This article explores venture capital (VC) as a means and process of accumulating future social necessity. It explores the mechanisms of growth that make VC-backed firms distinct. I argue that a distinctive feature of surplus value capture through VC is valorization via socially necessary contracted space-time, a corrective to Marx’s theorization of socially necessary labor time, which appears incomplete in the context of VC. First, extending Marx’s general formula for capital, I develop a general formula for VC, demonstrating how the VC investment upends traditional theories of capitalist accumulation. Second, I argue that VC invests in firms seeking to capture ‘human capital’ resources and uncapitalized market ‘space’ (noncapitalist social logics of exchange) with the aim of achieving ‘product-market fit’. Third, I demonstrate how time and space are contracted under the VC process as a value capture (VC) mechanism relating to future social necessity. VC is, I argue, about accumulating today what we will all need to be consuming tomorrow, just to keep up with social norms. Finally, I explore how the valorization of crisis (VC) demonstrates the accumulation of future social necessity in practice. I conclude with thoughts concerning the possibility of alternatives beyond the overdetermined rapacity of ‘VC’.

As sustainable finance has entered the mainstream, it has become an area of contestation among civil society, political and business. In response, policy makers seek to resolve stalemates and enhance legitimacy by utilising multistakeholder, consensus-driven approaches to policymaking. In this paper, we examine these emergent ‘cooperative’ structures from a network analytic perspective. Our structural analysis is based on six national and three EU policy spaces. We conduct compositional analyses to explore the makeup of the network(s) and use a range of centrality measures to capture emerging elites. We find an increase in civil society participation in these policy spaces over time; however, financial firms and pro-business voices remain dominant players. We also find a small cluster of elite actors from a range of stakeholder groups. We conclude that the increasing structural balance of stakeholder interests, however, does not translate into power for civil society to alter the direction of policymaking, but appears to serve enhancing the legitimacy of a policy process that departs from the priority and aspirations of civil society organisations.

While FinTech gets promoted as an innovative and progressive solution to meeting financial needs globally, it is afflicted by pervasive gender inequalities, only recently noticed in research. To explore these gender inequalities at the core of FinTech, we use a mixed-methods approach, combining data on 100 leading FinTech firms and 15 interviews with FinTech professionals, collected in the latter half of 2021. We argue that women in FinTech face the ‘triple glass ceiling’ at the intersection of financial, technological, and entrepreneurial gender inequalities. Our sample shows that women account for only 7.69% of (co-)founders, 18.2% of executive committee members, and merely 4.04% of FinTech companies are led by a woman. Gendered stereotypes and a privileging of masculine performances produce significant barriers to women entering and progressing within FinTech. Discriminatory practices are overt and implicit, everyday and exceptional, micro and acute. Shattering the ‘triple glass ceiling’ in FinTech represents an immense challenge.

This article contributes to an understanding of how real estate financialisation unfolds within a city in the global South, Johannesburg. It firstly shows that compared to what has been witnessed in the global North, real estate financialisation in South Africa is characteristically conservative: market actors do not engage in high-risk, low-income neighbourhoods. Indeed, in Johannesburg, financialisation has displayed minimal interest in residential markets. Instead, financialisation in the city has been driven by commercial property investments, typically in the form of urban enclaves such as securitised office parks, malls, mixed-use developments, and increasingly ‘satellite cities’ built from scratch. This article considers how the selective character of financialisation in the country is mediated by power relations in the global political economy. In particular, it highlights how South Africa’s status as an ‘emerging market’ encourages a prudent lending regime for domestic financial institutions and real estate actors.

Brett Christophers’ Our Lives in Their Portfolios documents the rising dominance of asset managers in tangible assets that matter to society, such as housing and infrastructure. He rightly describes the social harm of asset managers who focus on short-term wealth extraction from assets that require long-term investment. Where Christophers focuses less is on another structural question raised: why are the financial assets of working people in public and union pension funds managed by these extractive asset managers in the first place? How do we take our lives out of their portfolios?

In this essay, I argue that Christophers’ description of asset-manager society is best characterized by a logic of ‘acquire and extract’. I build on his insights to delve into the less-explored world of emancipatory alternatives. I argue for radical transformations – what I term ‘democratic ruptures’ – that shift the investment logic of asset managers toward one of ‘build and nourish’. With insights from the failure to establish economic democracy over large pools of finance by unions in the postwar period, I argue that the crucial missing ingredient in the social and ecological disaster of asset-manager society today is democracy. I conclude with a radical reimagining of financial democracy for the twenty-first century.

This essay critically engages with the concept of asset-manager society (AMS) proposed by Brett Christophers. We begin by drawing out its five key elements through a contrast with the related but distinct concept of asset-manager capitalism. We then ask to what extent AMS can be observed in the countries of the Global South, which are characterised by a subordinate position in international money and financial markets. We conclude by highlighting some potential implications of the rise of AMS in these economies and offering some broader thoughts on the future.

In Our Lives in Their Portfolios, Brett Christophers provides an account of the rise of ‘asset manager society’ – a world in which the infrastructures of public life are converted from public to private ownership. Here I use Christophers’ analysis to comment on growing calls for asset manager investment in climate adaptation. The asset manager business model requires ever-escalating returns, a poor fit with the now unavoidable losses that climate change promises to bring.

Asset managers have assumed a position of unprecedented power and influence in the control of essential infrastructures of social life, with broadly negative ramifications. But as the commentaries assembled here all insist, it did not – and does not – have to be this way. In this reply, I discuss the potential, as I see it, for the world to be otherwise, offering a rather pessimistic prognosis.