This article seeks to understand the evolving democratic legitimacy demands of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by reflecting on the challenges of catering to a globally affected public and enhanced participation opportunities given to some highly affected groups. It argues that the principle of democratic equality at a global scale fails to take account of inequities in affectedness and power within the demos and, instead, an approach that strives towards a principle of proportionality based on degrees of affectedness could enhance the UNFCCC’s democratic legitimacy. This builds on existing scholarship identifying a turn to an affectedness paradigm in international institutions more generally and the emerging influence of affected peoples organisations, characterised by the more direct forms of representation they facilitate and emphasis placed on the affectedness of their constituents to claim recognition and influence. The normative appeal of giving enhanced participatory opportunities to those most affected by climate governance is weighed against its challenges and risks. It is concluded that, despite conceptual and practical difficulties connected to the subjective nature of affectedness, a pragmatic approach that treats such a proportionality principle as a democratic ideal to be strived towards could have a legitimising effect on the UNFCCC.

This article examines the status of academic freedom in Hong Kong in light of the increasing securitization of higher education since the implementation of the National Security Law (NSL) in 2020. It provides an analytical framework to comprehend the changing landscape of academic freedom in Hong Kong, highlighting the impact of the NSL and the conflict between the necessity of political control on securitized campuses and the demand for international, free, and high-quality universities to make Hong Kong a global hub for higher education. The article concludes by asserting that the NSL has reshaped and will continue to impact academic freedom and university autonomy concerning core security issues, but there is still a possibility to establish a defendable space for genuine academic freedom in classrooms.

Judicial remedies are the critical means by which courts worldwide enforce and implement constitutional rights. Yet constitutional remedies were largely overlooked by early political process theorists, such as John Hart Ely. Contemporary comparative political process theory (CPPT) or comparative representation-reinforcing theory (CRRT) pays much greater attention to remedial questions, including the use of a range of ‘weak’ judicial remedies. These CPPT/CRRT scholars have highlighted the risks as well as advantages associated with the use of such remedies, but they have not reached any consensus on how to strike this balance and optimise their use. The article therefore draws on one specific recent version of CPPT/CRRT, namely the theory of ‘responsive judicial review’, to propose one way to strike this balance, namely: In cases impacting the ‘democratic minimum core’, courts should generally prefer strong remedies, with delayed relief only applied for prudential reasons; for other cases, courts should deploy more dialogic remedies, but generally these delayed or suspended remedies should be accompanied by a judicial statement of pre-defined strong remedies that take effect automatically in the event of legislative inaction. In this way, this article suggests that courts can give weak remedies ‘bite’, and hence promote actual legislative debate and dialogue, rather than incentivise legislative inaction after their rulings.

This study examines the landmark rulings in the “BBI Case”, adjudicated successively by the High Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court of Kenya, from the perspective of comparative political process theory [“CPPT”]. The BBI case involved a constitutional challenge to a set of seventy-four proposed constitutional amendments to the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. It raised a host of issues, ranging from the applicability of the basic structure doctrine, the role of the President in initiating constitutional change, Presidential immunity, and Fourth Branch institutions, among others. This paper analyses two crucial issues in the case: the articulation – for the first time in its history – of a process-oriented basic structure doctrine, by the High Court and the Court of Appeal; and the concurrent holding of the High Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court prohibiting the President of Kenya from initiating a constitutional amendment through the “popular initiative” route. It argues that on these issues, the Kenyan courts’ reasoning constitutes a creative, unique, and valuable contribution to CPPT, in the context of constitutional change. When faced with the possibility of abusive amendments within the framework of a two-tiered amendment process, the Kenyan courts responded by setting out rigorous procedural constraints upon the amendment power. As a corollary, the role of the judiciary under this approach is not to invalidate or veto abusive constitutional amendments, but to ensure that they pass through a substantive, rich, and deep process of public participation.

Comparative Political Process Theory or Comparative Representative Reinforcement Theory (CPPT/CRRT) is an emerging scholarly field that theorizes about the courts’ role in the broader comparative universe. Considered an intellectual descendent of John Hart Ely’s work in the American context, CPPT/CRRT emphasizes the courts’ role in preventing democratic backsliding, promoting equality, enhancing the efficacy of democratic institutions, fostering deliberative processes, and addressing the failures of majoritarian politics. CPPT/CRRT scholars generally advocate broadening judicial powers and capabilities to fulfill these roles. This article examines the practicality of such judicial responsibilities through the lens of the review of constitutional amendments in India. It concludes that, despite the theoretical aspirations of CPPT/CRRT, courts are unlikely to meet these expectations in practice due to their institutional limitations. The positive outcomes of judicial interventions tend to be more modest than the protective and proactive actions envisioned by CPPT/CRRT proponents. Moreover, the modest benefits also come at the cost of the potential adverse impacts that an empowered judiciary may impose on the constitutional fabric. Consequently, this article suggests a need for recalibration of CPPT/CRRT scholarship wherein its goals are moderated and its aspirational objectives balanced against the potential adverse effects of an empowered judiciary on constitutional systems.

This paper seeks to understand modern comparative reflections on John Hart Ely’s work through Comparative Political Process Theory or Comparative Representation-Reinforcing Theory, and how such approaches can be augmented through the lens of therapeutic jurisprudence. It argues that the legitimacy of courts’ actions (or inactions) in such settings can be understood through their potential to strengthen democratic institutions rather than do them harm, acting as a re-set or recalibration of the democratic landscape. By buttressing representation-reinforcing approaches with therapeutic understandings, curial interventions designed to shift longstanding democratic impasses or blind spots are likely to carry much greater institutional legitimacy. By applying this lens to a series of case studies, the paper highlights the normative contribution that therapeutic jurisprudence can provide to representation-reinforcing action and to the design of such approaches.

The European Court of Human Rights has long been cast as a defender of democracy in Europe. Yet, this idea has not always been at the core of the Court’s perception in the literature or indeed aligned with its jurisprudence which are often viewed in more Dworkinian terms. We suggest that there are good reasons, however, to take this idea more seriously in line with some of the early discussions on the function of the Convention. We argue that a good way to flesh out this idea is by drawing on the recent discussion on comparative representation reinforcement, sometimes labelled comparative political process theory, which builds on earlier work by US constitutional theorist John Hart Ely. Such an – expanded and updated – Elyian approach, we believe, has much to offer not just for domestic constitutional courts around the globe, but also for a supranational human rights court such as the ECtHR. We spell out what this might mean for the Court’s jurisprudence with reference to a few key areas of jurisprudence and the protection of minority rights in particular and sketch some implications for when to exercise restraint and when to intervene in a robust manner.

How should democratic communities decide who should belong? Recent debates about issues such as voting rights for prisoners, denationalization policies or citizenship tests raise this fundamental democratic question. While many scholars argue that decisions about citizenship and voting rights should be more inclusive of subjected outsiders and more independent from electoral partisan politics, we still lack institutional proposals for inclusive and independent membership politics. This article contributes to the nascent institutional turn in the debate about democratic membership boundaries. My aim is to show that normative debates about membership politics can benefit from recent advances in democratic theory on sortition-based democratic innovations, constructive representation and systems thinking.

I argue that membership politics could be democratized by introducing a randomly selected political institution, which I call ‘boundary assembly’, that equally represents members and nonmembers and is charged with making binding decisions on a subset of a state’s membership questions. I argue that the strongest objections to empowered randomly selected assemblies (shortcut objection, alienation objection, capture objection, technocracy objection) lose most of their force in the ‘extraordinary’ political context of decisions on membership boundaries. Boundary assemblies cannot ‘solve’ the democratic boundary problem, but they could be a first step toward more democratic membership politics.

This article addresses power-sharing constitutions that include powers of veto wielded by discrete ethnonational groups. Such constitutional arrangements – seen, for example, in Northern Ireland and Bosnia – have often prompted severe deadlock, a problem that in turn threatens democratic functioning and raises the risk of renewed communal violence. We consider the use of ‘umpires’ of power-sharing constitutional systems to vet the use of vetoes and (potentially) to prevent their overuse or misuse. Power-sharing umpires are not uncommon in practice. However, as yet there is little scholarship evaluating how, in substance, power-sharing veto umpires should approach their task. Relying on deliberative democracy theory, the article outlines three forms of ‘deliberative agreement’ that, in principle, deeply divided groups may reach in the course of policymaking. It goes on to explain how existing proportionality doctrines drawn from federalism and rights cases can be imported into the power-sharing context to ‘scaffold’ these broad ideals. This approach, it is argued, may provide a more detailed, coherent and practically workable approach to umpiring power-sharing constitutions.

Liberal democracies and illiberal regimes alike recognize academic freedom as a norm that enables scientific progress. This article investigates the extent to which the globalization of academic freedom has been the result of a global diffusion process in addition to national developments, such as modernization and democratization. Academic freedom spread as part of a wider liberal script after World War II. The empirical analysis shows, however, that the codification of academic freedom at the international and regional level has been slower compared with other parts of the liberal script. To the extent that academic freedom has emerged as a global norm, it has happened through decentralized diffusion processes driven by higher education institutions and civil society networks. Different views on meaning, scope and emphasis made international and regional institutions norm takers rather than norm shapers. They only started to systematically institutionalize academic freedom into the liberal script when networks of scholars and higher education institutions mobilized internationally amidst increasing contestations of their academic freedom since the turn of the millennium.

He seemed to enjoy portraying himself as mostly without allies – a principled contrarian. This was central to his self-consciousness. And John was very conscious of himself.1

Like other regions of the world, academic freedom is on the decline in Africa. While there are some generic factors accounting for this phenomenon worldwide, others are fundamentally unique to the African context. These are related principally to the subject matter of coloniality of higher education on the continent. This study addresses these matters by, among others, discussing the origins of the university in pre-modern Africa and the place of academic freedom in it. This development is followed by the emergence of university education in Europe through the application of the liberal script and which contributed to the sidelining and eventual general demise of higher education institutions with their roots in pre-modern Africa. The work contends that while one may trace the origins of the university/academic freedom to Africa, academic freedom as it stands today is shaped by the liberal script with hardly any reference to the root of higher education in Africa. Therefore, the meaning, understanding and application of academic freedom do not reflect the realities of higher education in Africa. This work proposes the adoption of a relative universalist approach, as opposed to the liberal approach, which is clothed with universality, but in reality, it is a reflection of a European idea of academic freedom. This approach is considered necessary to reflect the African reality of academic freedom which will help to identify effective advocacy tools to promote and protect academic freedom in Africa and thereby make academic freedom more meaningful for application in the region.

This article traces how the ‘freedom indispensable for scientific research’ was introduced into the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The review of the drafting history covers ICESCR Article 15.3 and that of its precursor, Article 27 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). It pays particular attention to arguments presented during negotiations over the UDHR (adopted in 1948), as well as over the ICESCR (adopted in 1966), and it reflects on observable norm entrepreneurship. Following the end of the Cold War, details on the right to science and the status of higher education personnel were further elaborated in soft law, notably in the form of two General Comments and two UNESCO Recommendations. These specifications and the earlier traveaux préparatoires reveal a multifaceted and rich debate about science, development, dignity and freedom at the United Nations, including positions that span variations of a liberal science script as well as persistent illiberal contestations.

Lon Fuller’s fictional Purple Shirt regime, Victor Orbán’s illiberal democracy in today’s Hungary and the Kaczynski brothers’ recently ended unconstitutional republic of Poland are three examples of a ‘broken democratic polity’ in which many aspects of the rule of law and constitutional democracy have been compromised and cannot be fixed without a qualified majority, even if democratic forces come to power. In this article, I address the question of whether illegal state action of a democratic government is an appropriate means of restoring legitimacy to what I call a ‘broken’ polity. Put differently: Is it morally defensible for a new democratically elected government to override and replace the rules of illiberal constitutional reform in violation of formal legality? If so, under what conditions? I argue that a positive answer to this question is justified if we adopt a neo-republican approach to politics and legitimacy.

In Latin America, the notions of academic freedom or the freedom of science have not had the overarching influence in defining the prerogatives of scholars and the university that we see them exerting over the experiences of Western Europe and the Anglosphere. The governing notion, from whence all other freedoms emerge, is that of university autonomy. In Latin America, university autonomy evolved over the twentieth century as a protection of the university against the encroachment of governments – often authoritarian or outright dictatorial – so they could carry out their missions as they defined them. In Latin America, the locus of what in Europe is understood as scientific freedom is vested in the universities, not in the professoriate. It is assumed that free universities will foster an environment of academic freedom within. The contemporary contestations of university autonomy in Latin America fit squarely into the liberal script, as they seek to make universities more responsive to policy goals in the areas of higher education quality and accountability, efficiency and productivity, expansion of public or private provision, access and equity. Often, universities and their associations have raised autonomy as an objection to these policy agendas.

This Introduction provides an overview of the topics covered in this special issue on ‘Academic freedom: Global variations in norm conceptualization, diffusion and contestation’, which explores what academic freedom means, how this may vary on a global level, how the norm spread around the world and what current contestations look like. The Introduction defines some terms essential to this debate, such as the freedom of science, academic freedom, freedom of scientific research and the right to science, and offers an analytical framework for the various contributions of the special issue. This includes, in particular, a distinction between illiberal and liberal science scripts and their relationship with academic freedom, as well as between different forms of contestations and limitations of academic freedom. Authors from varying disciplinary and regional backgrounds address different aspects of this theme in their respective contributions, of which the introduction gives a brief summary.

Europe has recently struggled with democratic backsliding and autocratization. This autocratization has accompanied a decline in academic freedom in many backsliding countries, as reported by the Academic Freedom Index. Can the standards set by the European supranational courts effectively safeguard academic freedom? This article provides answers to this question. It argues that despite differences in their approaches, the theoretical conceptions of scholarship held by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) share an essential feature: both have moved towards embracing the ‘liberal science script’ by protecting academic freedom. The main difference between the two courts’ approaches is the subject of protection. The ECtHR focuses on the individual rights of academics: It protects free speech in the academic context by establishing a high standard for holding academics liable for publicly expressing their views inside and outside of academia. The ECJ has applied the concept of institutional autonomy, thereby setting a high standard for safeguarding the freedom of academic institutions. This standard can be applied with regard to the demands placed by policy-makers on academia regarding its role in democracy, including gender equality requirements for EU research funding.

This article highlights the challenges of external reactions to authoritarian higher education governance in certain Central and Eastern European countries, especially Hungary and Poland. It interprets the political change in these countries as an authoritarian cultural backlash, which is not just a legal or political problem, but a kind of post-fascist cultural revolution contesting the liberal script. First, the article explains the framework of authoritarian policing in academia based on the more general works of Bob Altemeyer and Zeev Sternhell. Second, it tries to answer the question: What tools could counter these tendencies from the perspective of the European Union? As the article interprets the rise of authoritarianism as a phenomenon rooted in the cultural deficit of the countries concerned, it argues that a programme for a democratic and pluralist cultural counter-revolution should be implemented. However, no nation can be democratized solely by external actors, and the basics of democratic thinking should be developed from the grassroots level. If the crisis in academia is rooted in a value-crisis within the societies concerned, then measures countering this phenomenon should also include promoting Enlightened pluralism at all levels of these societies.

This article details the concept of constitutional embedding and demonstrates its utility in four country-rights cases. Constitutional embedding refers to the process by which some understanding of constitutional rights comes to take root in everyday life, moving from words on paper to something that shapes expectations and behavior. The degree of constitutional embedding varies along two dimensions: social and legal, or how individuals and groups operating in the social sphere understand and relate to constitutional rights, and how those working in the formal legal sphere do so. In a global political climate defined by democratic backsliding, powerful vested interests, and backlash against moves toward equality, the status of constitutional rights and how they become and remain embedded is doubly important. The constitutional embedding framework highlights how interactions between legal elites and ordinary citizens constitute the extent to which constitutional law influences daily life. The framework has broad applicability across contexts and rights domains.

This article explores the global spread of domestic codifications of academic freedom norms by mapping constitutional provisions over time and space. Drawing on the new Academic Freedom in Constitutions dataset, the study evaluates several hypotheses that may explain the norm’s geographically diverse, yet comparatively limited, adoption in 52 per cent of constitutions today. The descriptive analysis of constitutional adoption patterns suggests that the as yet large pockets of absence are a result of the fact that academic freedom was not included as a fundamental right from the early days of constitution-making, combined with its close link to higher education development, thus locking many countries into a path dependency of early constitutions exclusive of academic freedom norms. The availability of relevant models in nearby countries, together with higher education expansion, are key facilitators of academic freedom adoption at the critical time of a constitutional reform process. Diverse countries in different regions acted as norm entrepreneurs, often motivated to domestically protect academic freedom, thus leading to the emergence of regional and other clusters of academic freedom reference types. A sizeable proportion of insincere adopters further suggests that, in some regions, academic freedom serves as a legitimizing international norm.