This article focuses on the use and regulation of eight toxic pesticides in agricultural production in China. The pesticides are bifenthrin, chlorpyrifus, diazinon, dimethoate, methidathion, omethoate, phosmet and phosphamidon. These pesticides pose widely recognised public health risks in China. So far as we know, the article is the first article in English ever to treat these pesticides systematically from the standpoint of the regulation of risks to human beings and to the environment. Adopting perspectives from public health, economic sociology and law, the article considers the principal characteristics of these pesticides, the main health risks associated with their use in agricultural production and how these pesticides in agricultural production are currently regulated in Chinese law. It identifies a series of policy implications and makes specific policy recommendations concerning risk regulation of these eight pesticides.

The European Union is increasingly moving toward an integrated policy approach, which also acknowledges linkages between public health and (external) security policy. This introduction to the Special Issue sets out a research agenda on the emerging health-security nexus. It analyses recent policy developments with respect to the public health and security, and discusses interactions along the health-security nexus in the context of the European Union. It suggests drivers behind the integrated approach and it critically examines the health-security nexus from the perspective of effectiveness and legitimacy.

There have been relatively few serious incidents of chemical or biological terrorism in Europe; however, there is growing concern over how non-state groups might exploit chemistry and biology for hostile purposes in the future. This article uses the historical record of past incidents of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) adoption by non-state actors to inform understandings of the current and future risks. To achieve this, the article analyses six interlinked clusters of factors that can be seen as important in assessing the risk of whether or not to adopt such weapons. These are: the perceived relative advantage of CBW and their utilities; the complexity of such weapons; their ideological compatibility; the role of organisational structures; the visibility and ‘fashionability’ of such weapons; and the wider environmental context. Drawing from past cases of CBW adoption and the present European context, an analysis of these factors suggests that sophisticated CBW with gigantic effect are possible, but unlikely; however, the adoption and use of scruffy low-level chemical weapons is a distinct possibility. Accordingly, European public health agencies need to prepare for the possibility of a variety of CBW, not all of which are likely to be weapons of “mass destruction”.

The importance of the concept of risk and risk management in the data protection field has grown explosively with the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679). The article explores the concept and the role of risk, as well as associated risk regulation mechanisms in EU data protection law. It shows that with the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation there is evidence of a two-fold shift: first on a practical level, a shift towards risk-based data protection enforcement and compliance, and second a shift towards risk regulation on the broader regulatory level. The article analyses these shifts to enhance the understanding of the changing relationship between risk and EU data protection law. The article also discusses associated potential challenges when trying to manage multiple and heterogeneous risks to the rights and freedoms of individuals resulting from the processing of personal data.

Chemical terrorist attacks by non-state actors have traditionally been characterised as low probability events; however, the apparent normalisation of chemical weapons use, including by terrorists, in the ongoing conflict in Syria is causing some in the international security community to question whether it will remain low probability. For Europe there is an additional potential concern, namely the numbers of EU citizens who are “foreign fighters” and whose return from the conflict zone might also result in “importing” chemical weapons use. This article examines the rise of the “chemical weapons-returning foreign fighter” narrative and considers aspects of the European response. These responses predate the current concerns and include important efforts to create a robust public health response, such as early alert and communication systems, so that the attractiveness of these weapons being used within a European context might be reduced. Although there are limitations as to how far one can transfer what happens in a Syrian context to Europe, the suggestion is made that some of the framing assumptions within this response architecture may be now inadvertently limiting the potential to identify and respond to chemical attacks.

Many factors influence consumers’ perceptions and purchasing decisions, with product labelling forming the primary means of communication. The extent to which labels should contain information about traceability is debated. Whilst traceability is an important tool used by food business organisations and regulators in assuring food safety, other drivers for information about traceability are less well understood. This paper reviews the issues related to drivers for traceability from a consumer perspective, and evaluates country-of-origin labelling (COOL), enabling technologies and food fraud as potentially significant drivers in consumer requirements for information. The implications for risk assessment, systems implementation and communications about traceability are also considered.

Critiques of global public health security (GPHS) and proposed solutions tend to overlook the potential of the individuals and groups that are subject to and governed by GPHS – “the governed” – to contribute their “on the ground” knowledge and experience to decision-making in order to improve regulatory responses. This article argues for the development of a more reflexive approach as a way of ensuring the epistemic integration of these knowledges with the scientific-technical knowledges that currently dominate decision-making processes. I identify human rights as the conceptual lens that is most likely to enable reflexivity by the governed and regulators, and understanding and communication between them. The governed can use perceived or actual breaches of human rights to articulate “on the ground” knowledges as institutional risks to reputation and standing and, in turn, threaten the production and legitimation of organisational identity, socio-political orders and projects of rule. The particular sensitivity of regulators to these risks could compel epistemic integration. This more reflexive approach to GPHS promises to improve the knowledge base, efficacy, accountability and legitimacy of decision-making at multiple levels: WHO, EU, national and “on the ground”.

This article seeks to make a contribution to the food safety regulation literature, and to the broader framework of risk regulation, in the attempt to establish both theoretically and empirically what can be intended as effective governance of food safety regulation. The aim is to review existing measures of effectiveness of food safety governance, and to give a preliminary definition of effectiveness, together with a theoretical perspective on how to operationalise it, eventually proposing an empirical measurement. Effectiveness of food safety governance can be measured – on the one hand – as the capacity of consumers’ protection, and thus, as the minimisation of risk related to food, and – on the other hand – as the capacity of protection of producers’ interests, in order to ensure competitiveness within the market. Distinguishing food safety delivered from food safety perceived, the article seeks to analyse dimensions of effectiveness related to both the protection of consumers and producers, and to the minimisation of risk, drawing upon Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) and, particularly, her conceptualisation of opportunistic behaviour.

The EU is continuously developing strategies, policies and regulations to confront pandemic and epidemic diseases. The actions of the EU in this field do not happen in a vacuum but are instead embedded in a complex international and transnational network. This article suggests the existence of a tension between public health policy and a twofold set of competing considerations: growing security concerns and market pressures. To structure the argument the article examines three distinct but related aspects: first, it clarifies the different levels of decision-making impacting on the EU’s policy and regulation of vaccines for PEDs: these levels are described as international, transnational and domestic, and the key players involved at each level are also identified; second, it analyses levels of responsiveness to and preparedness for outbreaks and analyses how past experiences have oriented the policy debate; third, it discusses issues of accountability of vaccine developers, authorising authorities and rule-makers involved in preparedness and response to emerging PEDs.