¹ Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, New York, Crossroad Publishing, 1989.Google Scholar

² For various arguments on the dynamics of decision-making processes see Dryzek, John, ‘Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia’, Political Theory, 33: 2 (2005), pp. 218–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sunstein, Cass, ‘The Law of Group Polarisation’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 10: 2 (2002), pp. 175–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar; James Fearon, ‘Deliberation as Discussion’, in Jon Elster, Deliberative Democracy, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 44–69; James Fishkin, The Voice of People, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press; 1995; John Forester, ‘Dealing With Deep Value Differences’, in Lawrence Susskind (ed.), The Consensus Building Handbook, Thousand Oaks, Sage, 1999, pp. 463–93; Gerry Mackie, ‘Does Democratic Deliberation Change Minds?’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 2002.

³ Jürgen Habermas, particularly in The Theory of Communicative Action II, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987, offers useful insights into the fundamental role that learning reciprocity plays in communication. In his later works he also continues to emphasize the importance of informal, open and less-rigidly structured spheres of communication within the civil society. However, he does not analyse how and why the formal and informal deliberative bodies differ from each other. Instead he increasingly uses the formal bodies of deliberation such as parliament, administrative bodies and legal system as the institutional basis for his theory. Thomas McCarthy raises the importance of open-ended deliberative practices without a strict rationality requirement, yet he does not elaborate why and how those informal moments of communication differ from the practices of decision-making procedures. (The Ideals and Illusions, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1991). Seyla Benhabib with her emphasis on ‘anonymous public conversation based on free and spontaneous process of communication’ clearly points in the right direction, but she also fails to demarcate clearly the two different spheres of deliberation (Situating the Self, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992). Similarly, Iris Marion Young's attempt to broaden the boundaries of deliberation through the more inclusive features of the communication process is discussed only in relation to decision-making processes without showing how those different styles correspond to different stages of deliberation (Inclusion and Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000).Google Scholar

⁴ John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberal, Critics, Contestations, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.Google Scholar

⁵ Dryzek, ‘Alternative to Agonism’.Google Scholar

⁶ Indeed, the very meaning of Islam connotes submission, surrender and obedience: Asghar Khurshid, Islam, Politics and the State, London, Islamic Council of Europe, 1976, p. 28.Google Scholar

⁷ Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1994, pp. 40–1.Google Scholar

⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the Modern World, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996, p. 217.Google Scholar

⁹ Alfred Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001. In fact, even after the catastrophic effects of 11 September 2001, it is not so easy to establish that Islamic fundamentalism is on the rise. In the case of Turkey particularly, a decrease in fundamentalist insurgence is clearly visible.Google Scholar

¹⁰ John Esposito and John Voll, Islam and Democracy, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996.Google Scholar

¹¹ For a good collection of essays on this matter see Charles Kurzman (ed.), Liberal Islam: A Source Book, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998.Google Scholar

¹² Some of the most commonly quoted verses in this respect are ‘To you your religion and to me my religion’ (sura 109), ‘To each among you, have we prescribed a Law and Open Way. And if God enforced His Will, He would have made of you all one people’ (sura 5:48), ‘Let there be no compulsion in religion’ (sura 2:256), ‘God does not change the condition of a people unless they first change that which is in their hearts’ (sura 13:11).Google Scholar

¹³ Asghar Khan, Islam, Politics and the State, Kuala Lumpur, Ikraq, 1986, pp. 80–2.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Muhammad Iqbal, Liberal Islam: A Source Book, New York, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 260.Google Scholar

¹⁵ David Little, John Kelsay and Abdulaziz A. Sachedina (eds), Human Rights and the Conflict of Cultures: Western and Islamic Perspectives on Religious Liberty, Chapel Hill, University of South Carolina Press, 1988, pp. 28–31.Google Scholar

¹⁶ There is a large amount of literature in Turkish on these issues. Some examples are: Ali Bulac, Din, Devlet ve Demokrasi (Religion, State and Democracy), Istanbul, Zaman Kitap, 2001; Hami Guler, Politik Teoloji Yazilari (Essays on Political Teoloji), Ankara, Kitabiyat, 2002; Mevlut Uyanik, Islam Siyaset Felsefesinde Sivil Itaatsizlik (Civil Disobedience in Political Islam), Istanbul, Kaktus, 2001; Cafer Sadik Yaran (ed.), Islam ve Oteki (Islam and the Other), Istanbul, Kaktus, 2001; Ahmet Arslan, Islam Felsefesi Uzerine (On the Philosophy of Islam), Ankara, Vadi, 1999.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Caha, Omer, ‘Islam ve Demokrasi’, Islamiyat, 22: 2 (1999), pp. 53–77.Google Scholar

¹⁸ In Mehmet Akif Ersin (ed.), Birinci Kuran Sempozyumu, Ankara, Bilgi Vakfi, 1994. For a similar assessment of Turkish Islam also see Caha, Omer and Aras, Bulent, ‘Fethullah Gulen and His Liberal Turkish Islam Movement’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 4 (2000), pp. 30–42 Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Ali Bulac, Din Devlet ve Demokrasi, Ankara, Zaman, 2001, pp. 92–100.Google Scholar

²⁰ Here Hidayet Tuksal's book deserves a high praise, Kadin Karsiti Soylemin Islam Gelenegindeki Izdusumleri (Anti-Women Discourse in Islamic Tradition), Ankara, Kitabiyat, 2000.Google Scholar

²¹ Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 1–2. However, Gellner's contextual sensitivity does not go any further. The rest of his argument also leads to the conclusion that Islam cannot be secularized. See also Ernest Gellner (ed.), Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1994.Google Scholar

²² Ibid., p. 2.Google Scholar

²³ Arkoun also argues the development of Christianity and Islam in a similar vein and asserts there are in fact no differences among the Judaic, Christian and Islamic ways of internalizing the authority of the Revelation. Speaking of a separation between the realms of power in civic and religious terms is in a theological sense not conceivable. Thus, he contends, without taking into account the historical conditions of the day, establishing any contrast between Christianity and Islam would be too hasty, superficial and unacceptable. Mohammed Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, Oxford, Westview Press, 1994, pp. 18–23.Google Scholar

²⁴ The leader of the AKP, Tayyip Erdogan, in a post-election interview with the Washington Post’s Lally Weymouth indicates this commitment clearly:

‘In the West, some fear that your party is a threat to the secular state. Is this so?

‘Our party sees secularism as an important segment of democracy. Secularism establishes the administrative structure of this country.

‘People in the West admire Turkey as a secular, democratic, Muslim country. They are worried that your party is really an Islamic party that will change the nation's character.

‘Our political party is not Islamic. It is not based on religion. A political party cannot be Islamist. It cannot be for Islam. These are inaccurate terminologies. Islam is a religion, and a party is just a political institution’. Lally Weymouth, ‘A Devout Muslim, A Secular State’ at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30603-2002Nov8.html, accessed 15 November 2002.

²⁵ http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/01_12_04/dom.htm#d4, accessed 10 March 2004.Google Scholar

²⁶ http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/01_20_04/dom.htm#d2, accessed 10 March 2004.Google Scholar

²⁷ Fulya Atacan, ‘AKP versus SP’, paper presented at the CERI and IFEA Conference in Paris, December 2003.Google Scholar

²⁸ Turkone, Mumtazer, ‘3 Kasim: Bizans Dustu’ (‘3 November: The Fall of Byzantium’), Turkiye Gunlugu, 70 (2002), pp. 5–10.Google Scholar

²⁹ The Q study in Turkey was inspired by John Dryzek and Leslie Holmes's work, Post-Communist Democratisation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.Google Scholar

³⁰ For a detailed account of Q methodology, including how to construct a matrix, see Steven Brown, Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q Methodology in Political Science, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1980.Google Scholar