Mutual trust is at the heart of the European Union. Although the Union lacks a general mechanism to enforce its rules and decisions, member states usually comply with them. This remarkable fact can in part be explained by self interest: although individual rules and decisions may be found harmful and are ducked from time to time, all member states know they win by sticking to the rules of the game. The member state that grudgingly applies a rule or a decision, trusts all the others to do the same most of the time. If this were not so, the system would break down, in spite of the European Court of Justice denying the rule of reciprocity legal status in the Union.

Dissolution of the Bundestag by the Federal President on advice of Federal Chancellor — A ‘negative’ motion for a vote of confidence — Precedents of 1972 and 1982 — Dissolution in conformity with the constitution according to German constitutional court — The existence of a political crisis sine qua non for a dissolution to be constitutionally legitimate — Limited judicial control on decision to dissolve as set out in a 1983 ruling even further limited in the 2005 ruling — Effects of the exercised judicial self-restraint on constitutional division of powers — No proof for a decline of the rule of law or of acceptance of directly democratic elements — Strengthening of the powers of the Federal Chancellor sign of faith in the stability of the German government system.

Appointment and Censure of the European Commission — Development of Rules of Constitutional Practice — Parliamentary committee hearings 2004 — Guidelines on Approval Procedure of the Commission — Framework Agreement 2005 between European Parliament and Commission — Clash between Parliament and Council on control of European Commission — Responsibility of individual Commissioners.

The editorial board of the European Constitutional Law Review has solicited a number of contributions on presidential elements in government systems in Europe. At the origin of the project are some recent sweeping interventions of heads of state in the political arena. These are notably the (suspensive) veto of the domestic Act implementing the European Arrest Warrant Decision by Czech president Vaclav Klaus and the dissolution, against the will of both the government and the parliamentary majority, of the Assembleia da República by Portuguese president Jorge Sampaio in 2004. They excited our curiosity about the latent ingenuities of systems that we think to understand but of which we know so little.

A constitutional experiment in which a parliamentary system of government under proportional representation was combined with the direct election of a prime minister — the system prior to 1992 — the political context of the 1992 reform — the unintended consequences of the reform in practice — the return to a pure parliamentary form of government, combined with a constructive vote of no-confidence and a prime-ministerial power to dissolve parliament.

Influences of the Movimento das Forças Armadas, of earlier Portuguese and of foreign constitutions on Portuguese Constitution of 1976 — A semi-presidential system with originally four political powers: president, parliament, government and Revolutionary Council — Progressive ascendancy of the presidency in practice between 1976–1982 — Constitutional amendment of 1982: Revolutionary Council abrogated, parliamentary powers strengthened, presidential powers reduced — Presidential role in practice not declining, though depending on the political party power constellation — Influence of president as political moderator and institutional regulator at the lowest when political colours of president and parliamentary majority match — President not conducting, directly or indirectly, the country’s general policy.

Tensions between national welfare systems and the social rights of the citizens of the Union — Fundamental principle of free movement and the degree of financial solidarity with nationals from other Member States — Introduction of internal market principles in health care — The balancing role of the Court of Justice of the European Communities.

Three great constitutional conflicts — Great Britain: Commons v. Lords — Parliament Act 1911 — United States: President v. Supreme Court over New Deal — Court Packing plan Belgium: King v. conscience — Democracy wins in each of these cases.

As a result of the 2004 enlargement there are now twenty languages that are accorded official, and theoretically equal, status in the institutions of the European Union. With the expansion of the Union’s linguistic landscape some Union bodies, while allowing the use of more and more languages, have paradoxically limited the circumstances under which most of them may be used. To put it mildly, these efforts, as Advocate-General Poiares Maduro said in his opinion in Case C-160/03, Kingdom of Spain v. Eurojust, 2005 ECR I-2077, have been ‘a matter of some controversy’.

The court in this case decided that state subsidy to political parties that discriminate against women is prohibited by international treaties, notably the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

This raises a number of issues. Where the discrimination is for religious reasons, does sex equality need to be balanced against religious freedom? Both are usually seen as fundamental rights. What about discrimination against men, in favour of women; is that also against the law? Finally, is the obligation not to discriminate only binding on the state, or also on the party itself? Could such a party be banned from politics? Some of these issues were touched on by the court, although not convincingly, and some of them, such as religious freedom, were scandalously ignored.