1 Moore, Barrington Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969 Google Scholar.

2 For example Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, pp. 66–8Google Scholar.

3 Although he does not show how this can be measured. See Theda Skocpol, ‘A Critical Review of Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy’, Politics and Society, 4:1 (1973).

4 Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Stephens, Evelyne Huber and Stephens, John D., Capitalist Development and Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992 Google Scholar.

5 Rueschemeyer et al. Distinguish between bourgeoisie and middle class, with the latter being seen as a group which, if its interests could be served by such an alliance, was willing to throw in its lot with the working class to press for an extension of democracy. The only consistent democratic force, in their view, was the working class.

6 Stephens, John D., ‘Democratic Transition and Breakdown in Western Europe, 1870–1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis’, American Journal of Sociology, 94:5 ( 03 1989 ) p. 1038 Google Scholar.

7 Moore, op. cit., p. 418.

8 For a slightly different categorization, but one which emphasizes the importance of a nomenklatura background, see Silverman, Bertram and Yanowitch, Murray, New Rich, New Poor, New Russia: Winners and Losers on the Russian Road to Capitalism, Armonk, M. E. Sharpe, 1997, ch. 6 Google Scholar.

9 Kryshtanovskaia, Olga in Izvestiia, 10 01 1996 Google Scholar; and Kryshtanovskaia, Olga and White, Stephen, ‘From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite’, Europe‐Asia Studies, 48:5 ( 07 1996 )CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 For the argument that the nomenklatura has exchanged not power for ownership but ideology for ownership, which has allowed its power and wealth to be legitimized by the law rather than ‘the lie’, see Izvestiia, 7 March 1995.

11 Silverman and Yanowitch, pp. 15–15, distinguish between these groups, with the former taking over material production capacity which they controlled while the latter mobilized various resources, including financial, to which their positions gave them access.

12 For a discussion of this, see Stephen Fortescue, ‘Privatisation of Russian Industry’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 29:l (March 1994) pp. 141 and 149. Also Clarke, Simon, ‘Privatization and the Development of Capitalism in Russia’, New Left Review, 196: 11–12 (1992)Google Scholar pp. 1–1. and Simon Johnson and Heidi Kroll, ‘Managerial Strategies for Spontaneous Privatisation’, Soviet Economy, 7:4 (1991) For a similar point regarding Hungary, see Agh, Attila, ‘From Nomenklatura to Clientura: The Emergence of New Political Elites in East Central Europe’, Budapest Papen on Democratic Transition, No. 68, 1993, p. 14 Google Scholar.

13 According to one survey, 61 per cent of the ‘business elite’ had been part of the nomenklatura in Soviet times. Izvestiia, 10 January 1996.

14 For the argument that such insiders were able to gain control of many large enterprises because the old institutions which they had dominated in Soviet times had not been destroyed, thereby leaving them in a strong position to influence the government, see McFaul, Michael, ‘State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia’, World Politics, 47:2 ( 10 01 1995 ) pp. 238 and 240 Google Scholar.

15 Rutland, Peter, ‘Privatisation in Russia: One Step Forward Two Steps Back?’, Europe‐Asia Studies, 46:7 (1994) pp. 1112 Google Scholar.

16 Izvestiia, 10 January 1996. Also Pekka Sutela, ‘Insider Privatisation in Russia: Speculations on Systemic Change’, Europe‐Asia Studies, 46:3 (1994) This particular privatization option had been placed on the agenda as a result of the pressure from industrial managers. McFaul, op. cit., p. 232. For a discussion of some of the means used to achieve ownership, see Roman Frydman, Kenneth Murphy and Andrzey Rapaczynski, ‘Capitalism With a Comrade’s Face’, Transition, 2:2 (1996) p. 8. For one discussion of how management won control within enterprises, see Simon Clarke and Veronika Kabalina, ‘Privatisation and the Struggle for Control of the Enterprise’, in Lane, David (ed.), Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality, London, Longman, 1995, pp. 142–58Google Scholar.

17 Access to state funds was formally guaranteed to privatized enterprises as well as those remaining in state ownership. Yeltsin’s decree to this effect is noted in Izuestiia, 30 November 1992.

18 Lapina, N., Rossiiskie ekonomicheskie elity i modeli natsional’nogo razvitiia, Moscow, Inion Ran, 1997, pp. 10–11 Google Scholar. Also see the discussion in Joel Hellman, ‘Bureaucrats vs Markets? Rethinking the Bureaucratic Response to Market Reform in Centrally Planned Economies’, in Susan Gross Solomon (ed.), Beyond Sovietology: Essays in Politics and History, Armonk, M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1993, pp. 70–1.

19 On the coloured markets, see the Berkeley‐Duke Occasional Papers on the Second Economy in the USSR, beginning in September 1985. (The term refers to that range of unofficial economic activity which grew up outside the processes of the official Soviet economy. The terms ‘black’ or ‘grey’ markets were also sometimes used.).

20 Lynn D. Nelson and Irina A. Kuzes, ‘Privatisation and the New Business Class’, in Lane, op. cit., p. 124.

21 Lapina, op. cit., pp. 11 and 29.

22 Izvestiia, 26 January 1994 and the series in Izvestiia, 18, 19 and 21 October 1994.

23 Izvestiia, 11 June 1994.

24 For a discussion of the aluminium industry in this context, including its search for government support through personal contacts, see Lapina, op. cit., pp. 19–20. Lapina also cites estimates of the size of the criminal economy.

25 For one discussion of the general phenomenon, see Stephen Handelman, ‘The Russian “Mafiya”’, Foreign Affairs, 73:2 (1994).

26 The development of private security forces has been one response, but this will not be discussed here.

27 For one reference to the cartelization of the economy, see Deluuoi Mir, 20 February 1997.

28 On Gazprom, see Rutland, Peter, ‘Russia’s Natural Gas Leviathan’, Transition, 2:9 ( 05 1996 ) p. 3 Google Scholar, and Khripunov, Igor and Matthews, Mary M., ‘Russia’s Oil and Gas Interest Group and Its Foreign Policy Agenda’, Problems of Post‐Communism, 43:3 ( 06 05 1996 )CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 Izvestiia, 6 December 1994.

30 For some examples, see Rutland, Russia’s Natural Gas Leviathan, p. 13.

31 Lapina, op. cit., pp. 6 and 8.

32 These are only a few examples. For more details, see Floriana Fossato, ‘Russia: Media, Money and Power – An Analysis’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty .

33 Izvestiia, 16 November 1993.

34 For a discussion of the FIGs, see Blasi, Joseph R., Krournova, Maya and Kruse, Douglas, Kremlin Capitalism: Privatizing the Russian Economy, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 155–7Google Scholar. Also see Lapina, op. cit., p. 31.

35 For an argument that the highly organized and disciplined nature of the gas elite was in part due to its internal recruitment from within Gazprom, see Lapina, op. cit., p. 6.

36 Izvestiia, 26 January 1994.

37 Hellman, ‘Bureaucrats vs. Markets?’, p. 54.

38 Izvestiia, 10 January 1995.

39 Shlapentokh, Vladimir, ‘The Four Faces of Mother Russia’, Transition, 4:5 ( 10 1997 ) pp. 60–1Google Scholar. For references to the ‘bank war’, see e.g. Shevtsova, Lilia in Izvestiia, 9 10 1997 Google Scholar.

40 Fossato, op. cit.

41 Lapina, op. cit., p. 17.

42 For a brief discussion of this scheme, which was manipulated by the banks to gain control over economic assets at a cheap price, see Blasi et al., op. cit., pp. 74–6. Also Hellman, Joel, ‘Russia Adjusts to Stability’, Transition, 2:10 (1996) pp. 8–9 Google Scholar.

43 Izvestiia, 10 January 1996.

44 On the continued presence of people from Gazprom in leading political circles, see Lapina, op. cit., p. 7; on oil representation, see p. 9.

45 Izvestiia, 6 December 1994 and 10 January 1996.

46 For some details on the support for Yeltsin, see White, Stephen, Rose, Richard and McAllister, Ian, How Russia Votes, Chatham, Chatham House Publishers, 1997, pp. 251–2Google Scholar.

47 While the state owns 51 per cent of ORT, Berezovsky is its main financial backer.

48 See the report by Hoffman, David, ‘Powerful Few Rule Russian Mass Media’, The Washington Post, 31 03 1997 Google Scholar. The subsequent appointments to government office of Berezovsky and Potanin were widely seen as pay‐offs for this support.

49 This means that there is no guarantee that as the bourgeoisie expands through the entry of new entrepreneurs, the principles established to structure commercial life will change.

50 For some types of arrangement, see Stephen Fortescue, ‘Privatisation of Large‐Scale Russian Industry’ Saikal, Amin and Maley, William (eds), Russia in Search of its Future, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 93 Google Scholar. However there have also been indications that some managers are starting to act in a more market‐orientated fashion. Rutland, ‘Privatisation in Russia’, pp. 1120–1. For another analysis emphasizing the importance of personal relations in the political sphere, see Olga Kryshtanovskaia in Argumenty i fakty, 1997.

51 There have been attempts to develop business lobby groups, and these appear to have had some success. See discussions in Paul Kubicek, ‘Variations on a Corporatist Theme: Interest Associations in Post‐Soviet Ukraine and Russia’, Europe‐Asia Studies, 48:1 (1996) Sergei Peregudov and Irina Semenenko, ‘Lobbying Business Interests in Russia’, Democratization, 3:2 (1996) and Lapina, op. cit., pp. 9 and 13.

52 Rutland, ‘Privatisation in Russia’, p. 1125.

53 Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 7 April 1995.

54 Lapina argues that the fuel and energy complex prefers to work through the executive to get its way rather than the legislature. In the 1995 Duma elections, the banking sector supported a range of candidates of all persuasions, reflecting an attempt to use the legislature as a means for pressing its concerns. Lapina, op. cit., pp. 7 and 12–13.

55 Izvestiia, 21 September 1995.

56 See the discussion in Shlapentokh, Vladimir, ‘Early Feudalism – The Best Parallel for Contemporary Russia’, Europe‐Asia Studies, 48:3 (1996) pp. 398–9Google Scholar.