The notion of a meaningful life in secular modernism is often caught between two worlds: a deep human yearning for cosmic meaning, on the one hand, and a seemingly random, impersonal, contingent universe on the other hand. This is often referred to as absurdity. One response to absurdity is classical theism, and another is scientific reductionism. A third response, and the subject of this article, is religious non-theism. This article: (a) explicates the primary tensions of absurdity, in relation to both human expectations and discussions of beauty in contemporary physics and cosmology; (b) analyzes the arguments and motivations of religious non-theists and the attitude of awe toward the cosmos as a rapprochement between—or at least alternative to—classical theism and scientific reductionism, as a sort of post-secular response to absurdity; and (c) begins a critique of the religious non-theist perspective, explicating four worries, expressed as the Commitment Problem, the Standards Problem, the Moral Problem, and the Awe Problem.

Elaborate depictions of the court system in Second Temple and rabbinic literature signify its centrality for the Jewish legal tradition. Rather than offering positivistic descriptions, these representations are better thought of as templates of how to organize justice. While historically less informative, they are vivid expressions of the early Jewish legal imagination and its fascinating fixation on the architecture of justice.

A measure of the ahistoric quality of early accounts of judicial administration is their considerable exegetical strata. This article surveys how four seminal Second Temple and rabbinic works constructed accounts of the judiciary on the foundation of Scripture. The variances among them unfold from decisive hermeneutical choices, beginning with the threshold question of which among several, internally inconsistent, biblical sources to select as a base text. What animates these various choices, in turn, are competing conceptions of the origin and nature of legal authority within a religious tradition that enshrines the role of law.

The earliest prologue to the Life of Pachomius constructs the apostle Paul as an exemplary father and argues that Pachomius conforms to such a Pauline model. Prologues composed later make no such comparison but cite Antony as the model ascetic before turning to the narration of Pachomius’s life. This paper follows the Pauline thread of the earliest prologue by examining the use of the figure Paul and Pauline literature in the surviving Vitae. I argue that certain narratives cast Pachomius’s legacy after a Pauline prototype. Paul’s ascent to paradise in 2 Corinthians 12 and Paul’s survey of torments in the Apocalypse of Paul are rewritten in some of the Coptic and Arabic Vitae as episodes in Pachomius’s life. This use of Paul as a prototype for ascetic hagiography creates a vision of ascetic holiness incompatible with that constructed in the Life of Antony. Other narratives in the Pachomian Vitae, however, construct Pachomius after an Antonian prototype and reflect ascetic ideals promoted in the Life of Antony. The paper closes with reflections on possible historical circumstances for the shift from a Pauline model of asceticism to an Antonian one in the composition of Pachomian Vitae.

Lactantius’s Divine Institutes is a conversation with many partners. His affinity for Stoic thought in general, and Seneca in particular, is especially pronounced. Throughout the Institutes we find a delicate back-and-forth between Lactantius’s claim of a novel philosophy centered on the Christian Gospel and his attraction to—and dependence on—the pagan philosophy he hoped to supplant. This interplay is distinctly relevant to Lactantius’s portrayal of the figure of Jesus in Institutes IV. In this paper, I argue that Lactantius shapes his story of the nature and work of Jesus in part to give an answer to a primary Stoic question: where is the sapiens? Indeed, the figure of the sapiens, the “Stoic sage,” had presented something of a problem for the Stoa: Stoic cosmology demanded he exist while Stoic history had failed to find him. By Seneca’s time, a resigned acceptance of the absence of such figures of incarnate wisdom was commonplace; the figure of the sapiens had begun to fade away into the realm of theory, separated from imperfect human practice. In redressing this concern, Lactantius portrays his Christ: the true sage and exemplum, wisdom and virtue incarnate. In short, to Seneca’s resignation, Lactantius offers a rebuke and a corrective by a clever re-shaping of both Christian and Stoic expectation.

This article explores Maimonides’s position with regard to mercy in various aspects—ethics, law, and theology—and examines its unity. The first section discusses Maimonides’s view on the question of mercy in the moral plane: is mercy a virtue? It begins with a short discussion of the Aristotelian stance and then analyzes Maimonides’s view. It shows that Maimonides rejected the philosophical critique of mercy and deemed it a virtue. The second section discusses Maimonides’s view in the judicial plane: may a judge show mercy in judgment and be lenient when ruling? It also explores how Maimonides justifies the negation of mercy in the legal plane in contrast with his view of mercy as a virtue. The third section explores Maimonides’s view of mercy in the theological context. In his discussion of the divine attributes Maimonides interprets the attributes of “merciful and gracious,” and offered a metaphorical interpretation. Since humans are mandated to imitate God, this interpretation has consequences in the normative sphere. The theological discussion therefore raises the question of the moral and legal standing of mercy from a new perspective. It also raises the question of the relation between Maimonides’s position in the Guide of the Perplexed and that in his halakhic compositions. Are these two apparently different positions compatible?

The study explores the character and meaning of the imagery of the kiss in the Zohar as an expression of dynamic union. In order to demonstrate the formation of a specific structure of ideas and their dynamics within Kabbalistic theosophy, the Zoharic imagery found in the pericope Terumah has been situated here within the context of numerous sources, from which the Zohar, through direct or indirect transmission, could have drawn its key elements. The metaphor of the kiss, which allows the Zoharic homily to embrace several central Kabbalistic concepts of love, presents love as a universal power, being comprised of two Neoplatonic notions, the hypostatic relation and the principle of “being contained in each other.” The analysis of the various sources across ancient Greek, medieval Islamic, and Christian traditions amounts to a different characterization of the meaning adduced thus far in scholarship regarding eros in Jewish mysticism and suggests a more plausible trajectory of influence of Greek sources in the early Kabbalah.