This paper analyses the new Portuguese legal system of no par value shares – recently introduced in Portugal by Decree Law 49/2010, published on 19 May – as well as the main reason for this legal solution: to make corporate financing in the stock market more flexible.

Post-trading activities such as clearing and settlement (C&S) constitute a central element in the integration of European financial markets. However, unlike other areas of financial services, C&S has received little legislative and regulatory attention and, as a result, important barriers to the cross-border provision of C&S services persist in the European Union. In order to remove some of these barriers, the financial industry created, under the auspices of the European Commission, the European Code of Conduct for Clearing and Settlement, a self-regulatory instrument aimed at achieving a smoother provision of cross-border C&S services. This paper uses the concepts of input/output legitimacy to analyse the Code's representative nature and effectiveness. It shows that, first, the Code has not received input from all the relevant constituencies potentially affected by C&S, and second, that there are serious threats to future compliance with the Code related to the competitive pressures of European financial markets. The paper also identifies the proposals to regulate C&S facilities at EU level as well as the new European supervision authorities in the financial field as elements which may highly contribute to the input/output legitimacy of cross-border C&S rules in the EU.

Motivated by recent policy changes across many countries, this paper discusses the rationale for various policies that target financial advice in the market for retail financial services. To set the stage, we review recent findings on how retail financial consumers make use of professional financial advice. Based on our own research, as well as other recent contributions in the economics literature, we then discuss the pros and cons of, in particular, policies that target the disclosure as well as the size and structure of commissions.

The workforce in the EU is decreasing significantly compared to the US and Japan. This problem can to some extent be solved by having more women at the workplace. The European Commission is currently contemplating the introduction of obligatory quotas for women in the boardroom of private companies. In order to have a better understanding of the controversial and currently highly debated issue of obligatory gender diversity programmes in corporate governance, the Commission released a Green Paper on the EU Corporate Governance Framework in April 2011. By means of this Green Paper, the Commission invites all interested parties to submit their views on some important questions such as: should recruitment policies be more specific about the profile of directors to ensure that the board is suitably diverse? If so, how could that be best achieved and at what level of governance, i.e., national, EU or international? The present paper seeks to give an answer to these questions of the Commission. It examines at what level of governance gender diversity in the boardroom can be best achieved and also studies the effectiveness of obligatory and voluntary gender quotas in corporate governance as a tool to increase gender diversity in the boardroom.

The development of modern Serbian competition law started in 2005 with the adoption of the Competition Act laying down rules which were generally inspired by European Union law. As is usually the case in countries in transition, the 2005 Competition Act was soon replaced by a new one, adopted in 2009. The 2009 Act further harmonised substantive competition rules with those of the EU, while at the same time empowering the Competition Authority to directly impose fines for infringements of competition law. Although it is evident that the public authorities of Serbia made certain efforts to improve competition law enforcement, it still cannot be concluded that significant progress has been made. In this paper, the authors analyse specific problems which appeared throughout six years of competition law enforcement in Serbia. Some of the problems analysed are so-called built-in errors, arising as a consequence of the choices made by the legislator. Others are, however, the result of wrongful doing by the members of the Competition Authority. Taken as a whole, they represent the main reason for the poor results achieved through competition law enforcement in Serbia. The first problem analysed is that of wrong priorities: the Competition Authority has mostly concentrated on the control of concentrations of undertakings, while generally ignoring restrictions of competition through the conclusion of anti-competitive agreements or through abuse of a dominant position. The second problem emphasised by the authors is the absence of sound economic analysis in most decisions adopted by the Competition Authority. The fining policy of the Competition Authority is also analysed in in this paper. While no fines have been imposed under the 2005 Competition Act, the Competition Authority seems to be trying to ‘catch up’ by imposing fines under the 2009 Act for infringements established in proceedings brought under the 2005 Act. The authors argue that this should be seen as an illegal retroactive application of law. The fourth problem in the enforcement of competition law in Serbia arises from a de facto privileged treatment of undertakings with state-owned capital.

Why has the cycle of product mis-selling, widespread consumer detriment, complaints and (eventually) the imposition of penalties and the securing of redress from the finance industry proved to be so hard to break? This paper examines the payment protection insurance (PPI) mis-selling scandal in the UK with a view to identifying whether the Financial Services Authority's experience in that matter is bringing the UK any closer to finding regulatory solutions that are likely to produce a meaningful advance in curbing mis-selling problems. The FSA has said that its actions taken in the PPI market illustrate the type of intervention that its successor, the Financial Conduct Authority, can be expected to make.

This article analyses a recent decision by the German Federal Court of Justice in the field of investor protection. At first sight it seems as if the Court held on to a model of investor empowerment by means of informational duties. However, a closer look at the reasoning of the Court reveals a tendency towards heavier intervention in the field of financial advice, oriented towards the regulation of product design. In light of this new dimension of investor protection, the article critically analyses the Federal Court of Justice's use of the disclosure-based investor protection regime.