Words can be confusing and titles can be misleading, particularly if titles consist of one simple word. Two titles suffice to illustrate this phenomenon. In 2000, a book appeared with the title Empire and in 2002 another book appeared with exactly the same title. In the first Empire, Michael Hardt, an American literary theorist, and Antonio Negri, an Italian political philosopher, argued that although classical imperialism is over, Empire is alive and well, albeit in a new form. For them ‘Empire’ means the following: ‘Our basic hypothesis is that sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule. This new global form of sovereignty is what we call Empire.’ This is a rather special definition of Empire because what one usually has in mind when using that word is something very different. It is the Empire that the other book, written by the British historian Niall Ferguson, is about. This book describes, as the subtitle indicates, The Rise and Demise of the British World Order. But it is also about something more, as is apparent from the rest of the subtitle: and the Lessons for Global Power. These lessons are intended for the rulers of the Empire of today, the Americans. While the first Empire is the Bible for anti-globalists, Ferguson's book can be considered as the New Testament of the advocates of America's imperial ambitions.

The future is notoriously difficult to predict, but it can be invented. One option would be to develop a strategy directed towards sustainable consumption because, while the patterns of consumption of food, energy and materials, including water, differ greatly in various parts of the world, if business continues as usual, rates of consumption threaten to become a serious source of conflict. Among the challenges of the new century are a better understanding of what is meant by the transition towards sustainable consumption and how science and technology could be used to improve the efficiency with which resources are utilized, new products and processes invented, and the environmental cost of modern lifestyles best evaluated. Efforts to influence the phenomenon of over-consumption in nations that are more developed economically, and address under-consumption in nations that are less developed, are not topics that can be resolved by scientists and technologists alone. Interdisciplinary studies have become increasingly important to elucidate best methods of production, benefits, threats and consumer behaviour. Implementation of new remedies from science and technology, however, requires dialogue with the public on a case-by-case basis and should begin at the earliest stages of innovation. Sustainable consumption as a strategy lies at the heart of sustainable development; it provides the basis of social equity currently undermined by the rich–poor divide and a route to conflict avoidance.

Urban history, at least in Germany, has mainly concentrated on the Medieval and Reformation cities on the one hand and Industrial and Contemporary cities on the other. However, recent debates among Early Modernists have produced the view that ‘confessionalization’, that is the formation of three or four modern church systems based on specific confessions of faith, was one of the most influential factors in producing the fundamental changes that occurred between 1550 and 1650 in Europe. This had a huge effect on the cities of Europe and their inhabitants. This paper compares Catholic and Protestant cities in Europe around 1600 with regard to their specific architecture and their religious and civic rituals. Rites and other religious functions or institutions have always been an important part of urban life. Lewis Mumford refers to religious funeral rites in his magisterial analysis of urban life in a universal perspective: ‘The city of the dead antedates the city of the living. In one sense, indeed the city of the dead is the forerunner, almost the core, of every living city.’ In Europe, the relationship between the Church and the towns or cities was especially close and, in a sense, fundamental because of the medieval history of the European towns and the structure and profile of pre-modern European societies in general. We start with a brief overview of these preconditions for urban life during Europe's confessional period, and then go on to take a closer look at the confessional city itself.

What distinguished the mass transatlantic migration that occurred between Columbian contact and the early nineteenth century from the movements of peoples around the globe that occurred both before and after this phenomenon? Two central distinguishing features were the large element of coercion in the movements across the early modern Atlantic world, and the central importance of identity in shaping both the direction of migration and its composition. On the first of these, coercion was a sine qua non, not only of the well-known slave trade, but also of the much smaller migrations of convicts and – given the temporary, if voluntary, signing away of the migrants' freedom – indentured servants and contract labourers. On the second, the question of who became slaves was determined by the refusal of Europeans to enslave other Europeans.

The European debate on immigration is marred by stereotypes, such as the supposition that Europe is full, that asylum seekers can be separated from economic immigrants, that the sending countries suffer from brain drain and that immigrants take jobs away from the population in the receiving countries. Many of these arguments can be reversed, but recently immigrants have indeed been costly to the EU taxpayer. However, demographic decline will force Europe to devise a system by which labour immigration can be profitable again for the host countries.

The end of the Cold War marked a major break for migration policies in Europe. Defensive projections and visions of migration came to the fore in a European Union whose integration and openness toward the internal border-free single market went hand-in-hand with joint isolation of a ‘Fortress Europe’ vis-à-vis undesirable and, especially illegal, in-migration from outside its borders. As long as a negative coalition against unwelcome immigration prevails instead of a European migration concept, Europe itself contributes to the illegalization of immigration and to the persistence of the enemy image of ‘illegal immigration’. Against a background of widespread and confused fears of migration pressure from outside Europe, three issues have to be promoted by clear political direction with long-term perspectives: (1) a further normalization in dealing with migration and integration; (2) the acceptance and understanding of the feasibility of these central issues of social life in an immigration country, but also (3) the pragmatic acceptance of the limits of migration control in view of the often underestimated autonomous dynamics of migration and integration processes. This combines perspectives of researching migration and integration as well as the shaping of policies.

Employing methods extracted from the literature, in combination with data on the Dutch economy, we assess the impact of immigration on the labour market and the public sector in the Netherlands. Additional labour supply due to immigration will have only a limited positive effect on the total income of natives, though redistribution between native groups is relatively large. The long run fiscal impact of immigrants will only be positive if their labour market performance at least equals that of natives. We conclude that selective labour immigration may contribute to the economic well-being of the host country. However, large-scale immigration of labour is not considered to be effective in alleviating the financial burden of ageing in the Netherlands.

2004 is an Olympic year, so it is worth directing some attention to the ‘inventors’ of the Olympic Games, the ancient Greeks who, in the early eighth century BC, according to at least one tradition, founded the Olympic Games in the precinct of Zeus, an area on the Peloponnese not far from the later city of Elis. The ‘inventor’ of the new Olympic Games in 1896, the French Baron, Pierre de Coubertin, drew at least part of his inspiration from the ancient predecessors. What was the status of the ancient Olympics in the world of sports in the Greco-Roman period; what sort of sport was practised in Olympia? Who were the participating athletes and, above all, why did they practice their sports and why did they participate in the Olympics? Was it the case that it was a gentlemanly amateur activity and that commercialism in sport is just a modern deviation?

The Olympic Games are an invention of the ancient Greeks. They were held in Olympia in a quadrennial rhythm, without interruption for ca. 1200 years. Compared with the modern Olympics, the ancient programme was small: running events (over several distances), the pentathlon, and the so-called ‘heavy’ events: wrestling, boxing and pankration. Various equestrian events (with and without chariots) completed the programme. This programme is discussed with the athletes, their social background and ideology. Although in ancient Olympia a wreath of olive-leaves – a forerunner of our modern gold medal – was the first and only prize, there was no amateurism in Greek athletics. Olympic athletes happily participated in highly rewarding money games both before and after the Olympics. Money was not despised; abuse of money, in the form of Wine, Women and Song was criticized, but some athletes, then as now, were unable to resist the temptations of life.

Roman ludi circenses are well known, especially chariot-racing, which was extremely popular during the Roman Empire. In many aspects, this competition even foreshadows modern sport seen as show business (the Circus Maximus could accommodate about 150,000 spectators). One could not say the same thing about the athletic exercises of Roman citizens: the common view is that Romans had a negative attitude towards athletics, which were not regarded as useful and were sometimes considered as scandalous. But Roman citizens did, in fact, practise much sport, for instance in the Campus Martius in Rome, and in the palaestrae of public baths. They were particularly fond of ball-games and of swimming in very large cold pools.

Coubertin's contribution to the revival of the Olympic Games and the widespread opinion that the modern Games were ‘a French invention’ should be placed in their broad historical context. There are several arguments for and against the assumption that he was the founder, or ‘father’, of the modern Olympics and the Olympic movement. The historical development of the Olympic ideas since the time of Humanism will be discussed, along with the Renaissance and the various attempts to organize Olympic Games before 1896, with a further emphasis on the importance of Neo-Humanism and classical scholarship in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, in order better to understand ancient Greek athletics. Finally Pierre de Coubertin's concept of the Olympic Games and the contributions of the young Greek nation for the rebirth of the famous ancient games after the War of Independence will be analysed.

Baron Pierre de Coubertin purported to follow the traditions of the ancient Olympic Games, but adapted them to fit his own political, social, and sporting conceptions. From their very beginning, the modern Games have had aspirations that have extended beyond sport. After brief comments on corruption, philosophy of life, and spectacle, this essay examines the Olympic Games in terms of amateurism and professionalism; winning and the joy of participation; nationalism and ultra-nationalism; the medal count; war, violence, and peace; performance-enhancing drugs; women and minorities; and the Americanization of the Games.