IT IS NOT EASY TO CHARACTERIZE THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) AS A political system. The main comprehensive approaches have at least partly failed, and we have to admit that the EU is neither completely neo-functional, nor intergovernmental, nor pre-federal. We may call it sui generis, but this does not carry us very far.

On the other hand, we continue to apply in our analyses of the EU notions which originated in classical national democratic systems. This is true not only for the structures – above all the institutions – but for the processes as well. To add to our dilemma, recent studies on policy-making show us that the EU is far less homogeneous than one might imagine and that there are substantial differences from one policy area to another. But even if the EU is mainly a negotiating system, an authority which is clearly responsible for its outcomes should nevertheless exist. In a classical parliamentary system the government and the parliamentary majority fulfil this function. The minority may mainly oppose the majority and press for alternative solutions, or it may use its influence for reaching a compromise; it is generally agreed that a structured opposition is a constituent part of a democratic political system.

MAY I BEGIN WITH A DASH OF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE? I DO SO AS A health warning, to myself as much as to anyone else. Just as the great Lord Salisbury once said that too much poring over maps tended to drive nineteenth-century ministers and military chiefs mad, an excessive concentration on prime-ministerial styles can propel scholars and commentators smack bang into the Tommy Cooper school of analysis – here you have collective cabinet government then, just like that, when the premiership changes hands, you switch to overbearing prime-ministerial government. There has been a good deal of this since Tony Blair entered No. 10 exactly 214 days ago.

IN HER SUBMISSION TO THE OPSAHL HEARINGS ON THE NORTHERN Ireland problem in 1993, the literary and cultural critic Edna Longley made a simple point about the ‘Anglo-Irish Agreement’. This term for what was a pact between the UK and Republic of Ireland governments is, she argued, a misnomer: ‘[It] obscures the contested area, and panders to the belief – in both London and Dublin – that the UK is coterminous with England.’ Longley later urged that the Northern Ireland problem should be viewed more widely, in its proper context as part of the ‘melting pot’ of cultures of the two islands, Britain and Ireland.

CONSTITUTIONS, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND CONSTITUTIONAL conflict are once again commanding attention. The celebrations of the bicentennial of the American constitution, the implementation of constitutional reform in Canada, the Labour government's programme for constitutional change in the United Kingdom, the seemingly intractable conflict in Northern Ireland, and transfers of sovereignty to the European Union from its constituent states, testify to this. Equally, if not more challenging, have been the upheavals in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and its reconstituted states, the ‘third’ wave of democratization across the developing world, the experiment in participatory constitutionalism in South Africa and the return of Hong Kong to China. Of the 179 countries that elect their governments out of a total of 192 countries in the world, 176 have codified constitutions. Constitutions, however, that are not fully mature or operative and are not based on the principles or drafted with the advice of those nations that have developed and entrenched their constitutions tend to be disregarded, or even dismissed. Moreover, writing a constitution is one exercise, implementing, and interpreting it is a far more complex and delicate undertaking. So how are social scientists to evaluate the process?

IT WAS ASSUMED BY AMERY THAT THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION WAS AN important topic for study and something which might require further reform, because with the rest of his generation he took it for granted that the Constitution was itself wholly under the control of the British people through their indigenous institutions. Parliamentary sovereignty could only be understood in the light of sovereignty in the sense of political independence. At the time he was writing the importance of this basic concept had been reinforced by recent experience. Many European countries had lost their sovereignty through the imposition of German rule and had only had it restored to them by a massive military effort in which Britain had played no mean part. In their turn, the victorious allies had deprived Germany of its sovereignty and were through the occupation regimes starting on a path which it was hoped would lead, as indeed it did, to a Germany purged of the Nazi virus.

THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA REMAIN ONE OF THE MOST compelling questions both for scholarly analysis and in international politics. But in attempting to survey the prospects for a democratic future in post-communist Russia, all too often we are blinded by the dramas of the moment. Conflict between president and legislature, the success first of Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party and then of the communists in successive legislative elections, the Chechen war and the president's health – are all issues which have tended to crowd out analysis of more long-term structural considerations which will underpin the course of future Russian development. These major events in the day-today life of Russian politics can have a significant effect upon such development, but a focus upon them exclusively risks not only missing the importance of the deeper structural factors, but also misunderstanding the context within which these events occur. These events are shaped fundamentally by the structures which underpin the political system: broad structural changes within the society will give shape to the arena within which political activity takes place.

OUR CONCLUSION, IN PART I,* WAS THAT THE ABANDONMENT OF THE expert/lay dichotomy as the basis for understanding risk perception, whilst essential, is not going to be easy. We argued that:

1) Objectivism (the idea that we can clearly distinguish between what the risks really are and what people variously and erroneously believe them to be) has to give way to constructivism (the idea that risk is inherently subjective: something that we project onto whatever it is that is ‘out there’).

2) To impose a single definition of what the problem is, which is what so much of policy analysis and science-for-public-policy does, is to exclude all those who happen not to share that particular way of framing things. Since people are unlikely to support a policy that is aimed at solving what they do not see to be the problem, approaches that insist on singularity (and on single metrics — cost: benefit analysis, for instance, probabilistic risk assessment, qualityadjusted life years and so on) will inevitably be low on consent, surprise-prone, unref lexive, brittle and undemocratic.

AS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BECOMES AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT public policy issue facing both the country and its political leaders, the degree to which Britain can or should harmonize its welfare, employment and taxation policies with those of other EU members will receive progressively more attention. In this context and with the evident importance of opinion poll popularity for the main political parties’ pursuit of electoral success, public opinion on issues concerning welfare, taxation and redistribution is likely to have considerable bearing on the viability of Britain's incorporation of the legislation and practices endorsed in other EU member states. Nonetheless, even a cursory examination of evidence on the public's attitude on questions relating to these changes suggests integration is unlikely to follow a smoothly negotiated path. Responses to a recent British Social Attitudes survey, for example, show that, while holding mixed attitudes towards the idea of European integration and only mildly negative attitudes to EU inf hence over policies concerning pollution, immigration and defence, the British public are strongly opposed to EU influence over taxation and, to some degree, employment policy. Even among those people who endorsed the general aim of European integration, only a minority – in the case of taxation, a very small minority – found the idea of Europeanlevel decision-making acceptable.

‘POLICY DETERMINES POLITICS’ IS A FAMILIAR APHORISM AND ITS durability has been tested time and again. Lowi's initial typology showed the normal trinitarian design (distinguishing regulative, distributive and redistributive policy). Later a fourth type was added constituent policy. Lowi's original three elements are, however, not on the same logical level. If we distinguish between the regulative and distributive levels of decision-making we end up with a six-fold typology (Matrix 1).

SINCE 1989 THE NATURE OF OPPOSITION IN SEVERAL WESTERN democracies has been subject to change, and Italy is no exception. But the Italian case is distinct because the changes which occurred in Italy after 1989 amount to a revolution compared to the traditional political equilibrium. The Italian political scene was dominated, from the post-war years (1948) to the 199Os, by two political parties: the DC (Christian Democracy) and the PCI (Italian Communist Party), which respectively occupied the positions of ruling party and opposition party for over forty years.

THE LITERATURE ON CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO ETHNIC or peripheral demands suggests a continuum from meeting the challenge head on to conceding some or all of the demand. Strategies also have to be developed by parties in opposition. As the dominant party in Scotland, Labour found itself embroiled in the demand for constitutional change and having to respond in the 1980s. This created party management problems. The evolution of Labour's territorial strategy in opposition between 1979 and 1997 is important in understanding what it did after coming to power. The maintenance of support for Scottish home rule, the alterations in the policy and the method of implementing it can only be explained by understanding the evolution of the policy during the party's eighteen years out of office. During this time, there was a paradigm shift in Labour thinking which made devolution more likely when it came to power.

LIKE MANY OF HIS APHORISMS, MARX'S DESIGNATION OF THE FRENCH as the model political nation (leaving the economy to the English and philosophy for the Germans) contained enough of a grain of truth to remain relevant for over a century. Since 1989, the idea of politics based on the revolutionary experience begun in 1789 and pursued by a unified and international working-class subject has lost its utility for understanding the political choices facing modern industrial democracies. Nowhere is the need for a new understanding of the political more clear than in France itself, as illustrated by the strikes that paralysed the country for more than three weeks in November and December of 1995 and forced the government to retreat. While some saw the birth of a ‘social movement’, cheered the victory of society against the state, or imagined that class struggle had begun anew, the more pessimistic argued that the French had once again proven themselves incapable of political reform. The former presuppose a model of politics from the nineteenth century, the latter look forward to a globalized twenty-first century. For those of us still living in the twentieth, analysis of the French strikes can help us to understand how politics can make the shape of the twentyfirst century less inevitable.

THE QUESTION OF WHETHER MORAL VALUES CAN OR SHOULD BE taught has caused controversy and divided opinion almost since the beginning of time, and certainly since the very earliest days of philosophy. As is well-known, Socrates was condemned to death on charges of impiety and of corrupting the minds of the Athenian youth. Although the latter accusation was never fully spelled out, it was certainly connected with the perceived moral subversiveness of his philosophy and, in particular, with his denial that those who purported to teach moral values were qualified to do any such thing. This denial was construed by many as dangerous and as an attack on the moral foundations of Athenian society for which, famously, Socrates paid a high price.

A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IN RECENT SOUTH AMERICAN POLITICS has been the re-emergence of populism. More interesting still has been the unexpected combination – in some countries – of traditional populist appeals (successfully made), the determined application of free market policies, and the successful re-election of the market-reforming populists. This does not mean that populist politicians can succeed to order. Many populist candidates have sought election and only a few have secured it. Of those elected as (essentially) independent candidates, only some have succeeded. Presidents Bucaram in Ecuador and Collor in Brazil were removed from office by Congress and subjected to legal proceedings for corruption. However, where populists have succeeded, they have done so on a far more impressive scale than most people originally predicted.

THE ELECTION OF 582 COUNCILLORS TO NORTHERN IRELAND'S 26 local authorities on 21 May 1997 was eclipsed, to a large extent, by the media focus on the General Election earlier that month (1 May). That little attention is paid to the only elected forum with executive powers in Northern Ireland is neither new nor surprising. Councils in the province have relatively few functional responsibilities, confined principally to the delivery of regulatory services (street cleaning, refuse collection, leisure and tourism and a limited role in economic development); representation on area boards which deliver major services such as education; and a consultative role in relation to planning, roads, water and housing which are delivered through ‘Next Steps’ agencies or similar arm's-length organizations. This minor role is reflected in the level of council budgets. In 1997/98, the estimated net expenditure for local government in Northern Ireland amounts to £230 million, approximately three per cent of identifiable public expenditure.

THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONCEPT of community and the incremental construction of a political ideology for Plaid Cymru, the Welsh nationalist party. In explaining the two general applications of community, empirical and evaluative, the article claims that there is an essential vagueness attached to community which limits its value in developing a clear ideological focus for a political party. This incoherence within the concept, coupled with a specific reluctance to analyse and apply community more precisely within the framework of Welsh nationalism, has made it more a hindrance than an asset to Plaid Cymru's political and electoral progress.