The moral complexity surrounding intervention is influenced by a broad spectrum of both ethical and practical assumptions and considerations. “All these issues,” Smith writes, “affect one's ultimate position on intervention, and different assumptions lead, obviously, to different conclusions.” The bulk of this article is a useful survey of some of the key ethical issues of disagreement among contemporary authors who represent a variety of approaches to the subject: traditional and prudential realists, statists, cosmopolitans, ideologists. Smith's own view, clearly articulated in his concluding section, is what he labels “tempered nonintervention”: “a reaffirmation of the principle of nonintervention, tempered by the possibility of humanitarian intervention when undertaken with specific safeguards.”

Iran-contra and similar scandals alienate Congress and bypass the constitutional executive process. Treverton proposes four guidelines by which to test the effectiveness of covert actions undertaken by American presidents: (1) could the action stand exposure in midstream? (2) does intervention contradict overt U.S. policy? (3) what signal will be received, by whom, and with what result? (4) what if the first intervention does not succeed? The author urges presidents to abstain from implementing covert operations, which often result in nothing more than domestic and international controversy. Such decisions are the domain not of the Executive Office, but of the legitimate agency designated for such purposes, the CIA.

Today's international community may well view covert action and democracy as mutually exclusive policies. This article examines the practice of covert action in American foreign policy in light of events of the mid-1970s and 1980s, focusing on the scandalous misuse of executive authority and lack of accountability associated with covert means. Often manipulative and sometimes anonymous, covert operations raise critical morality concerns in a democratic society. Whether “any form of accountability is likely to be sufficient to bring the unauthorized use of executive power under control” is the crucial issue to be addressed when examining the practicality of covert actions by the executive branch.

Exploitation of the executive exercise of covert operations has presented a dilemma, but Colby maintains that even in peacetime a “democratic society must have and respect some secrets.” Does democracy, by its inherent nature, preclude the employment of covert action, even under exceptional conditions? Colby argues that the constitutional decision-making process is an ethical and legal one. In wartime, a “just” war is the goal, and the use of covert action must be evaluated by two essential criteria: self-defense and proportionality to the act requiring self-defense.

This article examines four interlinked historical aspects of intervention from a philosophic and ethical perspective. What are the dimensions of intervention and how is it managed? What conditions govern intervention? How can intervention be evaluated? What are the moral issues in intervention? India, the world's largest democracy, has promoted its power through intervention in neighboring countries under the cloak of morality. The United States, Great Britain, and Russia have nonetheless tacitly endorsed India's role as the policing force in the region. Does this recognition justify India's actions toward its weaker and smaller neighbors?

“My argument in this essay is that the fairness principle can be justified on the basis of an ethical perspective that stresses the importance of consequences in judging human action, and that it has far-reaching implications not just for evaluating state policy but for the design of international institutions.” Keohane's utilitarian perspective seeks to establish generalizable principles of morality for a framework of normative moral rules by which to construct a foreign policy for international cooperation. The author argues that all governments are morally obliged to support international institutions that advocate crosscultural and global public goods to advance the fairness principle. The international community is bound by Western understandings of distributive justice, universal human rights, and indisputable national sovereignty.

In this analysis of the Iran-Iraq war, Sick asserts that two major naturally wealthy regional powers consciously chose to forego diplomatic means to resolve their disputes. Moreover, by blatantly miscalculating and underestimating the damage of armed engagement, the leaders exhibited utter negligence and disobedience of the international code of conduct. With glaring lack of consideration for human anguish in the military attacks, they used children in battle, launched bombing and missile attacks on civilian targets and neutral shipping, and deployed chemical weapons. Implicated as well is the international community, which did little to stem the bloodshed.

At the time of writing, Dower observed mounting tension in U.S.-Japan relations. He identified two factors as contributing to mutual fear: differences in capitalism on national and international levels, and stereotypical perceptions based on racial phobias. The author describes major characteristics inducing pessimism based on rational fears concerning economic well-being, national pride, and “cultural values.” While densely intertwined economically, financially, militarily, and personally, both actors' abiding suspicion of one another has created a sense of impending crisis.

Adam's Smith's invisible hand guiding market mechanisms toward moral conduct seems recklessly idealistic today, in light of forces that have dramatically skewed international free-market operations. Donaldson argues that major changes are necessary in the decision-making process as well as in the conduct of multinational corporations in order to exercise moral obligations and meet culture-specific needs of host countries. Donaldson proposes standards for international institutions by which to protect fairness and freedom, ownership of property, free speech, and minimum education and subsistence levels. “Are such changes in the decision-making process of multinational corporations likely or even possible?” he asks. With some reservations, the author is optimistic that a more ethical approach to market issues is workable.

This article describes the restraints on biological weapons, as dictated in the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention, and the weaknesses of these instruments. Falk clearly argues for nonpossession as a requirement of international stability. He points out that their commitment to unconditional renunciation has been disregarded by the United States and the Soviet Union. The author concludes that the failure of major powers to comply with the rules they themselves set has encouraged emulation by the rest of the world. It is the duty of those with extensive knowledge of this weaponry to eliminate the pressure for its development.

Lipset sets out to demonstrate the distinct differences between American and European notions of liberalism and conservatism. Tocqueville's coined term “American exceptionalism” reaffirms that social, political, and religious systems took a unique form in the United States. American liberals and conservatives alike have sought to extend the “good society” based on the Protestant ethic worldwide, though, ironically, both see their domestic opponents as advocates of immoral policies. The author concludes with an assessment of the current global movement toward classical liberalism: “We are all liberals-even the socialists and communists,” he asserts. As economic liberalism is not a panacea for the world's problems, Lipset predicts a return to the state-centric world in the not-so-near future.

While the world enjoys a post-WWII Pax Americana, American foreign policy faces a curious dilemma: how to adjust to its own success in the ever-changing political climate. According to Calleo, the United States “has been driven to manipulate its finances in a fashion that increasingly harms the American economy and threatens the liberal world economy.” Placing little confidence in the endurance of NATO in the post-cold-war era, the author urges the United States to “become the ally of its allies rather than their managing protector,” as it has been historically, leaving Europe to take responsibility for its own security. Calleo argues that American and European interests can only grow more divergent with time; hence “the best antidote to European free-riding is American devolution.”

This article examines the trends of democratic transformation in Latin America, focusing on the notion that transitions there occurred despite the absence of the accepted cultural and economic preconditions for democracy. Radical leftist guerrilla movements historically inspired by Castro and the Dependencia politics that infiltrated the continent in the 1950s and 1960s were challenged by rightist military doctrines based on the national duty to protect the country and install order. This ideological polarization served as the ultimate impetus for moderation in policies on the continent. Sigmund is optimistic that the new consensus of conservatives, liberals, Catholics, and Marxists has made prospects for democracy in the region more positive now than at any time in history.

Game Theory has been an essential tool in analyzing national security, international trade, and the global environment since Neumann and Morgenstern introduced it more than 45 years ago. Chamberlin examines the work of these two authors, focusing on the relationship between rationality and morality as it arises in strategic interactions among players in a game based on three essential features: rational behavior, consequentialism, and the self-interest of players. The author concludes that due to the egoistic nature of actors, political dilemmas cannot easily be solved through the use of Game Theory. Nonetheless, he insists on its validity in contributing to our thinking about the place of ethics in international affairs and in clarifying both the dangers and potential areas of cooperation inherent in many international relationships.

This article uses two episcopal texts published by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops during the 1980s as a case study of the role of ethics in the foreign policy process. No longer a topic for theologians, philosophers, and lawyers alone, as in past decades, the morality of foreign affairs is now a matter of public discourse and political strategy. The size and social diversity of the Catholic church, the convergence of its stands on anti-communism and anti-nuclear weaponry, and the cosmic nature of the nuclear threat allowed the bishops to make transnational references reaching into all corners of the globe. The church-state exchange introduced the ethics of consequences and promoted moral debate about strategic foreign policy and deterrence.

In a brief summary of a poll conducted by the Carnegie Council, Myers outlines the American public's views on issues ranging from foreign policy/peace issues to economic security, defense, and human rights. The underlying perception of the United States as the “moral nation” raises a fundamental question: How deeply imbedded is the distinction between words and deeds in American foreign policy? Some results of the survey defied explanation. “Why are Americans so avid about human rights abroad, yet so reluctant to commit foreign aid, and so indignant about the U.S. dollars that are spent on NATO and Japanese security? Logic and sentiment remain interwoven,” concludes Myers.

This article compares reflections from four sources on the state of the American democracy in the international community (The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, by Paul Kennedy; 1999: Victory Without War, by Richard Nixon; “Communism at Bay,”The Economist; Long Cycles in World Politics, by George Modelski) within the framework of the 1980s, which was portrayed by leaders as “an era of good feelings.” Yet drastically different positions on American rise or decline are propounded by historians and officeholders, former presidents and scholars, journalists and aspiring candidates for political office. These four writings reveal the complexity of the analysis of the American decline. Yet, it is crucial for leaders to maintain public devotion to their nation, not through passion, but rather, in the words of Abraham Lincoln, through “the solid quarry of sober reason,”. America's capacity to preserve a strong and healthy resilience, the author concludes, is the exceptional value it continues to offer the world.