar

72. When Lawson makes the case that Freud appreciated Dewey's work he appears to rely on Max Eastman's recollection about his interview with Freud, and seems to accept at face value Eastman's statement that Freud referred to Dewey as “one of the truly great men of the era.” Given Freud's well-known distaste for “America” or whatever stood for “American,” I would be more than a bit wary about such a statement concerning a man who was recognized as a leading American philosopher. Especially should one be cautious with this evidence because, just a few paragraphs after Eastman recalls what Freud had said, he also recalled Freud's playful mood as he said, “He [Freud] put his head way back finally and laughed like a child. Sometimes a child at play reminds you of an odd little old man; there was something of that odd little old man in Freud's ways.” (Max Eastman, “A Significant Memory of Freud,” The New Republic, 104 (May 19, 1941): 695.) There is, then, just enough of a possibility that Freud was teasing Eastman to question seriously taking Eastman's testimonial of what Freud said at face value. At the very minimum, one must recognize that without corroborating evidence, the case cannot stand.Google Scholar

73. Lawson, , “John Dewey and the Hope for Reform”: 57.Google Scholar

74. I submit that Marcuse's Eros and Civilization is based on a solid understanding of Freud.Google Scholar

75. The exception here was my use of the term “mainly” in reference to Polish labor supply after the war. I should have said, “one of the main” etc.Google Scholar

76. Dewey, , Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York, 1938), p. 253.Google Scholar

77. I was aware that the reports existed, but did not know they were published and had not previously read them. While the case for manipulation can be made from the larger 80 page report, it is easier to make the case from the shorter memoranda.Google Scholar

78. Zerby, , “John Dewey and the Polish Question”: 27. Underlining for emphasis.Google Scholar

79. Eisele, , “John Dewey and the Immigrant”: 84, footnote 60.Google Scholar

80. Ibid., p. 74.Google Scholar

81. Dewey, John, “America in the World,” The Nation, (March 14, 1918): 287.Google Scholar

82. See Davis Graham, Hugh and Robert Gurr, Ted, Violence in America (New York, 1969). Also see The Kerner Report: Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York, 1968), pp. 216–221. Also see Wallace, Michael, “The Uses of Violence in American History”, The American Scholar, 40 (Winter 1970–71): 81–102.Google Scholar

83. Frankel, Charles, “John Dewey's Legacy,” American Scholar, 29 (June 1960): 314. I am indebted to David Hogan for tailing my attention to this quote.Google Scholar

84. Dewey, , Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 235.Google Scholar