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The Italian Xylella Case: The Role of EFSA in the EU Decision-making on Risk

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2017

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Abstract

Joined Cases C-78/16 and C-79/16, Giovanni Pesce (et al) v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, [2016] EU:C:2016:428.

In Xylella, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was called upon to assess how far policymakers can go in conditions of scientific uncertainty, and whether EFSA opinions can be indirectly subject to judicial review, despite not being legally binding. In particular, the Xylella case highlights the relevance of EFSA’s scientific authority over the Commission: since EFSA opinions are not directly reviewable by the CJEU – as they constitute an intermediate stage of a more complex administrative procedure – the political and legal liabilities relating to EFSA assessments are entirely shifted onto the Commission, whose discretion is reviewable by the EU judiciary. In this regard, the Xylella case confirms how difficult the judicial review of precautionary measures can be. It shows once again that a full assessment of these measures is impossible, as scientific uncertainty restricts the grounds for judicial review to the manifest appropriateness of the contested measures and the availability of less onerous and equally effective measures.

Type
Case Commentary
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 8 , Issue 3 , September 2017 , pp. 599 - 605
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 

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Footnotes

*

PhD candidate, European University Institute of Florence.

References

1 Council Directive 2000/29/EC of 8 May 2000 on protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to plants or plant products and against their spread within the Community, OJ L 169, [2000], pp 1–112.

2 Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 of the European Parliament of the Council of 26 October 2016 on protective measures against pests of plants, amending Regulations (EU) No 228/2013, (EU) No 652/2014 and (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 69/464/EEC, 74/647/EEC, 93/85/EEC, 98/57/EC, 2000/29/EC, 2006/91/EC and 2007/33/EC OJ L 317, 23/11/2016, pp 4–104.

3 Directive 2000/29/EC, supra, note 1, Art 16(1).

4 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/789 of 18 May 2015 as regards measures to prevent the introduction into and the spread within the Union of Xylella fastidiosa (Wells and others) (notified under document C(2015) 3415), OJ L 125, [2015], pp 36–53. Hereinafter “Decision 2014/789”.

5 Ismea report, production data 2016–2017, Olive oil production in Italy, 2 (February 2017), available at <www.pianidisettore.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/144> accessed 14 July 2017.

6 EFSA PLH Panel (EFSA Panel on Plant Health), 2015 “Scientific Opinion on the risks to plant health posed by Xylella fastidiosa in the EU territory, with the identification and evaluation of risk reduction options” (2015) 13(1) EFSA Journal 262 pp, doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2015.3989 Google Scholar. Hereinafter “EFSA, January 2015”.

7 ibid 24.

8 ibid 3.

9 ibid 38.

10 ibid 41.

11 ibid 42.

12 ibid 114.

13 Regional Administrative Court of Lazio, sec. I, case n. 10108/2015, Giovanni Pesce (et al) v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri; Regional Administrative Court of Lazio, sec. I, case n. 11728/2015, Cesare Serinelli (et al) v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. These cases were then consolidated by the CJEU.

14 The questions related to Decision 2015/789 judicial review vis-à-vis the principle of good administration and to the lack of any compensation to the landowners, are not explored in this case note.

15 According to Art 16(3) of the Plant Health Directive, the Commission shall examine the situation within the Standing Committee on Plant Health and follow its development. Furthermore, if necessary, the Commission shall amend or repeal the measures adopted by the Member States.

16 Joined Cases C-78/16 and C-79/16, Giovanni Pesce (et al) v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, [2016] EU:C:2016:428, para 44.

17 Regional Administrative Court of Lazio, sec. I, reference n. 780 of 22 January 2016, for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, para 3.4.

18 Giovanni Pesce (et al) v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, supra, note 16, para 49.

19 Emphasis added.

20 Giovanni Pesce (et al) v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, supra, note 16, paras 59–60.

21 EFSA, January 2015, supra, note 6, 114.

22 ibid paras 65–66.

23 ibid para 68.

24 Maria Weimer and Gaia Pisani, “Expertise as Justification – The Contested Legitimation of the EU ‘Risk Administration’” (Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance Research Paper No 2016-02) 3.

25 Alemanno, Alberto and Mahieu, Stephanie, “The European Food Safety Authority before European Courts – Some reflections on the judicial review of EFSA scientific opinions and administrative acts” (2008) 5 EFFL 320 Google Scholar.

26 Weimer and Pisani, supra, note 24, 8.

27 See Wardman, Jamie K, “The Constitution of Risk Communication in Advanced Liberal Societies” (2008) 28(6) RA 1620 Google ScholarPubMed.

28 Weimer and Pisani, supra, note 24, 20.

29 ibid 8.

30 ibid 11.

31 Van Asselt, Marjolein, Vos, Ellen and Rooijackers, Bram, “Science, Knowledge and Uncertainty in EU Risk Regulation” in Michelle Everson and Ellen Vos (eds) Uncertain Risks Regulated (Routledge Cavendish 2009) 364 Google Scholar.

32 EFSA, January 2015, supra, note 6, 4.

33 ibid 97.

34 ibid 92, emphasis added.

35 ibid 95.

36 Alemanno and Mahieu, supra, note 25, 322.

37 ibid 325.

38 Case T‑257/07, France v Commission, [2011] EEU:T:2011:444, para 76.

39 ibid 320.

40 Weimer and Pisani, supra, note 24, 4. See Vos and Wendler, supra, note 31, 88.

41 Cf Purnhagen, Kai, “The EU’s Precautionary Principle in Food Law is an Information Tool!” (2015) 26(6) EBLR 921 Google Scholar. According to Purnhagen, “the precautionary principle is only a tool for the principle that preventive action shall be taken to acquire information in order to prepare the regulatory decision”.

42 Meyer, Christoph O, “Over- and under-reaction to transboundary threats: two sides of a misprinted coin?” (2016) 23(5) JEPP 740 Google Scholar.

43 Fisher, Elizabeth, “Is the Precautionary Principle Justiciable?” (2001) 13(3) JEL 318 Google Scholar.