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From the great illusion to the Great War: Military spending behaviour of the Great Powers, 1870–1913

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 August 2007

JARI ELORANTA
Affiliation:
Department of History, Appalachian State University, Old Library Classroom Building, 325 University Drive, Boone, North Carolina 28608, USA
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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to re-evaluate the military spending dynamics leading to the First World War, namely to explore the impact of the declining military and economic leadership of the UK and the economic emergence of the USA. Individual countries responded to threats from perceived enemies and spillovers from potential allies rationally, yet often going beyond the bounds of traditional alliances. In a sixteen-country system, the military reticence of the UK and USA encouraged higher military spending by other states, which suggests that Germany was not responsible for the arms race alone. Aggregate systemic military spending also incurred higher individual spending levels, whereas alliance impacts were not consistent.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2007 Cambridge University Press

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