Germany is the country of legal methodology. No other country saw such an intense academic discourse on the question of what jurists are able, allowed, and supposed to do when interpreting and applying the law. This German peculiarity is tightly linked to the history of the German Civil Code (BGB). Carefully worded and systematically precise, this codification had the potential to significantly limit judicial freedom; thus, its advent marked the beginning of the German methodological debates. The following Article examines this relationship, starting with the year 1874 (when preliminary work on the Civil Code began) and continuing with an analysis of the five political systems during which the BGB was in force: the German Empire (1900–1914), the Weimar Republic (1918–1933), the National Socialist period (1933–1945), the GDR (1949–1989), and the Federal Republic (1949–today). With the exception of the GDR, the methodological debates consistently show attempts to enable judges to adapt the law to real life conditions, or to political ideas in conflict with the BGB, without formally moving beyond extant law. At the roots of 20th century methodological debates, one can thus discern a profound mistrust of German legal academia with regard to both the legislature and the judiciary. Jurists had no confidence in the BGB, which was criticized for being inflexible, outdated, and politically unsound. They did not trust in the freedom of judges either, trying instead to somehow bind them, be it to “life,” “reality,” “justice,” “sense of justice,” “national order,” or “Christian Natural Law.” It was not until 1958 that the Federal Constitutional Court was entrusted with the task of dynamically shaping the guiding values of society, thus forcing both the legislator and the courts to adapt the BGB to these principles. As a consequence, the heyday of German methodological debates surrounding the BGB slowly came to an end.

Today, the 1989 Revolution in East Germany is recognized and celebrated as the event that abolished the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and brought about German unification. What is mostly overlooked, however, is that these are not the Revolution's only and, from the perspective of constitutional law, not even its most important achievements. More important with respect to understanding constitutional lawmaking in Germany is that the 1989 Revolution did not lead to an unconditional adoption of West German constitutional law in the new East German states. Instead, the Revolution had its own constitutional agenda, which went beyond the West German Basic Law and was transferred to unified Germany where it then needed to be integrated into the existing West German constitutional order. The Article reinterprets the 1989 Revolution and shows how a revolutionary popular movement in the GDR developed its own constitutional agenda, which first found legal manifestation in GDR legislation, and then was transferred to unified Germany through the Unification Treaty and the new state constitutions.

Post-communist Central and Eastern European ('CEE') legislators and judges have been resistant to equality and antidiscrimination law. This Article argues that these negative attitudes can be explained in part by the specific trajectory that EAL has taken in CEE during and after state socialism, which has differed from Western Europe. In the UK/EU, the formal guarantees of equal treatment and prohibitions of discrimination of the 1960s and 1970s were complemented by a more substantive understanding of equality in the 1990s and 2000s. This development was reversed in CEE—substantive equality, of a certain kind, preceded rather than followed formal equality and antidiscrimination guarantees.

The State Socialist concern with equality was real, and yet the project was incomplete in several significant ways. It saw only socio-economic, but not socio-cultural inequalities (relating to dignity, identity or diversity). It was transformative with regards to class, but not other discrimination grounds, especially not gender. While equality was a constitutionally enshrined principle, there was an absence of any corresponding enforceable antidiscrimination right. Finally, the emphasis on the “natural” differences between the sexes meant that sex/gender discrimination was not recognized as conflicting with women's constitutional equality guarantees.

This Article engages in an empirical analysis of the counter-majoritarian role of the Brazilian Supreme Court, the Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), in terms of its sharp contrast with the aim of attracting wider participation from civil society in public hearings. Public hearings are an important judicial tool that have recently been introduced and that may influence foreign constitutional courts. A public hearing is a procedure in which the STF can hear experts, scientists, professors, civil servants, and even ordinary citizens when a Justice Rapporteur seeks to elucidate a specific technical aspect of a case, a controversial social issue, or an issue in a field that is generally unfamiliar to the presiding judge or judges. This research aims to address the influence of these public hearings on the deliberation process of the STF based on the democratic theory of representation. First, Section B outlines the main premises of the debate, elucidated the purposes and findings of public hearings. Next, Section C presents a theoretical approach addressing deliberation and representation to explain how information obtained in public hearings might improve the STF's adjudicative process. Section D outlines the chosen criteria and methods for the empirical research; this will demonstrate that public hearings in the STF are not working as envisioned. Lastly, to offer qualitative insight, Section E carefully examines two of the eighteen public hearings analyzed. The Article concludes that the STF has much work to do in terms of rethinking and improving the functionality of public hearings.

Environmental standards should not be a hindrance for economically relevant projects — especially in the fields of sustainability and green energy. Therefore, the Dutch legislature implemented experimental instruments in the Crisis and Recovery Act to improve the flexible application of environmental standards. They did this by allowing competent authorities to deviate from these standards. This article analyzes this Dutch approach, which can be characterized as “bending the rules.” Are these instruments legally sound and how are the relevant provisions applied in practice? Dutch government is currently working on a fundamental change of the system of environmental law with a new Environment and Planning Act. Should this new system of environmental law include a general permanent provision to deviate from environmental standards? This article provides environmental scholars with some lessons that can be learned from the Dutch Approach.