1 Exod 34:6; Num 14:18; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2; Ps 86:15; 103:8; 111:4; 112:4; 145:5; Neh 9:31; 2 Chr 30:9. See Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament (ed. Botterweck, G. Johannes et al.; trans. Green, D. E.; 15 vols.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004) 13:437–54Google Scholar; Encyclopaedia Biblica (9 vols.; Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1976) 7:364–67Google Scholar (Hebrew).

2 Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, Shirah 3 (trans. Lauterbach, Jacob Z.; 2 vols.; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 2004) 1:185Google Scholar; b. Šabb. 133b; y. Pe’ah 1:1, 15b.

3 Sifre: A Tannaitic Commentary on the Book of Deuteronomy, para. 49 (trans. Reuven Hammer; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) 105–6.

4 Deut 19:13; 25:12.

5 Exod 23:3.

6 Lev 19:15.

7 m. Ketub. 9:2–3.

8 Socrates already stressed in his trial defense that he did not ask for mercy from his judges, since they were obligated to base their judgment solely on the law; see Plato, Apology, end of the first speech.

9 Nussbaum, Martha C., Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 354–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 The Greek and Roman Stoics embraced and developed this view. See Brennan, Tad, “Stoic Moral Psychology,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (ed. Inwood, Brad; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 257–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 297–353; see also the discussion of Aristotle, below.

12 Yehuda, Eliezer Ben, “Raḥamim,” A Complete Dictionary of Ancient and Modern Hebrew (16 vols.; Jerusalem, New York, and London: Thomas Yoseloff, 1948–1959) 13:6541–43Google Scholar (Hebrew); Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament (ed. Botterweck) 13:437–52.

13 I prefer “compassion” to “pity,” unless the latter appears in the translated sources, because “pity” has come to have a nuance of superiority and patronizing of the sufferer. See Ben-Ze’ev, Aharon, The Subtlety of Emotions (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000) 327–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 301–4.

14 Aristotle, Rhet. 2.8 (1385b) (The Basic Works of Aristotle [ed. Mckeon, Richard; New York: Random House, 1941Google Scholar]). Aristotle uses the Greek word eleos which might be translated pity, compassion, or mercy. In this context, the English translations preferred pity.

15 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 297.

16 Aristotle, Poet. 13 (1453a).

17 Nussbaum (Upheavals of Thought, 297) places Aristotle among the supporters of compassion, but she seems to read too much into his position. Although Aristotle recognized compassion as a natural feeling, he did not deem it to be a virtue. See Carr, Brian, “Pity and Compassion as Social Virtues,” Philosophy 74 (1999) 411–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.5 (1105b–1106a).

19 On the relationship between virtues and feelings, see Kosman, L. A., “Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (ed. Rorty, Amelie O.; Major Thinkers Series 2; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) 103–16Google Scholar. For a detailed analysis of the traits that Aristotle considers to be virtues, see Cruzer, Howard J., Aristotle and the Virtues (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

20 Pines, in translator’s introduction to The Guide of the Perplexed (trans. Pines, Shlomo; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) lxxviii–xciiGoogle Scholar. On the influence of Alfarabi on Maimonides’s ethics see: Davidson, Herbert, “Maimonides’ ‘Shemonah Peraqim’ and Alfarabi’s ‘Fusul Al-Madani,’” PAAJR 31 (1963) 33–50Google Scholar; Jeffrey Macy, “A Study in Medieval Jewish and Arabic Political Philosophy: Maimonides’ Shmonah Peraqim and Alfarabi’s Fusul Al-Madani” (PhD diss., Hebrew University, 1982). For a general survey of Maimonides’s knowledge of Greek and Arab Philosophy, see Davidson, Herbert A., Moses Maimonides: The Man and His Work, (New York: Oxford University Press 2005) 86–121CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 Al-Farabi, Fusul Al-Madani: Aphorism of the Statesman (ed. and trans. D. M. Dunlop; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961) 29–30. Alfarabi, The Political Writings: Selected Aphorisms and Other Texts (trans. Butterworth, Charles E.; Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001) 14–15Google Scholar.

22 The Commandments: Sefer ha-Mitzvoth of Maimonides, Ninth Principle (trans. Chavel, Charles B.; 2 vols.; London: Soncino, 1967) 2:397Google Scholar.

23 The Eight Chapters on Ethics (Shemonah Peraḳim): A Psychological and Ethical Treatise (ed. and trans. Gorfinkle, Joseph I.; New York: AMS Press, 1966) 42–43Google Scholar.

24 Eight Chapters, chap. 2 (Gorfinkle, 47); Mishneh Torah, Laws Concerning Character Traits 1:1; see especially Laws of Repentance 5:2.

25 Lev 22:28.

26 Guide 3:48 (trans. Pines, 599). Ibn Tibbon’s classic translation used the Hebrew term raḥamim here. The connection between pity and the imagination is apparently related to the Aristotelian conception that pity is an emotion that results from fear, lest the pitier or one of those close to him suffer tribulation. This fear has its source in the imagination.

27 The Commandments, Ninth Principle (trans. Chavel), 2:397. The Arabic terms are: alraphah, alraḥmah, alšaphaqah, altwaddud. Ibn Tibon translated the terms to Hebrew: ḥemlah, raḥmanut, ṣedaqah, ḥesed. See also The Commandments, Positive Commandment 206 (trans. Chavel).

28 The Commandments, Positive Commandment 8 (trans. Chavel), 1:11–12.

29 Deut 28:9.

30 Deut 11:22.

31 Sifre on Deuteronomy, para. 49.

32 Deut 13:5.

33 b. Soṭah 14a.

34 This is explained at length in Guide 1:54, and will be discussed below, in section 3.

35 Ḥasid is from ḥesed, which is grace. The English translator could not use Gracious because it was already occupied for ḥanun and therefore gave a transliteration.

36 See principle nine of Sepher Hammiṣvot. Maimonides used different language in each context. In positive commandment 8, he used Hebrew following the Midrash cited. In principle nine, he used Arabic. According to the Ibn-Tibon translation (see note 27 of this article), three terms are identical (raḥum, ṣaddiq, ḥasid) and one is close in meaning (ḥanun close to ḥemlah).

37 Sepher Hammiṣvot, Positive Commandment 206; Laws of Mourning 14:1.

38 This was noted by Rosenberg, Shalom, “And You Shall Walk in His Ways,” in Israeli Philosophy (ed. Kasher, Asa and Hallamish, Moshe; Tel-Aviv: Papyrus, 1983) 72–92Google Scholar (Hebrew).

39 See, for example, Laws Concerning Slaves 9:8 and Laws Concerning Kings 10:11 (both are discussed later in this article).

40 Laws Concerning Character Traits 1:4 (Mishneh Torah: The Book of Knowledge [trans. Moses Hyamson; Jerusalem: Boys Town, 1962] 47b). For a comparison to the mean of Aristotle, see Fox, Marvin, “The Doctrine of the Mean in Aristotle and Maimonides: A Comparative Study,” in Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics, and Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) 93–123Google Scholar.

41 Laws Concerning Character Traits 1:5–6.

42 This example supports the position that the mean for Maimonides is not a practical guide for every situation but a general principle that characterizes the appropriate behavior in every situation. Maimonides did not expect that a person would mechanically measure the distance between the two extremes and would act accordingly in every case. He rather meant that a person should consider the relevant circumstances and determine the appropriate behavior accordingly. This appropriate behavior would reflect a certain middle-way that fit the specific situation. See Ravitsky, Aviram, “The Doctrine of the Mean and Asceticism: On the Uniformity of Maimonides’ Ethics,” Tarbiz 79 (2011): 439–69Google Scholar, at 439, 445–48 (Hebrew).

43 The Code of Maimonides, Book Seven: The Book of Agriculture (trans. Klein, Isaac; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) 89Google Scholar.

44 These rhetorical arguments are aimed to persuade the masses to be compassionate and kind. The philosophical basis for charity is rooted in Maimonides’s ethics and theology. For this matter one should refer to Guide 3:53–54 where he discusses the terms ḥesed, mišpaṭ, and ṣedaqah (grace, justice, and righteousness). In these chapters, Maimonides develops the idea that the duty of giving charity (and being involved in social justice in general) is based on the duty to emulate God (see the third section of this article). The scaling of the eight degrees of charity with the beneficiary self-sufficient at the peak (Laws of Gifts to the Poor, 10:7–14) also results from emulating God’s action.

45 Midrash Tannaʾim on Deut 15:9 (ed. Hoffmann, 83).

46 b. Šabb. 151b.

47 b. Beṣah 32b; R. Y. Karo (in Keseph Mišneh) and R. David ben Solomon ibn Zimra (Radbaz) referenced b. Yebam. 79a, which also contains this motif in the context of the Gibeonites; see below.

48 Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, Bešallaḥ., parashah 3 (= trans. Lauterbach 1:209); Exod. Rab. 1:27; Num. Rab. 9:11; Tanḥ., Naśoʾ 1. Obviously, the idea of brotherhood among the Israelites is already Biblical, and can be found in many commandments that employ the wording “your brother.”

49 Laws Concerning Repentance 2:10; Laws of Wounding and Damaging 5:10; Laws Concerning Forbidden Intercourse 19:17; Laws Concerning Slaves 9:8 (the two latter sources are discussed extensively below). For a discussion of Maimonides’s view of Jewish identity, see: Kellner, M., Maimonides’ Confrontation with Mysticism (Portland, OR: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2006) 238–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Kellner emphasizes the cognitive aspect (e.g., what should a Jew believe in?). In these texts, we see the ethical aspect.

50 The Code of Maimonides, Book Five: The Book of Holiness (trans. Rabinowitz, Louis and Grossman, Philip; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965) 125Google Scholar.

51 b. Yebam. 78b–79a; y. Qidd. 4:1, 68b.

52 2 Sam 2:21:4–6.

53 b. Yebam. 79a.

54 The Code of Maimonides, Book Twelve: The Book of Acquisition (trans. Klein, Isaac; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951) 281Google Scholar.

55 As R. Yosef Karo attests, Maimonides draws this conclusion from the fact that the prohibition “You shall not rule over him ruthlessly” (Lev 25:43, 46) refers solely to the Hebrew manservant (Keseph Mišneh ad loc.). See also, Siphraʾ, Behar 6:6 (ed. Weiss, 118b); b. Soṭah 3b.

56 y. B. Qam. 8:4, 6c (see also b. Ketub. 52b).

57 This is based on several Talmudic sources. y. B. Qam. 8:4, 6c relates that R. Yohanan would give his slave the same meat that he would eat and the same wine that he would drink; and b. Ketub. 61a tells of a few sages who acted in this manner. b. Ber. 40a states in the name of Rab: “A person may not eat before he gives to his beast”; and b. Giṭ. 62a attests to sages who did so.

58 b. Nid. 47a (in the name of Samuel).

59 Maimonides’s source is Gen. Rab. 48:3.

60 The mention of Abraham’s offspring alludes to b. Beṣah 32b, but also is compatible with b. Yebam. 79a and p. Qidd. 4:1, 65b.

61 Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980) 418–30Google Scholar. For an additional reference to the laws of the Torah as laws of mercy, see Laws of Sabbath 2:3: “Hence you learn that the ordinances of the Law were meant to bring upon the world not vengeance, but mercy, lovingkindness and peace.”

62 Maimonides emphasizes the universality of mercy in additional places. Especially noteworthy is what he writes in Laws of Kings 10:11, in which he discusses the obligation to treat the resident alien (ger tošaḇ) decently and kindly and extends it to idolaters, as well. For an analysis of this halakhah, see Blidstein, Gerald J., “On the Standing of the Resident Alien in Maimonides’ Thought,” in Studies in Halakhic and Aggadic Thought (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2004) 155–64Google Scholar (Hebrew).

63 b. Šabb. 151b.

64 Laws Concerning Character Traits 1:5; Shemonah Peraqim, chapter 4. Lamm, Norman, “The Sage and the Saint in the Writings of Maimonides,” in Samuel Belkin Memorial Volume (ed. Carmilly, Moshe and Leaf, Hayim; New York: Erna Michael College of Hebraic Studies, Yeshiva University, 1981) 11–28Google Scholar (Hebrew); Kasher, Hannah, “‘Hakham,’ ‘Hasid,’ and ‘Tov’ in Maimonides’ Writings: A Study in Terms and Their Reference,” Maimonidean Studies 4 (2000): 81–106Google Scholar.

65 The various works differ on this point. Maimonides writes in Shemonah Peraqim (chapter 4) that the upright path is the mean, while the trait of piety (ḥasidut) is meant only for those who need to mend their ways, or to erect a protective barrier for those who are liable to stray from the middle path. In Laws Concerning Character Traits 1:5, in contrast, he presents “the standard of piety” in a positive, and even praiseworthy light, as a level above the “middle paths.” Some scholars maintain that Maimonides changed his opinion (see Twersky, Introduction, 459–68), while others assert that he retained his early view (see Ravitsky, “Doctrine of the Mean,” 466–68, and the literature he references).

66 Negative Commandment 277: “This prohibition is contained in His words, ‘Neither shalt thou favour a poor man in his cause’ [Exod 23:3]. The Negative Commandment regarding this matter is found again in His words, ‘thou shalt not respect the person of the poor’ [Lev. 19:15].” (The Commandments [trans. Chavel] 2:260).

67 Negative Commandment 279: “This prohibition is contained in His words, ‘Thine eye shall not pity’ [Deut 19:21]” (The Commandments [trans. Chavel], 2:261). Nahmanides argues for the enumeration of an additional commandment that specifically prohibits showing mercy to a murderer; see Nahmanides’s glosses to Sepher Hammiṣvot (Negative Commandment 13) and Chavel’s discussion: Sepher Hammiṣvot of Maimonides with Critical Comments by Nahmanides (ed. Hayyim Dov Chavel; Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1981) 406 (Hebrew).

68 Code of Maimonides, Judges, 60–61.

69 Midrash Tannaʾim on Deut 19:13 (ed. Hoffmann, 115); Sifre on Deuteronomy, para. 187 (trans. R. Hammer) 207.

70 Midrash Tannaʾim on Deut 19:21 (ed. Hoffmann, 118). See R. David ibn Zimra (Hil. Sanhedrin 20:4), who mentions this source. See also Sepher Hammiṣvot, Negative Commandment 279.

71 Siphraʾ, Qedošim 2:4 (ed. Weiss, 89); Meḵiltaʾ deRabbi Šimon bar Yoḥac Exodus, 23:3 (ed. Epstein-Melamed, 214); Siphrey ʿAl Sepher Deḇarim on Deut 17 (Finkelstein, 28); Midrash Tannaʾim on Deut 1:17 (ed. Hoffmann, 9).

72 He reiterates this in Laws of Wounding and Damaging 1:4; Laws of Creditor and Debtor 1:4.

73 Yeš bahem aḵzariyut, literally, they exhibit cruelty.

74 Code of Maimonides, Judges, 8. The opposite is stated regarding one who incites to idolatry: “On the tribunal trying his case are appointed a very aged man, a eunuch, and a childless man, because they are not likely to show him compassion” (Laws Concerning the Sanhedrin 11:5; Code, Judges, 32).

75 b. Sanh. 36b. Cf. t. Sanh. 7:2; y. Sanh. 4:2, 22a.

76 For that matter there is no difference between the very aged man, eunuch, and the one who is childless. Compare R. Menahem Meiri’s interpretation to this law: “For all those who possess cruelty, you see that we strive for deliverance [from a guilty sentence] and pursue merit [i.e., acquittal]” (Beyt Habbehirah, Sanh. [ed. Sofer, 164]).

77 Laws Concerning the Sanhedrin 2:7.

78 m. Sanh. 1:6 (ed. Danby, 383).

79 See the midrash regarding the inciter: “‘Neither shall thou spare’—do not seek to justify him” (Siphrey ʿAl Sepher Deḇarim, pisqah 89 [Sifre on Deuteronomy (trans. R. Hammer) para. 89, 139]); b. Sanh. 33b; the ruling by Maimonides: Laws of Idolatry 5:4.

80 Siphraʾ, Qedošim 2:4 (“You shall not be partial to the poor”); Meḵiltaʾ deRabbi Šimon bar Yoḥay, Exodus, 23:3 (ed. Epstein-Melamed, 214): “You shall not show deference to a poor man [in his dispute]” (Mekhilta de-Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai [trans. W. David Nelson; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 2006] 358–59); m. Ketub. 9:2 (“They may not show pity in a legal suit” [ed. Danby, 258]).

81 E.g., b. Ketub. 52b; b. B. Meṣ. 83a.

82 b. B. Meṣ. 83a. Cf. y. B. Meṣ. 6:6, 11b. This instance is discussed extensively in the scholarly literature. See Silberg, Moshe, Talmudic Law and the Modern State (ed. Wiener, Marvin S.; trans. Bokser, Ben Zion; New York: Burning Bush, 1973) esp. 95Google Scholar; Urbach, Ephraim E., The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs (trans. Abrahams, Israel; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1975) 330–32Google Scholar; Elon, Menachem, Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles (trans. Auerbach, Bernard and Sykes, Melvin J.; 4 vols.; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1994) 1:156Google Scholar; Shilo, Shmuel, “On One Aspect of Law and Morals: Lifnim Mishurat Hadin,” Israel Law Review 13 (1978) 359–90Google Scholar.

83 Prov 2:20.

84 Rashi (b. B. Meṣ. 83a) interpreted “the way of the good” as: liphnim miššurat haddin, and this understanding was followed by most of the commentators (even though the narrative does not use this term). Tosafot (b. B. Meṣ. 24b, s.v. liphnim miššurat haddin), in contrast, finds here another principle, one which imposes a broader obligation.

85 At times liphnim miššurat haddin denotes conduct not required by the letter of the law, but which is fitting in terms of justice or equity. At times this refers to a specific exemption which a person waives or other circumstances. See Shilo, “On One Aspect.”

86 This is not a correction of the law based on justice or equity, or a voluntary waiver of the exemption granted by the law. The porters are responsible for the damage, and the only reason to make a concession to them is their economic situation. See Nimmuqey Yoseph, which states explicitly: “That is, to be merciful to people” (Rif, b. B. Meṣ. 51b).

87 Rif, b. B. Meṣ. 51b.

88 As is the ruling of Raban (R. Eliezer ben Nathan of Mainz) and his grandson Ravya (R. Eliezer ben Joel ha-Levi of Bonn), cited in Mordeḵay, b. B. Meṣ., 157, followed by many of the Franco-German decisors. This school developed a general principle of allowing a judge to rule liphnim miššurat haddin. See Elon, Jewish Law; Shilo, “On One Aspect.”

89 Laws of Hiring 3:2, 3 (trans. Pines, 12–13).

90 This ruling fits Maimonides’s general approach to liphnim miššurat haddin as an ethical norm that addresses the litigant’s goodwill. See: Laws of Robbery and Lost Property 11:7, 17. He, therefore, would not allow a judge to rule liphnim miššurat haddin or on the basis of mercy.

91 Guide 3:35 (the sixth class) (trans. Pines, 536).

92 Guide 3:41 (“Introduction”) (trans. Pines, 560). See Bazak, Ya’akov, “Maimonides’ Views on Crime and Punishment,” in Jewish Law and Current Legal Problems (ed. Rakover, Nahum; Jerusalem: Jewish Legal Heritage Society, 1984) 121–26Google Scholar.

93 Guide 3:39 (trans. Pines, 554).

94 Immanuel Kant is the major spokesperson of the theory of retribution in punishment. See Kant, The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right (trans. W. Hastie; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1887) 195–204. Following Kant, this approach became widespread among philosophers and legal experts. See, e.g., Hart, H. L. A., Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) esp. 210–37Google Scholar; see also Hugo Adam Bedau and Erin Kelly, “Punishment,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/punishment.

95 Murphy, Jeffrie G., “Mercy and Legal Justice,” in Forgiveness and Mercy (ed. Murphy, Jeffrie G. and Hampton, Jean; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 162–86Google Scholar; Statman, Daniel, “The Moral and Legal Standing of Mercy,” in Directions in Criminal Liability: Inquiries in the Theory of Criminal Law (ed. Lederman, Eli; Tel Aviv: Taubenschlag Institute of Criminal Law, Tel Aviv University, 2001) 9–51Google Scholar (Hebrew). For a different opinion, see Smart, Alwynne, “Mercy,” in The Philosophy of Punishment: A Collection of Papers (ed. Acton, H. B.; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1969) 212–27Google Scholar; Fox, Richard G., “When Justice Sheds Tears: The Place of Mercy in Sentencing,” Monash Law Review 25 (1999) 1–28Google Scholar.

96 Guide 3:35 (the fifth and seventh classes).

97 Guide 3:40 (trans. Pines, 555).

98 Maimonides did not explicitly mention anywhere in his writings the Aristotelian distinction between distributive and corrective justice (Eth. nic. 5.3–4 [1131a–1132b]). Even without this distinction, however, the principle of fitting compensation could still have been raised. For a discussion of this point and an original analysis of Maimonidean tort law, see Sinai, Yuval and Shmueli, Benjamin, “Calabresi’s and Maimonides’s Tort Law Theories: A Comparative Analysis and a Preliminary Sketch of a Modern Model of Differential Pluralistic Tort Liability Based on the Two Theories,” Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 26 (2014) 59–133, esp. 115–20Google Scholar.

99 Guide 3:42 (trans. Pines, 568). See Guide 3:40 for the commandments relating to the laws of damages.

100 Guide 3:55 (trans. Pines, 631). See Harvey, Zeev, “Justice and Rights in Maimonides’ Teaching,” in Jewish Political Tradition throughout the Ages: In Memory of Daniel J. Elazar (ed. Hellinger, Moshe; Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2010) 137–43 (Hebrew)Google Scholar.

101 Harvey, “Justice and Rights,” noted that the concept of right appears also in Guide 3:49, in connection with a wife’s ketuḇah (marriage contract) and the payment of the fee of a harlot (before the Giving of the Torah). These examples are of the same type, and exemplify the same principle.

102 Maimonides mentions mercy as the reason behind the laws relating to the hired worker (Guide 3:42). He explains the prohibition of delaying the hired worker’s wages as a question of mercy, as well as the worker’s right to eat from the vineyard in which he works. This reason, however, underlies the legislation. Once this has been anchored in law, it is the hired worker’s right to receive his wages on time and to partake of the vineyard. The judge who tries such cases will grant these to him as a right, and not out of mercy.

103 Guide 3:53. See Hadad, especially Eliezer, The Torah and Nature in Maimonides’ Writings (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2011) 223–52 (Hebrew)Google Scholar.

104 Guide 3:55 (trans. Pines, 631).

105 Laws Concerning Character Traits 1:6. As we have seen, this is anchored in the commandment of “Love thy neighbor as thyself,” but the main principle at work here seems to be that of imitatio Dei, which is broader and more comprehensive.

106 Kreisel, Howard, “Imitatio Dei in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed,” AJS Review 19 (1994) 169–211CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, Maimonides’ Political Thought (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999) 125–58Google Scholar.

107 The Commandments, Positive Commandment 8 (trans. Chavel), 1:12.

108 Guide 1:50–51. See Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed (ed. Michael Schwarz; Tel Aviv: 2002), 113, n. 7 (Hebrew).

109 Guide 1:52 (trans. Pines, 116).

110 Guide 1:54 (trans. Pines, 125).

111 This is indicated by the verses mentioned by Maimonides, and from the etymology of raḥamim-reḥem (womb).

112 See Hadad, Torah and Nature, 234–42.

113 Guide 1:54 (trans. Pines, 126).

114 Guide 1:54 (trans. Pines, 127).

115 Guide 1:54 (trans. Pines, 126)

116 This is part of a broader question regarding the relation between the ethics of the Guide and that of Shemonah Peraqim and Hil. Deʿot. According to one scholarly view, in the Guide Maimonides presents an ethics different from that in his halakhic works. See Davidson, Herbert, “The Middle Way in Maimonides’ Ethics,” PAAJR 54 (1987) 31–72, at 65–68Google Scholar; see also Shatz, David, “Maimonides’ Moral Theory,” in The Cambridge Companion to Maimonides (ed. Seeskin, Kenneth; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 180–81Google Scholar. Other scholars, in contrast, argue that, despite the differences, Maimonides presents a uniform ethics. See Ravitsky, “Doctrine of the Mean.” The current article is limited to a discussion of raḥamim.

117 Guide 1:54 (trans. Pines, 127–28).

118 This is consistent with what he writes in the concluding chapters of the Guide (3:53–54). This parallelism has been discussed extensively. See, for example, Eliezer Goldman, “The Worship Peculiar to Those Who Have Apprehended the True Realities,” in Expositions and Inquiries: Jewish Thought in Past and Present (ed. Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman; Jerusalem: Magnes; Ein Tzurim: Yaacov Herzog Center for Jewish Studies, 1996) 77–86 (Hebrew); Hadad, Torah and Nature, 223–52. Much has been written on the place of the political ideal for Maimonides. See Aviezer Ravitsky, “Philosophy and Leadership in Maimonides,” Daʿat 57–59 (2006) 31–59 (Hebrew), and the literature the article references.

119 On the Torah as an expression of the Mosaic legislation, see Levinger, Jacob S., Maimonides as Philosopher and Codifier (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1989) 155–64 (Hebrew)Google Scholar.

120 Maimonides (Guide 1:54) emphasizes that even laws such as “you must not let anything that breathes remain alive” (Deut 20:16) are not founded in retaliation. Rather, they have a logical goal: “So that they may not teach you to do all the abhorrent things that they do” (Deut 20:18).

121 Howard Kreisel, “Imitatio Dei,” 178.