During World War II the Allies controlled Spain's oil supply in order to limit Spain's support for the Axis. This experiment with sanctions is unusually informative because a wide range of policies was tried over a long period. Three episodes are of special interest: (1) a total embargo on oil for Spain in August 1940 that was surprisingly successful in dissuading Spain from joining the Axis; (2) a period of reduced supplies in 1941–42, which we call ‘the Squeeze’, that was only partially successful in reversing Spanish policies favouring the Axis; and (3) a second total embargo early in 1944, which proved a disappointment for the Allies, and that produced a rift between Churchill and Roosevelt. Our analysis is based on new monthly estimates of Spain's imports of gasoline and other petroleum products that we describe in the text and report in the Appendix. These estimates allow us to draw a clearer picture of the oil sanctions than has been possible in the past.

This article examines patterns of structural change and labour productivity growth in the late nineteenth-century Habsburg Empire. Using shift-share analysis and a set of basic measures to account for the contribution of physical and human capital growth, it seeks to address three questions. First, what was the role of labour productivity growth in per capita income growth? Second, to what extent can structural change account for the comparatively slow growth of the Habsburg economy in general, and Austria's, in particular? Third, how important were physical and human capital stock growth in aggregate labour productivity growth in Austria-Hungary as compared to Germany? The article argues that, in contrast to the Hungarian experience, the size and performance of the agricultural sector imposed a severe burden on Austrian aggregate growth. Further, the evidence points to a significantly smaller contribution of TFP growth to aggregate and industrial labour productivity growth in Austria and Hungary than in Germany. A proximate cause for the TFP growth differential may be found in far smaller positive externalities derived from lower initial human capital endowments in the Habsburg lands.

This article examines energy consumption in Sweden, Holland, Italy and Spain over 200 years, including both traditional and modern energy carriers. The analysis is based on totally new series of energy consumption including traditional carriers along with modern sources. Our main purposes are a closer examination of the process of the energy transition in Europe and a revision of the prevailing idea of there being, over the long run, an inverted U-curve in energy intensity. Changes in energy consumption are decomposed into effects from population growth, economic growth and energy intensity. The results on energy intensity challenge the previous suggestions of most scholars. An inverted U-curve does not exist whenever we include traditional sources of energy in our analysis.

The purpose of this article is to re-evaluate the military spending dynamics leading to the First World War, namely to explore the impact of the declining military and economic leadership of the UK and the economic emergence of the USA. Individual countries responded to threats from perceived enemies and spillovers from potential allies rationally, yet often going beyond the bounds of traditional alliances. In a sixteen-country system, the military reticence of the UK and USA encouraged higher military spending by other states, which suggests that Germany was not responsible for the arms race alone. Aggregate systemic military spending also incurred higher individual spending levels, whereas alliance impacts were not consistent.