¹ Adelman, Jeremy, ‘Andean Impasses’, New Left Review, 18 (November– December 2002), p. 41 Google Scholar. Adelman's thoughtful article illustrates the difficulties of comparative political analysis in the Andean region – the origins of instability and correlation of social forces in contemporary Colombia, Peru and Venezuela (as well as Bolivia), vary significantly and are highly complex, rendering attempts to find commonalities problematic. For a recent survey of literature on ‘failed states’, see the special issue of Development and Change, 33: 5 (November 2002).

² Adelman, ‘Andean Impasses’, p. 59.Google Scholar

³ Ibid., pp. 59–60.Google Scholar

⁴ On the García administration, see John Crabtree, Peru Under García: An Opportunity Lost, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1992; and Carol Graham, Peru's APRA: Parties, Politics, and the Elusive Quest for Democracy, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1992. A personal account of the 1990 elections can be found in Mario Vargas Llosa, El pez en el agua, Barcelona, Editorial Seix Barral, 1993.Google Scholar

⁵ For background information on the Fujimori regime, see Philip Mauceri, State Under Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1996; Maxwell Cameron and Philip Mauceri (eds), The Peruvian Labyrinth: Politics, Society, Economy, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997; John Crabtree and Jim Thomas (eds), Fujimori's Peru: The Political Economy, London, Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998; Carlos Iván Degregori, La década de la antipolítica: auge y huida de Alberto Fujimori y Vladimiro Montesinos, Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2000; Raúl Wiener, Bandido Fujimori: el reeleccionista, Lima, WWW Editores, 2001. On the web of corruption spun by Montesinos, see Sally Bowen and Jane Holligan, El espía imperfecto: la telaraña siniestra de Vladimiro Montesinos, Lima, Peisa, 2003.Google Scholar

⁶ Weyland, Kurt, ‘Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 31: 3 (Fall 1996), pp. 3–31;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Crabtree, John, ‘Populisms Old and New: The Peruvian Case’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 19: 2 (April 2000), pp. 163–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; O'Donnell, Guillermo, ‘Delegative Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 5 (January 1994), pp. 55–69 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McSherry, Patrice, ‘The Emergence of “Guardian Democracy”’, NACLA Report on the Americas, 32: 3 (November 1998), pp. 16–24 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Zakaria, Fareed, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, 76: 6 (November 1997), pp. 22–44 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Collier, David and Levitsky, Steven, ‘Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research’, World Politics, 49: 3 (April 1997), pp. 430–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Carol Wise, ‘State Policy and Social Conflict in Peru’, in Cameron and Mauceri (eds), The Peruvian Labyrinth, pp. 70–103; and Michnik, Adam, ‘The Montesinos Virus’, Social Research, 68: 4 (Winter 2001), pp. 905–16.Google Scholar

⁷ Accounts of the 2000 elections and their immediate aftermath can be found in Taylor, Lewis, ‘Patterns of Electoral Corruption in Peru: The April 2000 General Election’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 34: 4 (December 2000), pp. 391–415;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Lewis Taylor, ‘Alberto Fujimori's Peripeteia: From “re-reelección” to regime collapse’, European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 70 (April 2001), pp. 3–24.

⁸ Polling data from the Apoyo agency published in El Comercio, 23 April 2001, indicated that voter approval regarding the conduct of ONPE and the National Electoral Tribunal, both highly questioned organizations under Fujimori, stood at 74 and 71 per cent respectively. The president's personal standing registered 68 per cent, that of his government 62 per cent; a substantial 42 per cent wanted Paniagua to remain in office.Google Scholar

⁹ El Comercio, 23 January 2001.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Such attitudes had been spread initially by the actions of incompetent governments in the 1980s, which produced a collapse of the party system. They were encouraged by Fujimori throughout the 1990s as a ploy to neutralize potential opposition. On this, see John Crabtree, The 1995 Election in Peru: End of the Road for the Party System?, Occasional Paper No. 12, London, Institute of Latin American Studies, 1995; and Martín Tanaka, Los espejismos de la democracia. El colapso de un sistema de partidos en el Perú, Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1998.Google Scholar

¹¹ El Comercio, 18 January 2001.Google Scholar

¹² On this incident, see Caretas, 1615 (19 April 2000); 1662 (22 March 2001); 1663 (29 March 2001) and the reports in La República and El Comercio, 22 March 2001 and 23 March 2001.Google Scholar

¹³ Early opinion polls indicated that 65 per cent would ‘definitely not’ support the APRA candidate, while a substantial 74 per cent stated that García's pronouncements were ‘not believable’. El Comercio, 3 February 2001.Google Scholar

¹⁴ El Comercio, 12 March 2001.Google Scholar

¹⁵ The level of voter rejection towards García fell from 74 per cent to 46 per cent in the month following his return to Peru. Caretas, 1658 (26 February 2001).Google Scholar

¹⁶ FIM presidential candidate, Fernando Olivera, had built his reputation during the 1990s by fulminating consistently against political corruption. This included a personal crusade directed at ex-president García, conducted via protracted parliamentary investigations into allegations of personal enrichment and foreign bank accounts. While only a small percentage of the FIM's supporters would have found an alternative home in APRA, Olivera wrested many votes from Toledo and Flores.Google Scholar

¹⁷ El Comercio, 5 June 2001.Google Scholar

¹⁸ La República, 6 June 2001.Google Scholar

¹⁹ El Comercio, 16 May 2004. The poll was conducted among electors in Lima.Google Scholar

²⁰ Peru's deep ethnic and class divisions compound the negative impact of Toledo's personal foibles, for his behaviour is subjected to intense scrutiny and ridicule by a Lima-based media. Television and the press are staffed largely with coastal Spanish-speaking white or mestizo journalists of elite or middle-class extraction, who focus obsessively on the president's humble Andean peasant background. Toledo's accent and errors in syntax form the topic of extensive comment and generate much derision around dinner tables in well-heeled neighbourhoods. On occasions the abuse goes beyond the normal rough-and-tumble of everyday politics (one satirical piece labelled Toledo a ‘shitty half breed’). His red-haired partner is also targeted regularly, being referred to as ‘the raw carrot’, ‘the crazy carrot’, ‘the raging carrot’ and similar jibes. Fujimori would not have tolerated such mockery. It undermines Toledo's standing, but is an indication of greater press freedom.Google Scholar

²¹ Figures in this paragraph are taken from the Economist Intelligence Unit, Peru Country Report, January 2004.Google Scholar

²² On the rift between investment/economic growth and employment/incomes, see the article by eminent Peruvian economist Javier Iguíñiz published in La República, 2 June 2003.Google Scholar

²³ Caretas, 1776 (13 June 2003); El Comercio and La República, 16 June 2003; El Comercio, 16 May 2004.Google Scholar

²⁴ On the question of military reform, see the interview with Defence Minister David Waisman in La República, 14 October 2001. The following examples illustrate recent changes in civilian–military relations. After the televising (5 April 2001) of a video showing scores of high-ranking military personnel signing a pledge of loyalty to Fujimori–Montesinos and the 5 April 1992 autogolpe that dissolved Congress, the army chief of staff broadcast a public apology, promised reform of the institution and a commitment to democracy. A purge of Montesinos loyalists sent 486 officers into retirement in December 2001. March–April 2002 saw an arms sale involving the air force closely scrutinized by the Congress Audit Commission. This has become regular procedure. Arms deals conducted under Fujimori's watch (when no auditing occurred) are being investigated and comprise part of the prosecution case in trials against disgraced ex-generals. In November 2002, ex-major Santiago Martín and other members of the ‘Grupo Colina’ paramilitary death squad (allegedly responsible for 35 killings and 15 disappearances in the early 1990s), were arrested and proceedings opened against them. On the military during the 1990s, see Fernando Rospigliosi, Montesinos y las fuerzas armadas, Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2000. On proposals for reform, see Daniel Mora et al., Las fuerzas armadas en la transición democrática en el Perú, Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2001.Google Scholar

²⁵ In a typical opinion poll, 88.4 per cent of respondents voiced preference for a democratic polity, some 7.6 per cent for an authoritarian government. El Comercio, 3 May 2003. On the authoritarian tradition in Peruvian politics, see Seligson, Mitchell and Carrión, Julio, ‘Political Support, Political Skepticism, and Political Stability in New Democracies: An Empirical Examination of Mass Support for Coups d’État in Peru’, Comparative Political Studies, 35: 1 (February 2002), pp. 58–82.Google Scholar

²⁶ Adelman, ‘Andean Impasses’, p. 60.Google Scholar

²⁷ In the words of APRA veteran Armando Villanueva, ‘We want this government to complete its term and that's what will happen. Alan García has reiterated this when Toledo's approval rating has been very low and rumours of a conspiracy circulated’. Expreso, 18 December 2002.Google Scholar

²⁸ Felipe Agüero and Jeffery Stark (eds), Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America, Miami, University of Miami Press, 1998, p. 2; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 48–9.Google Scholar

²⁹ On accountability, see Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna (eds), Democratic Accountability in Latin America, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003. On continuing military influence, see Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies’, in Andreas Schedler et al. (eds), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1999, pp. 29–51; O'Donnell, Guillermo, ‘Reflections on Contemporary South American Democracies’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 33: 3 (October 2001), pp. 599–609; Consuelo Cruz and Rut Diamint, ‘The New Military Autonomy in Latin America’, Journal of Democracy, 9: 4 (October 1998), pp. 115–27.Google Scholar

³⁰ Adelman, ‘Andean Impasses’, p. 41.Google Scholar

³¹ Collier and Levitsky, ‘Democracy with Adjectives’, p. 443. Peru's armed forces have contained various ideological strands since the 1930s and relations with civil society have always been more complex than one of straightforward repression (as epitomized by the Velasco regime, 1968–75). In the late 1980s some commanders moved beyond a ‘shoot to kill’ policy when confronting Sendero Luminoso, initiating a ‘hearts and minds’ strategy that involved minimizing civilian casualties and arming the population. Since the late 1990s the Ombudsman's office has been running courses on human and citizens’ rights among the military and police. An appreciation of levels of awareness on human rights can be attained from Eduardo Fournier, ‘Feliciano’: captura de un senderista rojo, Lima, NRC Corporación Gráfica, 2002. A former general in the intelligence services, Fournier headed the team that captured the leader of the dissident Sendero Luminoso faction that opted to continue insurrectionary politics after the arrest of Abimael Guzmán. On changes in counter-insurgency practices, see Taylor, Lewis, ‘Counter-insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980–1996’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 17: 1 (January 1998), pp. 35–58.Google Scholar

³² Grugel, Jean, ‘Democratization Studies: Citizenship, Globalization and Governance’, Government and Opposition, 38: 2 (2003), p. 250.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³³ On the Citizen Watch movement, see Peru Solidarity Forum, 37 (May 2003). ‘Judicial Watch’ (Vigilancia de Justicia) groups are currently being established to monitor provincial courts and improve their performance. An informed discussion of recent initiatives in the area of judicial reform is provided via the ‘Justicia Viva’ series circulated by the Instituto de Defensa Legal at [email protected].Google Scholar

³⁴ One high-profile case of media control under Fujimori involved the owner of TV Channel 2, Baruch Ivcher, who was stripped of his citizenship and business in June 1997, after his station transmitted accusations embarrassing to the regime. In the run-up to the 2000 elections, Montesinos distributed $180,000 per week to buy support from the publishers of seven tabloids. The owner of national daily Expreso, Eduardo Calmell del Solar, was captured on video receiving a payment of $1 million from Montesinos in return for supporting Fujimori's third presidential campaign. Calmell and fellow members of the business community are in prison and facing trial, while others in exile attempt to keep one step ahead of Interpol.Google Scholar

³⁵ O’Donnell, ‘Reflections’, p. 607. Advances and retreats have occurred in the reform of state institutions, with criticism regularly being made about the pace of change. However, momentum over the past three years has clearly been in a forward direction vis-à-vis the military, police, legal system, local government, fiscal management, tax collection and related areas of public administration.Google Scholar

³⁶ Larry Diamond et al., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1999, pp. 25–9; Levitsky, Steven and Cameron, Maxwell, ‘Democracy Without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori's Peru’, Latin American Politics and Society, 45: 3 (Fall 2003), pp. 3–5.Google Scholar

³⁷ Kenney, Charles, ‘The Death and Rebirth of a Party System, Peru 1978–2001’, Comparative Political Studies, 36: 10 (December 2003), pp. 1235–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁸ According to one report, 10 PP members of Congress intend to resign and join a new organization, Perú Ahora, established by parliamentarians who left in February 2003. See the anti-Toledo daily Correo, 28 June 2004. Such defections would make the Toledo government more dependent on reaching consensus with APRA and UN to pass legislation through Congress. The potential negative impact on governability led the executive to strive to consolidate the Acuerdo Nacional with opposition political forces during the first semester of 2004.Google Scholar

³⁹ Throughout Latin America between 1996 and 2001, legislatures, parties and key state institutions have experience a collapse in public confidence. Peru forms part of this wider trend: one recent poll placed the approval rating of Congress at 8 per cent, the executive at 9 per cent and judiciary at 12 per cent. El Comercio, 15 March 2004. For the continent-wide data, see Marta Lagos, ‘Public Opinion’, in Jorge Domínguez and Michael Shifter (eds), Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, 2nd edition, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, p. 145.Google Scholar