During the past 30 years, the growth of the larger urban centres, which has been steady since the beginning of urbanization, ceased to be regular and general. Third World cities continued their evolution during the 1960s and 1970s. It was different for Western cities, especially in North America and Northern Europe, where a period of decline or stability occurred for about 15 years, between 1965 and 1980. In order to qualify this emerging trend, Brian Berry coined the word counterurbanization in 19761 During the 1980s, many demographers expected a generalization of this phenomenon, i.e. an accelerated decline of major urban centres all over the developed world but it did not occur. It is this problem that is addressed here.

A dramatic increase in volumes of commodity flow during the latter part of the 20th century reflects the fulfilment of postwar ideals of economic growth, but also imply serious challenges to the social and ecological integrity of places and regions. The record of imports and exports of food and energy products for Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden during the 1960–90 period illustrate some of the built-in contradictions between rhetoric and reality. Those very societies which proclaim definitions of sustainable development as the harmonization of economic, social and ecological values demonstrate—at national scales—ways of life which, according to these criteria, are not sustainable. Calorie counting at national and regional scales might offer useful catalysts for reflection on theoretical as well as practical dimensions of sustainable development.

Two major contrasts between Western and Eastern thought are discussed. Eastern people put a value on long-term thinking. They do not regard the search for certainty as important but accept multiple interpretations as simultaneously valid.

The memory of the German occupation in the Netherlands has been rather tenacious, compared to neighbour-countries. This can be explained by some specific features of Dutch history and society and by the long period of an undisturbed neutrality and peace. The traditional religious and political pluralism and tolerance generated a culture of political introspection and a strong belief in the universal validity of moral values, which was extremely ill prepared to meet the Nazi-system of brute force and terror.

Recent events have seen a tendency for large states to break up, in opposition to the consolidating processes which were general when small states became merged in much of Europe—although this process can be considered as still continuing in the European Union. At the same time there has been a growth of multinational companies which cut across such power groupings.

Nationalism as a historical phenomenon should be reassessed in light of the re-emergence of nationalism, and national conflicts, in post-communist societies. Democratic values and the mechanisms of the free market are not the only issues central to the political discourse of these societies, and issues of national identity and historical memory sometimes take precedence. Both the legacy of the way in which communist ideology and practice dealt with nationalism, as well as the void left by the collapse of the whole Lebenswelt fostered by communist regimes should be seen as contributing to the role played by nationalism in these emerging societies.

This critical essay is addressed to those Western intellectuals who draw the conclusion that contemporary development in post-communist countries is dominated primarily by the growth of irrational and destructive nationalism. A number of terminological and methodological misunderstandings are pointed out. Nation-forming has occurred in the form of national movements, a type which started from a non-dominant ethnic group and not from an Early—Modern state-nation. Such development towards a modern nation was prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe, although it is also found in Western and Northern parts of Europe. This type of nation-forming resulted in some permanent characteristics and stereotypes which developed typically in the members of ‘small nations’. It is necessary to discriminate in the use of the term, nationalism: we must recognize that national identity is different from nationalism. Ideas about real or partially imagined national interests accompany the existence of every (and hence also East European) nation. The process of education toward a European identity cannot ignore the existence of nations as a sociological fact with regard to the post-communist countries. The decision about the inclusion of these countries in the European identity does not only depend on the members of these nations, but also on whether the West will cease to perceive the small post-communist countries as mere accidental foci of ‘nationalism’ and the recipients of economic aid.