This article critically examines the approach adopted by the courts to causation in securities and financial product disclosure cases, where a plaintiff alleges loss as a result of defective disclosure by a product issuer. The article argues that the reliance approach should be rejected as the sole approach to causation in securities and financial product disclosure cases. The article gives two principal arguments in support of this claim. Firstly, the reliance approach, by insisting that causation may only be established by proving reliance on the disclosure document, implicitly assumes a ‘rational choice’ approach to investor decision-making which, as demonstrated by a significant body of behavioural research, does not accurately reflect the reality of investor decision-making. Secondly, the reliance approach sits at odds with other developments in securities cases and misleading and deceptive conduct jurisprudence. I argue that the courts should recognise that causation may potentially be demonstrated in a variety of ways other than reliance on the disclosure document, including reliance on sources such as communications from financial advisers, newspapers, online sources, briefings, investor roadshows, social media and other marketing practices.

In resolving disputes, the High Court of Australia sometimes has cause to expound upon the relationship between the Australian State and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. This article examines overblown and disingenuous New Right criticism directed towards the High Court in the aftermath of judgments deemed favourable to Indigenous Australians. It finds two themes recur in these attacks: that the High Court’s decision is undemocratic, or that the High Court has acted illegitimately. This article demonstrates that such claims are legally baseless. Drawing on quotes from major players in this debate, the article argues further that beneath this criticism lies a deeper angst over the sovereign foundations of Australia; an anxiety that reappears in arguments against contemporary calls for constitutional reform. As Australia nonetheless inches closer towards constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, the ferocity of New Right censure suggests that the movement may fear the Australian people do not share their same suspicions.

This article looks at the recent Public Health (COVID-19 Restrictions on Gathering and Movement) Order 2020, which was in force in New South Wales from 31 March 2020 to 14 May 2020. The order allowed police to fine people who left their houses without a ‘reasonable excuse’. This article considers the confusion around the order in the community and upper levels of the government. Publicly available information about the fines issued by the police is analysed and it is argued that an overly narrow application of the order by police meant that its application was not reasonably proportionate to the authorising legislation, the Public Health Act 2010 (NSW). It is concluded that if future lockdowns are required, care will need to be taken to ensure that Ministerial orders are crafted in line with the legislation and that police officers clearly understand their operation.

How are we to explain the High Court's reluctance to move into stronger forms of rights protection, as evinced by the disparity between its federalism and rights-based judicial review practices? It has been suggested that the federal and ‘rights’ provisions of the Constitution are equally indeterminate, calling into question the notion that the legal materials themselves compel a preference for one or another type of review. And the Court's record of rendering politically consequential decisions in its federalism jurisdiction suggests that political-institutional constraints may not preclude it from expanding its rights review powers. This article contends that the disparity in the Court's review practices can be explained only by way of a theory of judicial politics that is sensitive to notions of cultural as well as political constraint. It traces the historical emergence of an Australian politico-legal culture, before examining its role in restraining the further protection of constitutional rights.

Australia has announced the need to review the distribution of responsibility among individuals, businesses and governments, as a consequence of the move to digital citizenship. Australia has formally framed the issues in these terms and has opened dialogue between government and citizens regarding responsibilities for the use and protection of digital identity.

This article examines digital citizenship in Australia and considers the implications for individuals, government and the private sector of the requirement for an individual to use his/her digital identity for transactions. The features and functions of digital identity are examined, and the consequences for individuals, business and government of system failure are considered. The analysis shows that, while there are consequences for all, individuals are most affected.

The author argues that the traditional approach of relying on privacy for protection is inadequate in these circumstances. Privacy, by its nature, cannot adequately protect the part of digital identity which is required for transactions. The argument presented is that, unlike privacy, the right to identity can protect the set of digital information required for transactions. Considering the new system is literally being imposed by government, the inherent vulnerabilities of the system, and the consequences of system failure for individuals, formal recognition of the right to identity is an essential element of accountable and responsible governance. Whilst in time the right to identity in this context may be recognised by the courts, the author argues that legislative recognition and protection of an individual's right to digital identity is needed now as a key component of the distribution of responsibility in this new digital era.

In 1981 and in following years Australian parliaments embarked upon a novel experiment: statutory reform of the general approaches to statutory interpretation. The best known of these provisions (called here “purpose rules”) is s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth).

The presumption of constitutionality has been frequently invoked in recent judgments of Murphy J in the High Court. The article examines the use of the presumption in the United States and Canada. It then considers the way in which the presumption has been applied in Australia and the justification given for it. It is suggested that although the presumption does not have a clearly recognised place in Australian constitutional theory, the presumption is important and it should be given much greater prominence. For this to happen will require changes in judicial attitude. It also requires Parliament to reassert its role in the determination of constitutional questions.

The standing rule in administrative law requires parties to demonstrate that they have a special interest in the subject matter of the decision they wish to challenge in judicial review proceedings. This article examines the problems the special interest requirement has presented in judicial review, particularly to environmental groups, and how it has been liberalised in lower courts. The article then examines several possible reforms to standing and concludes that a standing rule should be retained but relaxed.

This article examines the application of the rule of law to special leave to appeal applications (‘SLAs’) in the High Court of Australia. SLAs are a fusion of administrative and judicial power. As an administrative tool, determinations of SLAs are a workload filter, limiting the appeals heard by the Court. As an exercise of judicial power, SLA determinations have significant impact upon the parties to litigation and the development of substantive law. Presenting the findings of data analysis of the determination of SLAs in the High Court of Australia from 2013 to 2015, we identify the loss of publicly available information brought about by changes to the High Court Rules in 2016. Using this evidence, we argue that the current administration of SLAs preferences efficiency to the detriment of public confidence in the administration of justice. We suggest facilitating the rule of law through publication of the written submissions for SLAs.

Globally, financial system regulators are susceptible to deliberate and inadvertent influence by the industry that they oversee and, hence, are also susceptible to acting to benefit the industry rather than the public interest – a phenomenon known as ‘regulatory capture’. Australia, arguably, has an optimal model of financial system regulation (a ‘Twin Peaks’ model) comprising separate regulators for prudential soundness on the one hand, and market conduct and consumer protection on the other. However, the current design of the Twin Peaks model has not been sufficient to prevent and address prolonged and systemic misconduct that culminated in a public Royal Commission of Inquiry into misconduct in the industry. Subsequent to the Royal Commission and other inquiries, the Department of Treasury has proposed legislation to establish an Assessment Authority to assess the effectiveness of the Twin Peaks regulators. The proposal includes enquiries by an Assessment Authority into the regulators’ independence, so as to identify instances of, and thereby mitigate, their capture. As with all financial system regulators, the Assessment Authority itself may be susceptible to regulatory capture, either by the Twin Peaks regulators, or by the financial industry. Thus, this paper poses the question: how can the new Assessment Authority be optimally constituted by legislation, and operated, to effectively oversee the effectiveness of the regulators, but itself remain insulated from the influence of the regulators and industry? We analyse the primary sources of influence over financial system regulators that the Assessment Authority will likely face and recommend ways in which a robust design of the Assessment Authority can mitigate those sources of influence. In doing so, we adopt an inter-disciplinary approach, drawing upon not only regulatory theory but also for the first time in relation to this question, organisational psychology. Our findings address gaps in the proposed legislation currently before Federal Parliament and propose methods by which those gaps may be filled, in order to ensure that this important reform to Australia’s financial regulatory regime has the greatest chance of success.

Anthony Frank Mason came to the notice of many in the legal profession early in his career. He was admitted to the New South Wales Bar in 1951 and three years later had his first significant success in a constitutional challenge to provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, arguing that provisions purporting to give power to the registrar were contrary to Chapter III of the Constitution. Shortly afterwards he endeavoured to appear for Fitzpatrick in the proceedings before the House of Representatives against his client and Browne for contempt of Parliament but he was denied permission. He has said that that experience had a considerable effect on his outlook in respect of the principles of natural justice and the importance of the courts in protecting the citizen.

In 1964 he was appointed Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth. While he was the fourth person to hold that position (the others being Garran, Knowles and Bailey) he was the first Solicitor-General who was not also Secretary of the Attorney-GeneralIs Department. His main duties were, therefore, to act as counsel and adviser to the Commonwealth. This gave him insights into the institutions and organisation of government which no doubt played their part in the formation of his later judicial views on public law.

In Singh v Commonwealth (‘Singh’), the High Court was presented with the question whether a person born in Australia can be considered an ‘alien’ for the purpose of s 51(xix) of the Constitution (‘naturalization and aliens’). In a 5:2 decision the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that birth in Australia necessarily accorded her the status of non-alien and thus a constitutional nationality which could not be displaced by legislative reliance on other heads of power. The decision is important, both for its elucidation of Parliament's scope to regulate Australian citizenship — the subject of a series of important cases over the last two decades involving strong dissents and two reversals in approach — and for its consideration of principles of constitutional interpretation.

It was never intended that the company to be constituted should consist of one substantial person and six mere dummies.

The robust affirmation of separate corporate personality by the House of Lords in Salomon is in sharp contrast to the fragile legal personality possessed by Mrs Salomon in 1897. In corporate law discourse Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd is portrayed as the first case about the “one person company”. The case has given rise to considerable debate about the recognition of corporate personality where the corporation is the alter ego of a human person. In fact the portrayal of A. Salomon & Co Ltd as the alter ego of Aron Salomon is misleading because the company was a family company. The subscribers to the memorandum, described by Lopes LJ in the above quote as “six mere dummies” were Aron Salomon's wife and five children who were active participants in the company.

Our comprehension of the legal means and methods by which military forces are employed, controlled and — where considered necessary — immunised, is incomplete. Some questions are — in a jurisprudential sense — well settled, or at least evolving along a logical, comprehensible, and generally linear course. Thus the scope of the defence power under the Australian Constitution has, on the whole, been relatively consistently interpreted over time as an elastic power — expanding in time of large-scale conflict, contracting in time of profound peace, variably waxing and waning between these two poles in situations of uncertainty less than war but short of settled peace. There have certainly been some new developments in understanding the scope of the power — such as the High Court of Australia’s decision in Thomas v Mowbray (relating to the constitutional validity of the federal control order regime). In this case the majority held that components of the defence power are also exercisable through non-military organs such as the police. But on the whole, our understanding of the power has developed along conceptually and chronologically coherent and logical lines. Similarly, there is no question in the Australian context that this evolution has also been more generally coherent in terms of its interaction with related constitutional questions. Thus Thomas v Mowbray is, in many ways, a belated cross-referral allowing police and intelligence agencies to access authority under the defence power. This merely reflects and accompanies the long established principle that the military forces can likewise be used for law enforcement purposes — as confirmed in Li Chia Hsing v Rankin. It is perhaps justified to say that were we to apply a jus ad bellum / jus in bello approach (law of armed conflict based and thus formally inapplicable, but nevertheless useful) to the problem, the jus ad bellum issues — the when and why of use of military forces in law enforcement operations — are relatively settled, or at least evolving coherently and consistently with their history and precedent.

It has been an eventful year for the Criminal Code (Cth). Chapter 2 General Principles of Criminal Responsibility ('Chapter 2’) emerged unscathed, indeed reinforced, as a consequence of judicial scrutiny by the High Court in R v Tang and it was the subject of an extended exposition of the principles of statutory interpretation, incorporating elements of his McPherson Lectures, by Spigelman CJ in R v JS. The High Court decision is remarkable for the strict literalism of its interpretation of Part 2.2 The elements of an offence. The judgment of Kirby J, though dissenting in the outcome, provides a valuable addition to his earlier judgment in R v Barlow, on the principles of interpretation of legislation codifying the criminal law. Danger signs are apparent, however, in an equally literal reading of Chapter 2 by the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal in Crowther v Sala, which will be discussed later in this essay. As appellate case law on Chapter 2 grows, stresses on its structure that were unforeseen by its framers have begun to accumulate. If Chapter 2 is to continue to guide Parliament and courts in the formulation and interpretation of criminal legislation it will require continuing legislative maintenance.

This article considers the YouMeUnity Report proposal for the inclusion of new language provisions in the Australian Constitution as part of a package of reforms for the constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. The article outlines the important symbolic and substantive effects of recognising language rights in the Constitution. The article explains how the recognition of a national language and the recognition of minority languages are conceptually distinct — promoting a national language is aimed at promoting national unity and enhancing the political and economic participation of individuals in the state, whereas protecting minority languages is aimed at recognising linguistic diversity, enriching the cultural life of the State, maintaining connections with other nations, and recognising language choice as a basic human right. The article argues that there is a strong case for minority language recognition, and in particular, the recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages, in the Australian Constitution, but warns against the recognition of English as the national language.

Constitutional authority over resources and environmental questions resides principally in the States in Australia, but there are many powers which the Federal Government can develop, either alone or together with the States, in working out national policies in these areas. Although the constitutional issues are important, resolution of land use problems is fundamentally a matter of competition for power and authority within the political system.

Professor Whalan suggests four stages in the development of environmental law: (a) totally resource-oriented statutes with possible overlaps and clashes between separate uses; (b) integration of the separate codes and the introduction into those codes of environmentally oriented protective provisions; (c) the enactment of statutes directed towards a specific environmental problem or problems; and (d) the development of overview bodies with advisory and supervisory functions to which the protective responsibilities may be added.

In these statutory moves towards macro-environmental law in Australia, the Courts have been given a very limited role and it is argued that much of the law is not normative in character but procedural, administrative and discretionary. In very many cases, ultimate control is political rather than judicial.