Anyone approaching the phenomenon of power sets out by searching for definitions or rather formulae so as to somehow make the phenomenon tangible and graspable. In more recent publications, and by the way not only those of the German speaking community, it is Max Weber who is most frequently quoted as defining power as the chance for imposing one's own will even against opposition. At the same time, he described the term ‘power’ as sociologically amorphous, i.e. without form or structure. This characterisation left many unsatisfied, and so people have been looking for statements that could provide the term with a certain ‘form’ after all.

As a socially effective idea the foundation is ancient. Entities similar to foundations existed already in the time of the Greek-Roman antiquity. Nevertheless, the foundation as a specific legal instrument in the European legal systems is a legacy of the Christian age. Until the beginning of the Enlightenment, it was essentially the legal form of expression of the benevolence of the rich concerned with the salvation of their souls. The pia causa was an essential feature of an admissible foundation. The Enlightenment brought about the secularisation of foundations without, however, also combining this with an end to the requirement that a foundation be legitimised by a pious purpose in the wider sense of the word. The Prussian General Civil Law of 1794, for example, only allowed “benevolent foundations” which were legally equivalent to the socalled paupers' institutions. Family foundations for the benefit of a family were not regarded as true foundations, but as a species of the so-called community family rights with a fluid transition to functionally comparable family estates in fee-tail. It was only in the 19th century that the bases were created for today's practice in the law relating to foundations. This was done generally by means of a separation between the civil law as the legal constitution of society arising out of popular sentiment and, on the other hand, public law as the entirety of the state-made rules governing the relationship between citizens and the state. Henceforth, the task of civil law was considered to be to transform the traditional law into suitable rules for community life and conflicts. The task of public law was to intervene in the free play of social forces for ethical, economic or political reasons.

As a result of the specific directions taken by development in Hungary (the economic reform after the year 1968 – gulaschcommunism, soft-dictatorship, pseudo rule of law) various elements of company law appeared in Hungary already in the 1960s. A particular company law came into existence within the state enterprises and the cooperatives (civil law partnerships, joint enterprises, associations – their unified regulation is to be found in law decree 4 of 1978), and the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 maintained in force several of the commercial company forms regulated by the Commercial Code from before the Second World War. Therefore as of 1972, when the partnership of Western enterprises in Hungarian companies became possible, the Kft.-s (limited liability company) and the Rt.-s (company limited by shares) also appeared but sparsely in the Hungarian economy.

Hamburg may not be known as a city of art, science and culture. It is a port and a place of business and commerce. The cultural treasures of Hamburg do not originate from princely collections. They were bought by the city of Hamburg or were donated by citizens. One of these important testamentary bequests is exhibited in the Hamburger Kunsthalle: the marble bust of Immanuel Kant by Carl Friedrich Hagemann (1773-1806), a pupil of Johann Gottfried Schadow (1764-1850). This bust, which is said to be the most impressive portrait of the philosopher of Königsberg, was commissioned by Jonas Ludwig von HeG (1756-1823), a student of the Albertus University of Königsberg, author of historical and scientific works and admirer of Immanuel Kant. Since that time many authorities and followers of Kant have been domiciled in Hamburg. To one of the present advocates of Kant's legal philosophy – Professor Ernst-JoachimMestmäcker – these lines are dedicated.

The last 10 years of the 20th century can surely be perceived as one of the most important decades of Polish history. Following the political decisions taken by the Poles in 1980 (the establishment of ‘Solidarity’) and 1989 (the Round Table, and semi-free election), on 29 December 1989 – by amendment of the old Constitution 1952 – Poland rejected the political and economic system introduced after World War II. By breaking free from the totalitarian socialist state, Poland pronounced its support for a democratic state of law that fulfils principles of social justice. By rejecting the centrally-planned state economy it chose market-oriented economy based on freedom of economic activity and ownership guarantee. Finally, by breaking free from the Soviet block it insisted on its return to a European community based on values of democracy, rule of law, national identity and peaceful cooperation of independent states.

Imagine yourself sitting in the Berlin Philharmonic Hall, listening to a concert given by the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra. On the stage-bill is the Second Piano Concerto by Johannes Brahms. I especially like this concerto because it comes as a nice double pack: Hidden in the third movement is a wonderful cello concert. Therefore, you can be sure that this important cello-solo will be played by Dr. Faust, the first solo-cellist of the Berlin Philharmonic, on an original Stradivari from 1798. Dr. Faust discovered this extraordinary instrument on one of the many tours of the Orchestra. His enthusiasm, however, was immediately dampened as he realized that neither he personally, nor the Orchestra, nor the Association of the Friends of the Orchestra, could afford to buy it. But then, Dr. Faust recalled a recent conversation with Hilmar Kopper, at that time CEO of Deutsche Bank AG. The Deutsche Bank, a public stock corporation, showed public spirit and financed the cello.