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Takeover Regulation- through the Regulatory Looking Glass

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

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As the Action Plan on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union (2003) makes clear, the EU has sought to develop company and securities law as vital pillars of an overall attempt to improve Europe's international competitiveness. An important part of this is the creation of an integrated capital market in the EU. The regulation of takeover bids was deemed to be a key element of such an integrated market. This paper will focus on Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids and will seek to examine it under the regulatory microscope. It is too early to make a complete judgment about the Directive's effectiveness as a regulatory mechanism as this would involve determining whether it achieves its goals, secures high levels of compliance from Member States and market participants and is democratically accountable to the extent that its provisions affect the public interest. It is however possible to reflect upon some of its potential strengths and failings in respect of these criteria.

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Articles
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Copyright © 2007 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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