Smart contracts are designed to be self-executing and self-enforcing. They are written as computer code that can automatically monitor, execute and enforce the performance of the agreed terms. The code of smart contracts exists across a distributed, decentralised blockchain network, controlling the execution and making transactions trackable and irreversible. This article examines the extent to which the Australian Consumer Law unfair contract term provisions can respond to the use of smart contracts. The article finds that the Australian Consumer Law unfair contract term provisions work relatively well to protect smart contract consumers. While some challenges exist and should be properly considered, there seems to be no need to either create entirely new law, modify the existing regime or totally ban smart contracts to protect consumers against unfair contract terms in smart consumer contracts.

According to laboratory federalism, federal systems can promote governmental innovation and experimentation, while containing the risks of innovation to only one jurisdiction. However, it is unclear whether these benefits are realised in practice and whether states are actually effective ‘laboratories’. This article evaluates the extent to which laboratory federalism is occurring in practice, focusing on a case study of age discrimination law in Australia. Drawing on related ideas of democratic experimentalism; legal doctrinal analysis of age discrimination law in the Australian states and territories, and at the federal level; and qualitative expert interviews with 66 Australian respondents, I map the potential and limits of laboratory federalism in advancing age equality. I argue that, in this particular context, the benefits of experimentation may be outweighed by the resulting difficulties of enforcing age discrimination law, exacerbating inequality in practice. The federal structure has led to a confused and confusing patchwork of legal regulation. There is therefore a need for stronger federal structures to facilitate mutual learning and better realise the benefits of laboratory federalism.

This article examines the consequences of the Australia’s Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Act 2020 (Cth) (‘Foreign Relations Act’) for international law. It argues that the arrangements entered into by state, territory and local governments to which the Foreign Relations Act applies can be relevant to international law in three ways. First, they may relate indirectly to Australia’s international legal obligations. Second, they may be a means by which Australian subnational governments claim a role for themselves in governance on global issues. Third, as an exercise of diplomacy, they influence the relations Australia maintains with other nations and the way in which it participates in the international system. As the states and territories in particular become more assertive, including on international issues such as climate change, giving the Commonwealth complete control over such arrangements may impact Australia’s relationship with international law.

This article traces the manner in which the High Court’s recent legality jurisprudence has applied the ‘modern approach’ to interpretation in the context of fundamental rights. It is an approach which has exerted doctrinal pressure on the iconic and once authoritative conception of legality outlined in Coco v The Queen. Relevantly, the Court’s commitment to contextualism has extended to the interpretation of statutes which, on their ordinary meaning, implicate fundamental rights; and the important doctrinal shift which these cases seem to evidence is that the infringement of fundamental rights by necessary implication no longer has to satisfy the stringent — Coco — test. In Coco, the Court had stated that legality — the fundamental rights presumption — ‘may be displaced by an implication if it is necessary to prevent the statutory provisions from becoming inoperative or meaningless.’

Facilitating access to effective and meaningful collective bargaining is at the heart of the most recent set of reforms to the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (‘FW Act’) enacted in the Fair Work Legislation Amendment (Secure Jobs, Better Pay) 2022 (Act). In the shadow of these reforms, this article explores who can engage in collective bargaining in Australia and under what conditions. While there are a range of issues impeding the effectiveness of the collective bargaining system under the FW Act, this article focuses on the question of bargaining access under both labour and competition laws and reveals some of the formidable challenges facing employed and non-employed workers alike. It examines how the rise in dependent contractors and the disaggregation of firms—through labour hire, subcontracting, franchising and/or digital platforms—has destabilised the binary conception of employment. The decline in formal employment and the growth of the ‘fissured workplace’ have not only perpetuated the problem of ‘wage theft’, they have altered the way in which wages are set in the first place. Moreover, these factors have exposed the tensions that lie between the regulation of mainstream labour markets through worker-orientated labour legislation and the regulation of product markets and business relationships under consumer-orientated competition legislation. The discussion explores the limitations created by the siloing of regulatory approaches to enabling collective bargaining for workers covered by different statutory regimes. We identify that in both labour and competition laws, meaningful access to collective bargaining in fissured work contexts has been frequently stifled by misplaced assumptions about the nature of the regulatory target and the power distribution in business networks. The article contends that a regulatory response to fissuring (or the problem of ‘the networked firm’) would straddle the labour/competition law divide in various ways, to ensure fissured workers are no longer excluded from exercising collective power by both legal domains.

We contend that, contrary to mainstream understanding, the Australian Constitution provides a meaningful framework for ensuring economic justice, by virtue of its conferral upon the Commonwealth Parliament of particular legislative powers, namely the income justice and taxation powers. We draw on Rawlsian political theory, together with constitutional theory including recent work on constitutional directive principles, to explain how a constitution, and specifically the Australian Constitution, can impose requirements upon the political order independently of its operation as a legal instrument whose legal meaning is interpreted and applied by the courts. We use this novel account of the relationship between political and legal constitutionalism to establish the consequences, for each branch of government, of this constitutional requirement to secure economic justice. This includes a defence, from the perspective of political as well as legal constitutionalism, of the constitutionality of laws imposing retrospective taxation.

In resolving disputes, the High Court of Australia sometimes has cause to expound upon the relationship between the Australian State and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. This article examines overblown and disingenuous New Right criticism directed towards the High Court in the aftermath of judgments deemed favourable to Indigenous Australians. It finds two themes recur in these attacks: that the High Court’s decision is undemocratic, or that the High Court has acted illegitimately. This article demonstrates that such claims are legally baseless. Drawing on quotes from major players in this debate, the article argues further that beneath this criticism lies a deeper angst over the sovereign foundations of Australia; an anxiety that reappears in arguments against contemporary calls for constitutional reform. As Australia nonetheless inches closer towards constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, the ferocity of New Right censure suggests that the movement may fear the Australian people do not share their same suspicions.