The Australian High Court has in general rejected the use of extrinsic historical material in the interpretation of the Constitution. Though it has consistently claimed that in interpreting a Constitutional provision it is giving effect to the intentions of the founders, it has not been prepared to turn to the convention debates, draft constitutional bills or other primary records in order to ascertain the founders' intentions. The intention is to be ascertained from the ordinary and natural meaning of the words themselves, relying on the proper legal methods of construction and interpretation. However, even when this rule was considered to be settled doctrine there were exceptions. In those cases where the words were ambiguous the Court could turn to the drafts of the Constitution “as a matter of history of legislation”. As well, convention debates could be referred to “for the purpose of seeing what was the subject matter of discussion, what was the evil to be remedied, and so forth”.

Soft law is a pervasive phenomenon which is highly effective as a means of regulation in Australia, as it is in many other jurisdictions. This article will not focus on the regulatory aspects of soft law, but will examine the capacity of individuals to obtain remedies where public authorities fail to adhere to the terms of their published soft law. The available judicial remedies apply in very limited circumstances, both in private law actions (in tort or equity) and public law (judicial review) actions. Ultimately, the most effective ways to remedy breaches of soft law appear also to be ‘soft’, such as recommendations of the Ombudsman and discretionary schemes for ex gratia payments.

It is a tenable view of Commonwealth v Tasmania that as a matter of ratio decidendi it added nothing to the judicial construction of the Commonwealth's external affairs powers (Constitution ss 51(xxix) and 61) which was not already adumbrated in R v Burgess; ex parte Henry (in 1936) and clearly established in Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (in 1982). In this range of cases, attention is concentrated on circumstances in which the Commmonwealth claims power to enact and implement laws having a domestic application within Australia which would not be valid unless they were made in pursuance of an international agreement to which the Commonwealth is a party. There are other circumstances in which the external affairs power will support Commonwealth laws, and these are mentioned in all the Franklin Dam and Koowarta opinions, but hitherto the case illustration of such valid laws has been minimal. It has been hitherto assumed, though not explicitly stated, that international agreements and their implementation in Australia constitute a distinct subdivision or aspect of the legal rules in question.

According to the orthodox principles of private international law, as applied within Australia during the twentieth century, the different States are essentially to be regarded as foreign entities. At common law, the courts of one State will generally apply the statutory laws of another State to resolve a civil law dispute if directed to do so by the common law choice of law rules, but not otherwise. Yet federation was a eustatic event in the evolution of the Australian legal system, albeit that the sea change has taken some time to flow through to many areas.

Australian States are not foreign nations but sub-entities within one nation established and maintained by the Australian Constitution. The law to be applied when there is some competition between Australian legal rules cannot appropriately be dictated just by the common law. That raises constitutional questions by its very nature.

In Australia, decisions about the post-separation relocation of a parent (usually a mother) with children where the other parent (usually a father) has opposed this are increasingly controversial, and have attracted both media and academic attention, including in the pages of this journal. Unlike in the United Kingdom where restrictions even on international relocations appear from analyses of the reported case law to be relatively rare, decisions in Australia restraining relocations are quite common. There has, as yet, been no Australian legislative reform specifically addressing decision-making on the issue of relocation. The decisions are made under the general provisions dealing with post-separation parenting (Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), hereinafter referred to as the ‘FLA‘).

In 2009, Australia experienced a record ‘high’ of 36 487 personal insolvencies. The magnitude of this figure, which represents all bankruptcies, debt agreements, and personal insolvency agreements in that financial year, is augmented when placed in the context of the 300 per cent increase seen in the number of Australian personal insolvencies between 1990 and 2009. This growth far exceeded the 28 per cent increase in the Australian population during that period. It is indisputable that personal insolvency is affecting a growing number of Australians.

This paper examines the relationship between so-called “merits review” of administrative decision-making, and “judicial review” of administrative action as that term is used in the title of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act), for instance. In particular, it assesses and, in some respects, challenges the widely held view that there is a qualitative difference between merits review and judicial review. The main thrust of my argument will be that the differences between judicial review and merits review are not as stark as they are often portrayed. More provocatively, I will suggest that merits review can plausibly be described as judicial review in disguise.

Section I considers the constitutional underpinnings of merits review, and concludes that from a functional point of view, the exclusion of merits review from the judicial power of the Commonwealth is hard to justify. Section II examines various suggested distinctions between judicial review and merits review. Its main conclusion is that merits review is characterised by the power to exercise afresh the decisionmaking power invested in the original decision-maker.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Australian constitutional development in the past decade has been the advent of the constitutional protection of political communication. One important effect of this development has been to focus Australian constitutional debate on the long-standing and rich tradition of constitutional protection of speech in the United States. Reference to American constitutional law is not unprecedented. The United States Constitution has long been a source for Australian constitutional lawyers. It was extensively referred to by the framers of the Australian Constitution and, over the century since the framing, it has been a constant point of reference for the High Court of Australia. However, the influence of the First Amendment is particularly significant since the Bill of Rights and the other rights provisions of the United States Constitution have traditionally been thought of as a part of the American constitutional tradition which Australia does not share.

A decade ago, members of the High Court recognised an implied guarantee of procedural due process in the exercise of federal judicial power. Polyukhovich v Commonwealth, Leeth v Commonwealth and Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration were the leading cases. Thus in Lim’s Case, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ said that the Commonwealth Parliament cannot require or authorise a Chapter III court ‘to exercise judicial power in a manner which is inconsistent with the essential character of a court or with the nature of judicial power.’ Opinions about the content of this due process principle varied. Most judges accepted that federal judicial power must be exercised consistently with the rules of natural justice. Deane and Gaudron JJ went further, however. They argued that the due process principle guaranteed the fair trial of a federal offence, a requirement that, among other things, would prevent abolition of the inherent power of a court to stay an unfair criminal trial.

The executive power of the Commonwealth largely has been neglected, both by the High Court and by commentators, receiving scant attention in comparison with the Commonwealth's legislative and judicial powers. The High Court has examined executive power on fewer than 10 occasions – principally three cases in the Whitlam era: Barton v Commonwealth, the AAP Case and Johnson v Kent – and, most recently, in the Bicentennial Authority Act Case in 1988. (The power has, of course, also arisen in several Federal Court cases, most notably the Tampa Case in 2001.) The relative neglect of this power is reflected in constitutional commentary, for which High Court cases represent primary 'authority'. The Commonwealth's legislative powers have, of course, received detailed examination in every major text since Quick and Garran in 1901. But, while the first monograph on Commonwealth judicial power appeared as early as 1904, almost 80 years were to elapse before publication of a book devoted to the executive power of the Commonwealth.

The franchise is the linchpin of representative democracy. The level of representation is dependent upon the extent of the franchise. This most fundamental of democratic rights, the right to vote for those who govern, is not entrenched in the Commonwealth Constitution. At the time the Constitution was enacted, the franchise was in a period of flux, with property qualifications and plural voting on the demise and the concept of a universal franchise in the ascendant. Proposals to enshrine the franchise in the Constitution met with protests that the smaller colonies, such as South Australia (which allowed women the right to vote) were attempting to impose their will on the larger colonies of New South Wales and Victoria. It is not surprising therefore that such protection as mar be found in the Constitution for the right to vote has been described as “obscure”.

This article demonstrates the pressing need to rethink the doctrine of separation of powers in Australia in light of the increasing influence of intergovernmental organisations such as the Financial Action Task Force (‘FATF’), which are shaping domestic lawmaking. The article documents the influence of the FATF on Australia’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing framework, showing how FATF ‘recommendations’ are in fact decrees that Australia and other nation states integrate into their domestic legal systems — even when the legislative branch of government does not support such actions. The article suggests that Australia should consider implementing a fourth arm of government — an integrity arm — to strengthen the nation against the influence of intergovernmental organisations.

One notable outcome of the 2004 federal election is that no Indigenous Australian was elected to federal Parliament. Since July 2005, when Aden Ridgeway’s term as Senator expired, there have been no Indigenous Australians among the 226 members of the national Parliament. This article explores briefly why this is the case, and then moves to consider the viability of Australia adopting a quota system whereby ‘dedicated’ or ‘reserved’ seats of Parliament would be created for Indigenous Australians.

This article examines the relevance to judicial interpretation of contextual meaning: the meaning legal texts hold when considered in full light of their social and moral context. I argue first that, as a descriptive matter, contextual meaning is necessarily prior to any more restricted form of textual interpretation; that is, the contextual meaning of a legal text is its ordinary meaning. I then contend that, as a normative matter, judges should presumptively apply ordinary or contextual meaning when construing legal materials. The remainder of the article explores the nature and limitations of the contextualist model of judicial practice. The possibility of conflicts between contextual factors at different levels of abstraction makes it necessary to distinguish narrow and wide versions of the contextualist methodology. I argue that wide contextualism offers the best overall account of judicial interpretation. I conclude by examining the practical and normative limitations of this model.

A central question in family property law in Australia is how to place a value on the homemaker contribution in comparison with other kinds of contribution. The problem is especially difficult where the property largely consists of assets owned before marriage, acquired by inheritance, or received after separation. This article explores the relevance of the homemaker contribution to property division both in marriages and de facto relationships, challenging the popular assumption that living together per se justifies significant wealth transfers. It is argued that parenthood provides the most important justification for property alteration, and that withdrawal from workforce participation due to the care of children or other family members is the primary concern in evaluating the homemaker contribution. The article then goes on to explore what the homemaker contribution meant when the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Family Law Act’) was enacted, and how that conceptual coherence has become lost over time. There are now two different approaches which have emerged to the quantification of the homemaker contribution in the context of pre-marital property, inheritances, damages awards and property acquired after separation. These approaches are irreconcilable. The approach which is now finding favour in the Full Court of the Family Court is one which makes it impossible for the Court to explain how it has reached its decision on the quantification of the parties' proportionate shares. Furthermore, it is founded on an interpretation of the homemaker contribution that Parliament never intended and has not since authorised. This raises important questions about the legitimacy of the Court's approach to property division under s 79 of the Family Law Act. The article concludes by offering a new interpretation of the role which the homemaker contribution should play in the division of property on relationship breakdown which is consistent with the overall framework of s 79. It involves two distinct considerations of the homemaker contribution. The first is to examine how homemaker contributions should be rewarded. The second is to consider how they should be compensated.

Dr Galligan examines the origin of judicial review under the Australian Constitution through an catalysis of the Conventions and Conferences preceding its drafting. A political scientist, he disputes the claim that there is no basis for judicial review in the Australian federal system and argues that the intention of the founders, influenced by Inglis Clark, was to create a powerful American-style court primarily to interpret the Constitution in the resolution of federal disputes. As a case study of the founders' intentions he considers the debates and “solution” of the question of control of Australia's inland river system.

This article argues against the disenfranchisement of prisoners and explores the terrain of possible political and legal reform in this area. After a brief introduction defending the importance of the franchise, the article falls into several parts. First, there is an examination of the definition of the franchise by Australian electoral law, in the context of international norms. The second part explores arguments for and against prisoner enfranchisement, and draws on overseas jurisprudence, and historical and political theory. The practical effect of the disenfranchisement is then assessed statistically, and also in terms of realpolitik. Finally, the possibility of using anti-discrimination law to challenge these laws is considered.

In this article, we focus on one of the most important statutory protections for Australian consumers in financial hardship: the right to seek a variation of a credit contract contained in s 72 of the National Credit Code. We provide a comprehensive history of this right, which has been part of Australian consumer credit law since the 1970s. Over the years, it has evolved from a very limited right to seek an extension of time to pay a debt on grounds of illness and unemployment, to a broader provision that requires credit providers to comply with a prescribed process before they can commence enforcement action against a consumer who has sought a variation to their payment arrangements. We also undertake an analysis of the evolution of this right to demonstrate that despite improved understandings of the causes of financial hardship, it continues to envisage a middle-class subject with a strong awareness of their rights, and excludes some particularly vulnerable consumers. This right is also representative of a regulatory approach that envisages a limited role for consumer credit law, and does not sufficiently address the imbalance of bargaining power between the consumer and the credit provider. We argue for the imposition of an obligation to provide a minimum range of hardship assistance directly upon credit providers, as a means of addressing this imbalance and ensuring more meaningful protection for consumers in financial hardship.

Probably the most basic contemporary controversy over the interpretation of the Australian Constitution is that between the methodologies of originalism (or intentionalism) and progressivism. According to the first, the fundamental task of the Courts (and especially the High Court) usually is regarded as being to interpret the Constitution so as to give effect to the intentions of those who framed it at the great Conventions of the 1890s, commonly referred to as 'the Founding Fathers' or (as here) 'the Founders'. Progressivists, on the other hand, believe that a search for historical intention is at best incidental in the process of constitutional interpretation, and that the Court should construe the Constitution so as to bring it into accord with modern needs and exigencies. Between the two sides in this fiercely contested debate stretches a vast chasm both of theoretical approach and rhetoric. A third approach, literalism, despite a hallowed history in Australian constitutional law and its routine deployment in virtually all important cases concerning federal legislative power, today largely is overshadowed in the minds of constitutional lawyers by the fascinations of its two rivals.

In May 2018, the Hague Conference on Private International Law (‘HCCH’) produced a draft convention for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. A Diplomatic Session of the HCCH is expected to take place in 2019 at which this draft ‘Judgments Convention’ will be presented. If a multilateral convention emerges from the Diplomatic Session, Australia is likely to be an early adopter: the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department conducted a public consultation on the draft Judgments Convention in 2018. Against that background, this article considers the impact of implementation of the Judgments Convention in Australia. It is argued that domestic legislation that emerges from the Judgments Convention will deliver an overdue refurbishment of the Australian law relating to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Australia’s adoption of the Judgments Convention ought to be welcomed.