* Since a project of this sort necessitates consideration of a large number of texts, it might be helpful to the reader to list the material to be covered in the following pages :

Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972);Google Scholar Id. Justice as fairness: political not metaphysical, Philosophy and Public Affairs (Summer 1985) hereafter = JAF]; Sandel, M., Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982)Google Scholar [= LLJ]; MacIntyre, A., After Virtue (London, Duckworth, 1981)Google Scholar; Taylor, C., Philosophy and the Human Sciences: philosophical papers, Vol. II (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar [= PHS]; Walzer, M., Spheres of Justice (Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1983)Google Scholar; Id. Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1987)Google Scholar [= ISC].

(1) Indeed, it has been argued that, in a situation of conflicting claims, the demands of the smaller community outweigh those of the state because the former are freely and fully taken on by their members when they join; the force of those claims therefore diminishes as universality of membership increases. Cf. Walzer, M., The Obligation to Disobey, in Walzer, , Obligation: Essays on Disobedience. War and Citizenship (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970).Google Scholar

(2) It might be felt that this account of Taylor's position leaves out a central aspect of his thought, namely his sophisticated and complex critique of the influence of atomism in political science and theory. Is not this anti-atomism the key to his opposition to liberalism ? To this question there is a two-part response: first, it is not clear that to be anti-atomist is to be anti-liberal—or more precisely, Taylor's opposition to atomism clearly involves direct conflict with such classical liberals as Hobbes and Locke, as well as some twentieth-century American political scientists, but it does not obviously apply directly to John Rawls and I know of no writing in which Taylor makes such a specific application of his anti-atomism. Secondly, however, even if such an application is meant to be inferred (and can be successfuly brought about), it would in my opinion most plausibly count as a substantive moral reaction to some aspects of the values inherent in modern liberalism, and as such it does not fall under my rubric of considering attacks on liberalism's theoretical foundations.

(3) This might also be regarded as the point at which Taylor's and Walzer's work meets up with MacIntyre's conception of communities as those structures which embody the values resulting from, as well as the necessary precondition for, the human search for the good life.

* I would like to thank Adam Swift for this helpful comments on earlier draft of this article.