Professor Joseph Weiler will soon stand trial for criminal libel in France for refusing to remove a book review from a website associated with an academic journal for which he serves as editor. His case has disturbing implications for all those who write, edit, and publish critical scholarly work. In this article, I explore those implications for Canadian scholars at home and as members of a global scholarly community. I assess the likelihood of success of a similar complaint under Canadian defamation law, and I consider the impact of libel chill and libel tourism. I conclude that although the defendant in such a case would have a good chance of prevailing under Canadian law through the defense of fair comment, a threat to academic freedom remains that requires action on the part of individuals and institutions committed to its preservation and enhancement.

This reflective article maps out the findings of a socio-legal study on language use in administrative settings in Belgium’s Dutch-language area. It explains how the author arrived at a socio-legal approach to this study object. Thereafter the article focuses on the methods used and the conceptual framework. It discusses the various methodological choices regarding data collection and the use of methods stemming from anthropology in this study. It also illustrates how anthropological literature on concepts such as discretion and multiple embeddedness provide conceptual tools for building a framework around which to structure and present the empirical data.

The last part of the article sketches the findings of this socio-legal study. Drawing on the conceptual framework, it illustrates that even when practice deviates from statutory law, the relationship between the law and the practice cannot be easily captured in a dichotomic relationship. The author furthermore deduces some relevant findings in light of general human rights. The article concludes with some reflections on research that combines law and anthropology, both as separate disciplines and as a combined endeavor.

The Japanese Constitution has never experienced any amendment since its enactment in 1947. This article claims that the reason is not the Japanese people’s support of it from the heart. The hypothesis presented in this article is that many other political, structural and cultural reasons have gradually deprived the Constitution’s normative force among people, and have made constitutional amendment unnecessary in Japanese politics.

One year ago, the Qatar World Cup was in full swing, and Qatar was omnipresent in our public and private spheres. For many, the Qatar 2022 World Cup will forever be intimately connected with the plight of migrant workers. This Article dives into the confluence of spectacle, counter-marketing, international—labor and human rights—law, and local reforms, which came together in the long decade which followed FIFA’s fateful decision in December 2010 to give the 2022 World Cup to Qatar. It starts by situating the FIFA World Cup 2022 within Qatar’s drive for soft power and nation branding, before turning to re-counting how the 2022 World Cup was “ambushed” in the name of Qatar’s migrant workers and their rights, putting the issue on the global agenda and triggering the involvement of the ILO. Thereafter, the Article discusses the effects of this ambush counter-marketing by engaging with the labor reforms introduced by the Qatari government, while highlighting their limits in terms of scope and implementation. The Article concludes with a general discussion on the blind spots and shortcomings of the turn to counter-marketing as a strategy to vindicate international human rights or labor rights.

Economic interventionism in the form of subsidization and operation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is today among the main frontlines of international trade conflicts. Along with trade restrictions and new legislation designed to impact cross-border investment, mergers, and acquisitions, the use of subsidies and countervailing measures by governments and trade-distorting effects of SOEs have lately caused harsh controversies within and outside the World Trade Organization (WTO) between its members. Going forward, there are reasons to expect these tensions to intensify rather than diminish in number and importance. This Special Issue aims at examining the development of international trade rules regulating state interventionism against the background of the Covid-19 global pandemic and present shifts in global geopolitics and the economy. This introduction, in presenting the state of the art on the questions tackled by this Special Issue and highlighting its contribution to existing literature on the topic, offers different considerations aimed at bringing together various trends emerging from the Articles contained in this Special Issue. It also explores avenues for further research and reflection.

This special issue aims to investigate the regulatory challenges facing the EU with regard to security governance in the broad area of the fight against financial crimes and by adopting a wider outlook on how to map and understand these phenomena in their salient contexts. In recent years, security as a key word can be witnessed as increasingly penetrating policies on a national, international, and supranational level. This development is also visible in EU policies, inter alia in the EU's policy concerning the area of freedom, security, and justice (AFSJ). Coupling the word security to the concept of governance in the somewhat thought-provoking phrase “security governance” prominently cements its position in the entirety of processes and mechanisms that steer people as well as corporations or markets. Security in the EU internal context concerns to a great extent the fight against terrorism and its financing as well as the policing of EU borders. Security in this regard concerns the structure of EU law and how it can be justified at the macro-level.

The concept of rupture straddles the space between revolution and reform, anarchy and order—a paradoxical term to demarcate, on the one hand, the possibility of a complete falling away of one systematization, without necessarily initiating some new regime, and on the other hand, the conditions of improvement and renewal, an opportunity of reassessment, and quite often re-entrenchment. Thus, rupture is not necessarily the same as speaking about revolution, or even emancipation for that matter, because it does not necessitate any giving up of a certain system of ideas or authority, at least not in any longstanding sense. To put it bluntly, it is neither progressive nor reactionary, but in some sense, perhaps best understood, and I will expand on this shortly, as simply the very conditions of establishing and/or maintaining any symbolic order (by which I mean the albeit uneasy synthesis of political, social, economic, religious relationships that constitute what ends up getting called a ‘system’ or ‘order'). Rupture is a strategy, in other words, of both understanding and political action, but which itself carries no necessary affiliation with any ideological disposition. We might say, therefore, to speak of rupture is to enlist a set of concerns, disagreements, traditions, ideas, and so on, that are useful when attempting not just to describe a situation, but to move towards some political decision as a group, though what exactly that would be is open to contestation.

“A harmonious society needs a stronger legal system that wields greater authority.”

“He,” the Chinese character for harmony, is now in everyone's mind when thinking about contemporary China. Harmony and other ‘Confucian values’ seem to have penetrated all spheres of Chinese society, from the Communist Party's elite to business leaders and academics. But Confucius is both used and abused: quoting the philosopher at the start of the Olympic Games Opening Ceremony in a kitsch historical extravaganza featuring 3,000 men dressed up as his disciples does not clarify the true political meaning of an increasingly ideologically eclectic regime. On the contrary, it leads, to borrow Claude Lefort's term, to further “complications.” Thus, the interest in the idea of a ‘socialist harmonious society’ stems less from what it holds aloft than from what it hides.

Following a three-year investigation, on August 30, 2016, the European Commission (EC) released its decision in the Ireland-Apple State aid case. The EC found that Ireland had breached the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union because the manner in which Ireland had determined the tax payable by two Apple subsidiaries was not consistent with the arm's length principle and/or it was not based on objective criteria. This meant that Ireland had selectively favored Apple and provided the firm with State aid. The EC decision provides an example of how aggressive multinational enterprise (MNE) tax minimization is anti-competitive. The Ireland-Apple case also provides an illustration of how a lack of transparency and incoherency in MNE definition contribute to aggressive MNE tax minimization. States' reactions to the EC decision are further telling because they show how MNE tax minimization engages the self-interest of States. This suggests that efforts to combat aggressive MNE tax minimization, such as the OECD's Base Erosion and Profit-Shifting Action Plan, face complex State motivations in effecting change on the international level. Profit haven States have the most to lose if MNE tax minimization is effectively addressed. In addition, MNE home States may be at times loath to support changes to the system which favors “their” MNEs at the expense of other States' tax revenues. It is as if some home States view MNEs as their privateers, with such MNEs operating internationally under the tacit approval of their home States to aggressively avoid paying taxes to other countries. Home State leadership may be mistaken in thinking that MNE tax minimization is in their favor because MNEs are largely free agents and aggressive MNE tax minimization is dearly costing nearly all states.

Last year marked the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide when more than 800,000 people were slaughtered within 100 days under the watch of the international community. As the United Nations has since acknowledged, “[t]he international community did not prevent the genocide, nor did it stop the killing once the genocide had begun.” The whole world failed the victims – a failure the UN Report called a fundamental “failure of the international community [and] failure of the United Nations system as a whole.” Those who could did little or nothing to help. Indeed, some actively concealed or denied the unfolding genocide. Interestingly, the genocide took place more than half a century after the victorious allies of World War II vowed “Never Again!” to genocide in response to the Nazi holocaust. Also, by 1994 the 1948 Convention on the Punishment and the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide under which states assumed a legal duty to prevent and punish the crime of genocide was nearly half a century old.

On 7 February 2006, a chamber of the European Court of Human Rights gave judgment in the much awaited ‘Ostrava case’, which challenged the placing of disproportionate numbers of Romani children in ‘special schools’ for the learning impaired in the Czech Republic. This practice, widespread across Central and Eastern Europe, amounts in effect to racial segregation and denies Romani children access to a standard of education comparable to their non-Romani peers. The Ostrava case, taking eight months to assemble and seven years to reach judgment day in Strasbourg, represented the centre-piece of the litigation strategy of the Romani rights movement. The decision of the Strasbourg Court to ignore the evidence of indirect racial discrimination by a 6-1 majority represents not only a setback for those working for the improvement of the situation of the Roma – widely acknowledged as the most disadvantaged, discriminated and marginalised group in Europe – but also for the crystallisation of non-discrimination norms in Europe.

Of all anti-terror-laws adopted in Germany in the last thirty years, one of the most famous measures is certainly the so-called Kontaktsperregesetz, an Act introducing the possibility of incommunicado detention in the case of imminent terrorist threats. It is the prime example of how far reactive legislation can go, under the pretext to fight terrorism. This form of incommunicado detention was adopted in 1977, by introducing a new section (section 4, Sections 31–38) to the Introductory Act to the Judicature Act (Einführungsgesetz zum Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, hereinafter EGGVG). The provisions were enacted in response to a particular terrorist incident, and have not been applied since. Surprisingly enough, in April 2006, a seemingly new provision was added to this regime (Section 38a EGGVG), however, as we will later see, this regulation is in fact not new, but has only changed its systematic position within the enormous legislative forest of Germany, and, at the same time, its legal nature (from transitory to permanent). Section 38a EGGVG extends the scope of application of incommunicado detention considerably, by allowing it to be used not only in terrorist cases, but also for other forms of criminal organizations like mafia. It thus increases the possibility of prisoners to be absolutely isolated from other inmates, family, friends, and even from their defense counsels, for up to thirty days; a period which can be prolonged for an indefinite period of time, provided that certain requirements are met.

The International Court of Justice's advisory opinion favoring the legal status of the Kosovar declaration of independence came as an exhilarating surprise to many in Kosovo. The spirit of suspicion and negative perception of most internationals (US citizens being a notable but not exclusive exception) meant that a favorable ruling from an international court was unexpected.

On the occasion of the republication of the “blue volume,” containing the proceedings of the 1986 “Critical Legal Thought: An American-German Debate” Conference at the University of Bremen Law School, much or little might be said as to the significance, promises or learned lessons of that event. The original conference conveners, like the editors of the ensuing volume, do much of that in the following pages. In fact, their recollection of the motivations and ideas driving the transatlantic event provides a marvelous view into the evolving mystery of legal thought, education and professionalism - on both sides of the Atlantic. The two accounts rightly embed the mid-1980s conference in a much larger historical context. Christian Joerges’ much-referenced account reaches back deep into the constituting phases of nineteenth-century German legal thought. David Trubek's essay is a thoughtful critical assessment of both the gaps and the overlaps between the German and the American legal cultures in the lead-up to and of the globalizing aftermath of the event.

Where do American and German critiques of their respective “mainstream” legal traditions converge, and where do they diverge? When can the convergences be interpreted as common learning experiences with modern law, as insights into the futility of critical efforts, as indications for their correction? Which divergences are due to differences between the legal cultures and philosophical traditions? Where are they reactions to more specific socio-political constellations and particular structurings of the respective academic systems? From which projects can the “other side” gain new insights, or perhaps entirely new perspectives? Such questions inevitably arise from a volume devoted to German and American critical and socio-theoretical contributions to the discussion of legal theoretical fundamentals. Yet they demand too much from an individual author (at least this one), and their enumeration is intended to make clear the sort of difficulties they occasion and suggest how they might be fruitfully dealt with.

Having gone through an international process on status settlement, in the aftermath of the proclamation of independence, the Kosovo Assembly adopted a Constitution and a range of essential laws. One of the very basic laws adopted in the aftermath of independence is the Law on the Constitutional Court. The Ahtisaari Commission had given a singular importance to the latter, having seen the Kosovan Constitutional Court as one of the most important guarantors of democracy in constitutional terms. In an Ahtisaarian view, the Kosovan Constitutional Court is, inter alia, thought of as a guarantor of the ethnic communities' constitutional rights. As a result, the law concerned along with the Constitution of Kosovo determined the organization and functioning of the Kosovo Constitutional Court.