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2. In a full analysis, two other fundamental assumptions of the dominant, modern conception of knowledge would also have to be dealt with: the assumption of uniformitarianism and the assumption that the purpose of knowledge is control. Space and time constraints preclude this more complete analysis here.Google Scholar

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8. “One of the things I have particularly noticed in the course of my life,” writes Owen Barfield, “is the ever-increasing vogue of the word value, and especially its plural, values, as well as of relatively modern concepts like value judgments and value free, in philosophy, psychology, sociology, journalism and elsewhere.” “People used to talk.” he observes, “about the beautiful and ugly, noble and beastly, right and wrong; but that could only go on as long as there was confidence that qualities are objectively real. The current preference for ‘values’ has come about because the term is one that neatly avoids any such ontological commitment.” Barfield, Owen, “Language, Evolution of Consciousness, and the Recovery of Human Meaning,” Teachers College Record, Vol. 82 (Spring 1981):428, 430.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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15. Laurence Veysey documents the intellectual fragmentation of these subjects during the last hundred years, and he also attributes it to the influence of the dominant scientific conception of knowledge. “Those who reject the dominant scientific conception of knowledge,” Veysey writes, “can only wander off in a score of mutually unrelated directions.” And those who accept it, he does not add, must by definition commit intellectual suicide. Is there another possibility? See, Veysey, Laurence, “The Plural Organized Worlds of the Humanities,” in Oleson, Alexandra and Voss, John, editors, The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America, 1960–1920 (Baltimore and London, 1979), p. 57.Google Scholar

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17. Green, Thomas F., “Schools and Communities: A Look Forward,” Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 39 (Spring 1969):221–252.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18. Cf., for example, Tyack, David and Hansot, Elizabeth, “Conflict and Consensus in American Public Education,” Daedalus, Vol. 110 (Summer 1981): 1–26; Grant, Gerald, “The Character of Education and the Education of Character,” Ibid., pp. 135–150; for an important, related analysis, see, Kaestle, Carl F., “Moral Education and Common Schools in America: a Historian's View,” Journal of Moral Education, Vol. 13 (May 1984):101–111.Google Scholar

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20. See, for example, Cox, Harvey, Religion in the Secular City: Towards a Postmodern Theology (New York, 1984); Polanyi, Michael called attention some years ago to the propensity of the fundamentalist mentality to join readily with the technological mentality. See, Polanyi, Michael, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, 1958), p. 216.Google Scholar

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23. Lears, Jackson, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880–1920 (New York, 1981).Google Scholar

24. Kolakowski, Leszek, Religion (New York and Oxford, 1982), p. 132. Among the most radical historical and sociological analyses of science, including so-called “hard science,” as a social institution and cultural product, and, hence, as demanding ideological analysis in all its particulars, is to be found in the work of David Bloor and his Edinburgh colleagues. See, for example, Bloor, David, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London, 1976), Barnes, B., Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory (London, 1974); and Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (London, 1977); and Barnes, B. and Shapiro, S., eds., Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture (Beverly Hills and London, 1979).Google Scholar

25. See, Ermarth, Michael, Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason (Chicago and London, 1978).Google Scholar

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32. I take my description in this paragraph of an education that is highly intellectual and aesthetic in an integral way from the theory and practice of Waldorf Education, now more than sixty years old and the largest independent school movement in the world. See, Harwood, A.C., The Recovery of Man in Childhood (London, 1958); Rist, George and Schneider, Peter, Integrating Vocational and General Education: A Rudolf Steiner School (Hamburg, 1979); Hofmann, V. et al., Forschungsbericht über Bildungslebensläufe ehemaliger Waldorfschüler; Eine Untersuchung der Geburtsjahrgänge 1946 and 1947 (Stuttgart, 1981).Google Scholar