(1) Par souci de simplification, nous assimilons ici « l'armée soviètique » aux seules forces placéts sous le contrôle du ministère de la Défense. En réalité, l'ensemble des « Forces armiés soviétiques » inclut aussi les unités du kgb et du mvd. Les gardes et les gardes frontières du kgb portent des revers d'uniformes et des épaulettes, respectivement en bleu avec les lettres gb, et en vert avec les lettres pv ; les miliciens du mvd ont des revers d'uniformes et des épaulettes de couleur marron marquées des lettres bb. Voir par exemple : Donnelly, Christopher, The Soviet Military Establishment, in Spotlight on the Soviet Union,A Report from a Conference at Sundvollen,Norway,25–27 April 1985, Report no. 1/86 (Oslo, Forsvarets Hogskole, 1986), pp. 27–29.Google Scholar

(2) Nous donnons ici les grades soviétiques. Général lieutenant correspond à général de division.

(3) Voir l'analyse en profondeur de Scott, Harriet Fast, Red Star in Motion—Do the Many Recent Changes in the Soviet High Command Augur Ill for the West?, Soviet Aerospace Almanac 1985, Air Force Magazine, vol. 68, no. 3 (03 1985), 55–60.Google Scholar

(4) Parmi les nombreuses éudes à ce sujet, consulter Petersen, Philip A., The Modernization of the Soviet Armed Forces, NATO's Sixteen Nations, vol. 31, no. 4 (07 1986), 35–36, 38.Google Scholar

(5) Développé en particulier par Herspring, Dale R., The Soviet Military in the Aftermath of the 27th Congress, Orbis, vol. 30, no. 2 (Summer 1986), 297–315.Google Scholar

(6) Signalons à cet égard une analyse remarquable du Général Close, Robert (Report submitted by), Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West Relations, 32d Ordinary Session, 10 11 1986, Document no. 1079 (Paris, Assembly of the Western European Union, 1986).Google Scholar

(7) Sur ce dernier point, voir deux intéessantes études : Katz, Mark N., Anti-Soviet Insurgencies: Growning Trends or Passing Phase ? Orbis, vol. 30, no. 2 (Summer 1986) 365–391Google Scholar, et Wheeler, Jack, Destabilizing the Soviet Empire, The Heritage Foundation, National Security Record, no. 97 (12 1986), 1–3.Google Scholar

(8) L'auteur se contente, pour l'instant, de reprendre un terme employé couramment par les médias pour décrire les orientations économiques attribuées à l'actuel secrétaire général du pcus. Une analyse approfondie des tendances dites réformatrices de celuici demanderait davantage de réserves visà-vis d'un tel mot. Consulter en particulier : Gustafson, Thane and Mann, Dawn, Gorbachev's first year: building power and authority, Problems of Communism (par la suite PC), XXXV, no. 3 (05–06 1986), 11–19Google Scholar. Pour une approche plus précise sur les fondements possibles de réformes du système soviétique, voir Pipes, Richard, Can the Soviet Union Reform?, Foreign Affairs (par la suite FA), vol. 68, no. 1 (Fall 1984), 47–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(9) Au sein de la vaste littérature sur ce sujet, voir notamment Hanson, Philip, Brezhnev's Economic Legacy, in Joseph, Philip (ed.), The Soviet Economy After Brezhnev, 13th NATO Economic Colloquium 11–13 04 1984 (Brussels, NATO, 1984), pp. 41–54Google Scholar ; Höfmann, Hans-Herman, The Soviet Economy at the end of the eleventh Five-Year Plan: counting on Gorbachev, in The Soviet Union 1084/85. Events, Problems, Perspectives, ed. by the Federal Institute for East European and International Studies (Boulder, Westview Press, 1986), pp. 123–138Google Scholar ; et Nove, Alec, Whither the Soviet Economy ?, The Washington Quarterly (par la suite TWQ), vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring 1984), 89–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(10) Développé aussi par d'Encausse, Hélène Carrère, URSS: parier sur le changement ?, Politique Internationale, no. 33 (Automne 1986), 242–254.Google Scholar

(11) Pour une bonne approche concernant les groupes d'intéêt dans la politique soviétique : Skilling, H. Gordon and Griffith, Franklin (eds), Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971).Google Scholar

(12) Voir par exemple Goldhammer, Herbert, The Party and the Army, in The Soviet Soldier. Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level (New York, Crane & Russak, 1975), pp. 255–309Google Scholar; Kolkowicz, Roman, The Historical Perspective, in The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 36–46Google Scholar ; Mackintosh, Malcom, Power in the Kremlin : politics and the military, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (par la suite RUSI), vol. 129, no. 4 (12 1984), 9–10Google Scholar; Scott, Harriet Fast and Scott, William F., The party-government control structure, in The Soviet Control Structures: Capabilities for Wartime Survival, NSIC National Strategy Paper, no. 39 (New York, Crane & Russak, 1983), pp. 22–24.Google Scholar

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(15) En fait, Vse-rossikaya chrezvychaynaya komissiya po borbe s kontrerevolyutsiye sabotazem i prestupleniyami po dolzhnosti. Sur la Cheka, consulter en particulier Legget, George, The Cheka : Lenin's Political Police (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982).Google Scholar

(16) Colton, Timothy J., Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: the structure of Soviet military politics (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(17) Ellen Jones, The Political Officer p. 128.

(18) Ibid., 140–142. Les récits de défecteurs fournissent aussi des cas éloquents à ce propos. Voir par exemple Bareon, John, MiG Pilot. The final escape of Lt. Belenko (New York, Avon Books, 1981), pp. 82–85 et 90–91.Google Scholar

(19) Voir par exemple Daniel, S.P.C., The KGB: history, role and organization Soviet Studies Research Centre, no. E26 (Sandhurst, Royal Military Academy, 09 1986), 3–4, 7, 40Google Scholar ; Knight, Amy W., The kgb's special departments in the Soviet armed forces, Orbiz, vol. 28, no. 2 (Summer 1984), 257–280Google Scholar ; Zamascikov, Sergei, Political Organizations in the Soviet Armed Forces: the role of the Party and Komsomol, Monograph Series on the Soviet Union (Falls Church, VA, Delphic Association, 12 1982), pp. 31–36.Google Scholar

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(22) Éitudié par Deriabin, Peter with Bagley, T.H., Fedorchuk, the kgb, and the Soviet succession, Orbis, vol. 26, no. 3 (Fall 1982), 633–634.Google Scholar

(23) Signalé par Barghoorn, Frederick C., The Security Police, in Skilling, and Griffiths, (eds), Interests Groups in Soviet Politics, p. 118.Google Scholar

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(25) Parmi les nombreuses études à ce propos, DeVries, Paul T., Khrushchev and the Military: a study of party-military relations, 1955–64, Military Review (par la suite MR), vol. LVI, no. 5 (05 1977), 73–81Google Scholar ; Kolkowicz, Roman, Conflicts in Soviet Party-Military Relations: 1962–1963, RM-3760-PR (Santa Monica, Rand, 08 1963)Google Scholar, et The military and the ouster of Khrushchev, in The Military and the Communist Party, pp. 282–306.

(26) Sur ce dernier point, consulter par exemple Major Emil Meiss, F. III : Militarism in Russia : from imperial roots to the Soviet Union, MR, vol. LXVI, no. 7 (07 1986), 28–27Google Scholar ; Odom, William E., The militarization of the Soviet society, PC, vol. XXV, no. 5 (09–10 1976), 34–51Google Scholar ; Pipes, Richard, Militarism and the Soviet State, Daedalus, vol. 104, no. 2 (Fall 1980), 1–12Google Scholar ; Simes, Dmitri K., The military and militarism in Soviet society, International Security (par la suite Int. Sec.), vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981–1982), 123–143CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Strode, Rebecca V. and Gray, Colin S., The imperial dimension of Soviet military power, PC, vol. XXX, no. 6 (11–12 1981), 1–15.Google Scholar

(27) A propos du militarisme, voir Vagts, Alfred, A History of Militarism, rev. ed. (New York, Meridian Books, 1959)Google Scholar. Consulter Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957).Google Scholar

(28) Concept emprunté à Gross, Natalie A., Military professionalism in crisis management, in Soviet Perceptions of Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations 1983–1985(Paper presented to the Inter- University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society,Chicago,19 October 1985), p. 13.Google Scholar

(29) Comme ce fut le cas, par exemple, en 1965. Voir à ce propos Wolfe, Thomas W., The Soviet Military Scene: institutional and defense policy, RM-4913-PR (Santa Monica, Rand, 07 1966)Google Scholar. Le même auteur a aussi traité de ces aspects d'une manière plus générale dans Soviet Military Policy under Khrushchev's Successors, P-3193 (Santa Monica, Rand, 08 1965)Google Scholar ; Soviet Military Trends under the Brezhnev-Kosygin Regime, P-3556 (Santa Monica, Rand, 05 1967)Google Scholar ; et Policymaking in the Soviet Union: a statement with supplementary comments, P-4131 (Santa Monica, Rand, 06 1969).Google Scholar

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(31) Mis en évidence par von Borcke, Astrid, Domestic determinants of Soviet defense and security policy, in The Soviet Union — Domestic Policy, the Economy, and Foreign Policy, VII, 1982–1983 (New York, Holmes & Meier, 1984), p. 64Google Scholar. Voir aussi Wolfe, Thomas W., Soviet organizational arrangements for handling salt, in The SALT Experience: its impact on U.S. and Soviet strategic policy and decisionmaking, R-1686-PR (Santa Monica, Rand, 09 1975), pp. 24–49.Google Scholar

(32) Voir deux études de Odom, William E.: The party connection, PC, XXII, no. 5 (09–10 1973), 12–26Google Scholar ; et The party-military connection: a critique, in Herspring, Dale R. and Volgyes, Ivan (eds), Civilian-Military Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder, Westview Press, 1978), pp. 27–52.Google Scholar

(33) Parmi les nombreuses éudes à ce sujet, consulter Becker, Abraham S., Military allocations and burden, in Soviet Economy in the 1980s: problems and prospects, Selected Papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, 97th Cong. 2d Sess., part I, 31 12 1982 (Washington, GPO, 1983), pp. 287–295Google Scholar ; Field, Brian, Soviet military expenditure estimates: meaning and measurement, NATO Review, vol. 34, no. 4 (08 1986), pp. 28–31Google Scholar ; Lee, William T., Soviet Defense Expenditures in an Era of SALT, USSI Report, no. 79–1 (Washington, United States Strategic Institute, 1979)Google Scholar ; Soviet Defense Expenditures and Related Programs, Hearings, Subcommittee on General Procurement of the Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong. 2d Sess., 1 11 1979–4 February 1980 (Washington, GPO, 1980).Google Scholar

(34) Voir en particulier : Can America Catch Up? The U.S.-Soviet Military Balance (Washington: Committee on the Present Danger, 1984)Google Scholar ; Cobb, Tyrus W., The military imbalance: Soviet military expansion during an era of detente, MR, LVII, no. 3 (03 1977), pp. 79–85Google Scholar ; Crommelin, Quentin Jr., Soviet Military Supremacy. The untold facts about the new danger to America, USC Defense and Strategic Studies Program (Los Angeles, University of Southern Southern California, 1985)Google Scholar; Lee, William T. and Staar, Richard F., Soviet Military Policy Since World War II, Forw. by William R. Van Cleave (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Wolfe, Thomas W., Evolution of Soviet Military Policy, P-3773 (Santa Monica, Rand, 02 1968).Google Scholar

(35) Dans Voprosy istorii KPSS (mai 1974), cité par Scott, Harriet Fast and Scott, William F., The Armed Forces of the USSR, 3d Ed., Rev. and Upd. (Boulder, Westview Press, 1984), p. 59.Google Scholar

(36) Une analyse, qui se voudrait plus élaborée, parle de « stratocratie ». Voir à cet égard Castoriadis, Cornélius, Devant la guerre. Les réalités, I (Paris, Fayard, 1981)Google Scholar. En fait, il s'agit d'une entreprise idéologique visant à déplacer la dynamique totalitaire du socialisme vers le militarisme. De la sorte, le socialisme ne peut conduire au totalitarisme car, en Union soviétique, il a été supplanté par la militarisation de la société.

(37) Selon Nikolay Berdyayev, « le bolchevisme entra dans la vie russe comme un pouvoir qui avait atteint le plus haut degré de militarisation, mais l'ancien Éitat russe aussi a toujours été militarisé ». Berdyayev, Nykolay, The Origins of Russian Communism (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(38) Voir notamment Brezinski, Zbigniew, The Permanent Purge: politics in Soviet totalitarianism, Russian Research Center Studies, no. 20 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956)CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; d'Encausse, Hélène Carrère, Staline. L'ordre par la terreur, Champs (Paris, Flammarion, 1979)Google Scholar ; Dallin, Alexander and Breslauer, George W., Political Terror in Communist Systems (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1970)Google Scholar ; Conquest, Robert, The Great Terror. Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (London, Macmillan, 1968)Google Scholar. A signaler aussi une approche basée principalement sur des archives et des sources journalistiques, qui diffère parfois des vues habituelles: Getty, J. Archie, Origins of the Great Purges: the Soviet communist party reconsidered, 1933–1938 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(39) Kriegel, Annie, Vent d'Est : la logique du système en pays communiste, in Le système communiste mondial. Perspectives Internationales (Paris, PUF, 1984), pp. 81–91Google Scholar. Du même auteur, Le système communiste mondial : mythes ou réalités, Pouvoirs, n^o 21 (1982), 19.

(40) Consulter par exemple Tucker, Robert C., Swollen state, spent society: Stalin's legacy to Brezhnev's Russia, FA, vol. 60, no. 2 (Winter 1981–1982), pp. 427–8.Google Scholar

(41) Analysé notamment par Astrid von Borcke, The role of the secret service, in The Soviet Union 1894–85, pp. 51–53.

(42) Il nous a sembé préférable, à ce propos, de parler de stratégie des relations Est-Ouest plutôt que de « détente ». En effet, il semble évident, maintenant, que Brezhnev ait recherché un apaisement avec l'Ouest uniquement afin d'être en mesure d'atteindre ses objectifs militaro-stratégiques tout en assurant un niveau de vie supportable pour la population (voir Robert C. Tucker, Swollen state, spent society …, p. 428). C'est le « système de Witte » appliqué à l'URSS qu'Alain Besançon a décrit dans son « Court traité de soviétologie à l'usage des autorités civiles, militaires et religieuses » in Présent soviétique et passé russe, Pluriel (Paris, Le livre de poche, 1980), pp. 245–248Google Scholar. Il écrit notamment : « L'ancien système conduisait à un développement rapide de la vie civile […] le nouveau système de Witte conduit, au contraire, à un renforcement de l'État soviétique. Soit en effet que les biens importés nourrissent directement l'appareil militaire, soit qu'ils permettent, en entretenant la société civile, de diriger de nouvelles ressources sur l'appareil militaire, celui-ci est le principal bénéficiaire de l'opération » (pp. 247–248).

(43) Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Soviet Hight Command, in The Armed Forces of the USSR, p. 107. Voir aussi des mêmes auteurs, The Council of Defense, in The Soviet Control Structures: capabilitie for wartime survival, pp. 45–48.

(44) Ellen Jones, National defense policymaking, in Red Army and Society, pp. 6–8.

(45) Notons que Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopedia [Encyclopédie militaire soviétique] mentionne la présidence du Conseil de défense par Brezhnev depuis 1964. Cité par Ellen Jones, National defense policymaking, p. 6.

(46) Rappelons que la totalité du programme nucléaire soviétique à l'époque stalinienne fut placée sous le contrôle de Beriya. De même, jusqu'aux années soixante, il semblerait que les ogives nucléaires soviétiques entreposées, en temps de paix, à plus de cinquante kilomètres de leurs lanceurs soient confiées à la garde des unités du kgb. Dans une période plus récente enfin, ce sont essentiellement les unités du kgb qui ont été chargées d'entretenir un climat de tension le long de la frontiére avec la Chine. Pour ces différentes raisons, la présence du président du kgb au Conseil de défense semble inévitable. Dans leur ouvrage sur les structures de contrôle en URSS, les Scott ont ajouté le ministre du mvd.

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(47) En se basant sur les fonctions des secrétaires ayant participé à une réunion dehauts responsables politico-militaires organisée peu de temps aprés le décès de Brezhnev, les autres membres du Secrétariat appartenant au Conseil de défense seraient le responsable des cadres, les deux secrétaires chargés des relations internationales et le directeur de la GlavPU. Voir Krasnay zvezda du 27 octobre 1982 cité par Wolfgang Werner, Gorbachev : a manager for the Soviet Union, in The Soviet Union 1984–85, p. 215.

(48) Indiqué par Warner, Edward L. III, The institutional setting of Soviet defense policy, in The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: an institutional analysis (New York, F. A. Praeger, 1977), pp. 36–47Google Scholar. Consulter aussi Mackintosh, Malcom, The military role in Soviet decision-making, in Keeble, Curtiss (ed.), The Soviet State. The domestic roots of Soviet foreign policy (Aldershot, Gower for the RIIA, 1985), pp. 178–179.Google Scholar

(49) Wolfgang Werner, Gorbachev : a new manager for the Soviet Union, p. 215.

(50) Voir Roman Kolkowicz, The Stalingrad group, in The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, pp. 35–369.

(51) Bien décrit dans Hough, Jerry F., The Military, in Soviet Leadership in Transition (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1980), pp. 97–99.Google Scholar

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(53) Voir David Holloway, The politics of military power, in The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, pp. 175–177.

(54) Consulter par exemple Aspaturian, Vernon V., Internal politics and foreign policy in the Soviet system, in Farrell, R. Barry (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, North-western University Press, 1966), pp. 212–287Google Scholar. A propos de la stabilité du régime soviétique sous Brezhnev, voir notamment Hough, Jerry F., The Brezhnev Era : the man and the system, PC, XXV, no. 2 (03–04 1976), 3, 5.Google Scholar

(55) Parmi l'innombrable litérature ayant analysé ces issues, se référer notamment à Colton, Timothy J., Brezhnev's ambiguous legacy, in The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union, rev. and upd. ed. (New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), pp. 6–31Google Scholar ; Meissner, Boris, Brezhnev's legacy in Soviet politics, Aussen Politik, vol. 34, no. 2 (1983), 107–121Google Scholar ; Odom, William E., Choice and change in Soviet politics, PC, XXXII, no. 3 (05–06 1983), 1–21Google Scholar ; Rush, Myron, Succeeding Brezhnev, PC, XXXII, no. 1 (12–02 1983), 2–7Google Scholar ; Ulam, Adam, The world outside, in Byrnes, Robert F. (ed.), After Brezhnev. Sources of Soviet conduct in the 1980s (London, Frances Pinter in association with the csis, Georgetown University, 1985), pp. 345–422.Google Scholar

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(57) Cité par Natalie A. Gross, Soviet Perceptions of Military Professonalism and Civil-Military Relations 1983–1985, pp. 6–8.

(58) Outre la contribution de Vernon V. Aspaturian (note 54), consulter aussi McDonnel, John, The Soviet defense industry as a pressure group, in Booth, Ken, McGwire, Michael and McDonnell, John (eds), Soviet Naval Policy : objectives and constraints (New York, F.A. Praeger, 1975), pp. 87–122Google Scholar ; Moreton, Edwina, Comrade Colossus : the impact of Soviet military industry on the Soviet economy, in Keeble, Curtiss (ed.), The Soviet State, pp. 125–139Google Scholar ; Ross, Dennis, Coalition maintenance in the Soviet Union, World Politics, XXXII, no. 2 (12 1980), 258–280CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; et Spielman, Karl F., Defense industrialists in the USSR, PC, XXV, no. 5 (11–12 1976), 52–69Google Scholar. L'article de Dennis Ross, en particulier, procure un aperçu édifiant du poids des industries lourdes dans le système économique soviétique.

(59) Alexander, Arthur J., Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement, Adlphi Papers, nos 147 & 148 (London, IISS, Winter 1978–1979), 33–34Google Scholar. Pour davantage de détails à ce propos, consulter du même auteur : R & D in Soviet Aviation, R-589-PR (Santa Monica, Rand, 11 1970)Google Scholar ; Research in Soviet Defense Production, NATO's Fifteen Nations, vol. 26, no. 5 (10–11 1981), 52–60, 74Google Scholar ; Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition, R-2942-NAS (Santa Monica, Rand, 08 1982)Google Scholar. Voir aussi Adomeit, Hannes and Agursky, Mikhail, The Soviet Military Industrial Complex and Its Internal Mechanism, National Security series, no. 1 (Kinston, Ont., Centre for International Relations, 1978)Google Scholar ; Boretsky, Michael, The technological base of Soviet military power, in Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union, a compendium of papers submitted to the subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (Washington, GPO, 1970), pp. 188–231Google Scholar ; Tonwsend, James, Soviet combat aircraft procurement, NATO's Sixteen Nations, vol. 31, no. 5 (08 1986), pp. 60–62.Google Scholar

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(61) Ellen Jones, The professional soldier, in Red Army and Society, p. 81.

(62) Dmitri Simes, The military and militarism in Soviet society, p. 33.

(63) Voir par exemple l'analyse de Herspring, Dale R., Marshal Akhromeyev and the future of the Soviet armed forces, Survival, XXVIII. no. 6 (11/12 1986), 524–535.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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(65) Analyse empruntée auprès de Cohen, Stephen F., A law of diminishing Soviet leaders?, International Herald Tribune, 22 02 1985.Google Scholar

(66) Voir en particulier l'analyse développée par Simes, Dmitri K., Gorbachev : a new foreign diplomacy? FA, vol. 65, no. 3 (America and the World 1986), 477–500.Google Scholar

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(68) Le but de cet article n'étant pas les dépenses militaires soviétiques, dont l'etendue du sujet peut faire l'objet d'une étude à part, l'auteur souhaiterait fournir ici quelques indications bibliographiques : Becker, Abraham S., The Burden of Soviet Defense. A political-economic essay, R-2752-(Santa Monica, Rand, 10 1981)Google Scholar ; William T. Lee, Soviet Defense expenditures in an Era of SALT ; Rosefield, Steven S., False Science : underestimating the Soviet arms buildup (New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Book, 1982)Google Scholar ; Strode, Rebecca, The Soviet armed forces : adaptation to resource scarcity, TWQ, vol. 9, no. 2 (Spring 1986), 55–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(69) Cité par Dale Herspring, The Soviet Military in the aftermath of the 27th Congress, p. 310.

(70) Sur ce dernier point, consulter notamment Garthoff, Raymond L., Mutual deterrence, parity, and strategic arms limitation in Soviet policy, in Leebaert, Derek (ed.), Soviet Military Thinking (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 92–124Google Scholar ; Laird, Robbin F. and Herspring, Dale R., Strategic weapons in Soviet military policy, in The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms (Boulder, Westview Press, 1984), pp. 9–28Google Scholar ; Sienkiewicz, Stanley, Salt and Soviet nuclear doctrine, Int. Sec., vol. 2, no. 4 (Spring 1978), 84–100CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A propos des possibles divergences d'analyses entre les militaires et le pouvoir civil en URSS, voir Fitzgerald, Mary C., Marshall Ogarkov on the modern theater operation, Narval War College Review, XXXIX, no. 4 (Autumn 1986), 6–25Google Scholar ; ID., Marshal Ogarkov and the new revolution in Soviet military affairs, Defence Analysis, vol. 3, no. 1 (1987), 3–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Hasegawa, Tsuyoski, Soviet on nuclear-war fighting, PC, XXVIII, no. 6 (11–12 1986), 524–535.Google Scholar

(71) Voir The Soviet Economy under a New Leader, a paper prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency for submission to the Subcommittee on Economic Resources, Competitiveness, and Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., 19 March 1986.

(72) Voir Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, Postwar development of Soviet military doctrine and strategy, in The Armed Forces of the USSR, pp. 52–69. Pour davantage de précisions, consulter Donnelly, Christopher N., Soviet operational concepts in the 1980s, in esecs, Stengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe. Proposals for the 1980s, Report of the European Security Study (London, Macmillan, 1983), pp. 105–136.Google Scholar

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(74) Hutchinson, Robert and Oliphant, J.C., Petrov ousted as first deputy Defence minister, JDW, vol. 6, no. 8 (30 08 1986), 339.Google Scholar

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