Sample selection bias is a common problem in the business history literature. This paper proposes methods for researching and writing the history of firms and industries designed to address the problem. The key elements are a forward-looking perspective and close attention to the development over time of selection environments, the resources individual firms can mobilize, and understanding an agency within the firm or firms.

There is an on-going debate among scholars from various disciplines about economic institutions and their impact on economic development. The case of the Amsterdam Chamber of Insurance is relevant to this discussion and in particular to the part that focuses on the nature and development of contract enforcement mechanisms. Marine insurance was introduced in Amsterdam in the mid-sixteenth century and soon the insurance industry developed into a prospering business. Its development was of great importance to the expansion of long-distance trade as it reduced the financial consequences of risks inherent to maritime trade. However, the new industry with its complex contracts was prone to misunderstandings, fraud and deception, creating the need for an independent, specialised court. The Chamber of Insurance was established as a generalised court, rather than a particularised court as was the case in cities that preceded Amsterdam’s trade dominance. Why did the Amsterdam municipality choose to set up this court and what were the implications? A recently discovered Statute Book of the Chamber gives insight into why the Chamber was established, how it functioned within the setting of Europe’s dominant trade centre and how it has affected the development of similar courts in the Netherlands.

Following the loss in 1712 of its previous monopoly over British trade with West Africa, the Royal African Company found itself unable to compete with smaller, lower-cost British slave traders and nearly collapsed entirely. Salvation seemed to arrive in 1720 in the person of James Brydges, the Duke of Chandos, who led a massive re-capitalization of the company and made the strategic decision to move its focus to the commodity trade between Europe and Africa and on the search for new botanical and mineral resources in Africa itself. While Chandos directed the RAC’s employees in implementing this radical new scheme, he kept it secret from his fellow shareholders, leading them to believe that his plans were aimed at revitalizing the company’s mature but declining line of business in the transatlantic slave trade. The Duke’s strategy, however, proved overly ambitious and failed to reverse the company’s decline.

A growing body of research in economics and in business and economic history has shown the key role of bankruptcy and insolvency law on business organization, firms’ governance, and entrepreneurial choices. Most research, however, has focused on the formal aspects of laws, and still little is known on how various systems worked in practices. This paper fills this gap in the literature analyzing the functioning of bankruptcy procedures in four main European economies (Italy, France, England, and Germany) between ca.1880 and 1914. Using an original data set and descriptive statistics on length, organization, and return of procedures, the paper shows how the aim of attracting debtors was more successful in the less regulated English system, but how the protection of creditors’ rights was more efficiently pursued in France and Germany. Italy appears as the absolute worst performer.

Spain emerged from the Civil War (1936-1939) with formidable economic problems. They were caused by military destruction, by foreign condemnation, and especially by the establishment of an autarkic system, in which the victorious Francoist side followed the political and economic path of other European fascist regimes. Despite legal restrictions, many foreign companies continued to seek out and exploit both new and old relationships in Spain, usually in association with the state-owned holding Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI). This foreign support was a major factor in ending Spain’s international isolation, increasing confidence in the Spanish economy, and removing obstacles for later growth. The purpose of this article is to analyze the collaboration between French firms and INI in the early Franco era (1940s and 1950s), identifying the main enterprises, agreements, and results. We assert that foreign assistance to Spain was present during the autarky period and highlight the continuity of the collaboration between Spain and France in those difficult years. Therefore, we defend multinationals' flexibility in adapting themselves to a hostile environment, particularly across political and economic networks with local partners.