Conspiracy theories and rumors, as forms manifesting “social thought” (Rouquette, 1973), share processes and functions. The few studies dealing specifically with the question of belief in rumors questioned the link between adhesion and transmission (Allport & Lepkin 1943; Rosnow, 1991; Guerin & Miyazaki, 2006). The aim here will be to question the link between « knowledge », « adhesion » and « transmission » in conspiracy theories and rumors through two empirical studies. Can we know and transmit without adhering to? Can one know and adhere to without transmitting? Can we adhere to and transmit without actually « knowing »?

Latin American women's filmmaking has an unprecedented international profile thanks to the films of the Peruvian director Claudia Llosa, and the Argentine directors Lucía Puenzo and Lucrecia Martel. What is frequently unacknowledged when discussing the work of these award-winning filmmakers is the fact that all of their films are co-productions with Europe, and that programmes such as Cinéfondation, a programme aligned with the Cannes film festival, the Hubert Bals Fund, the World Cinema Fund and Ibermedia have been instrumental in their production. This article will tell this story through a discussion of the work of Claudia Llosa with an introduction to the issues raised by her award winning festival film Madeinusa (2006), and a focus on La teta asustada/The Milk of Sorrow (2009). It will consider the arguments of theorists who critique what they see as neo-colonial European interventions in ‘world cinema’, and those who celebrate the enabling work of the funding bodies. The chapter asks where can we place the cultural production of Llosa within these paradigms? Does the film confirm the critical positions by being subject to a process of othering for a European cinephile festival audience? Does it create its protagonist Fausta, an Andean migrant to Lima, from racist, neo-colonial stereotypes as some critics claim? Or, does it raise important questions relating to class and ethnic divisions within contemporary Peruvian society? The article ends with a discussion of how Llosa's second film, that presents the urban poor and the colonial class from a bourgeois point of view, compares with the films of Lucrecia Martel and Lucía Puenzo which provide a bourgeois point of view on the bourgeoisie itself.

This note presents an outline of the social and intellectual conditions accounting for the rise of “conspiracy entrepreneurs”, that is these heterodox thinkers who make a living from their denunciations and revelations on the malevolent organisations and characters who really lead the universe. A special attention has been focused on the reports concerning conspiracy entrepreneurs in the media, which describe them as eccentric and thus entertaining. After the presentation of some studies of David Icke's reptilian hypothesis, a question is raised: is it not legitimate to assert that academics studying conspiracy theories are themselves conspiracy entrepreneurs through their role in the spread of the subject of their studies.

It is the aim of this paper to sketch the basic idea of the phenomenology of moral drive through a dialogue with Dasan and Fichte. In section 1, I will delineate Fichte's theory of moral drive; in section 2, I will discuss Chong Yak-Yong's theory of moral drive. In section 3, I will evaluate the theories of moral drive they have developed, and in section 4, I will sketch the basic idea of a phenomenology of moral drive.

Since the financial success of the American remake of a Japanese horror film called Ringu (Hideo Nakata 1998), remaking a well-accepted Asian scary film in its domestic or pan-Asian market has been a recurring phenomenon in the American film industry for the past decade. The particular style of horror films which this article identifies as the “New Asian Female Ghost Films” has been the most welcomed Asian genre for the Hollywood project for reworking Asian cinematic originals. Beyond the commonality in narrative and thematic sharing, the New Asian Female Ghost Films are characterized as the specific iconography of the monstrous feminine with other gendered/gendering imageries and imaginations to reflect as well as the countries’ long traditions of female ghost filmmaking and the changed socio-cultural matrixes.

Philosophy as an academic discipline was introduced to Korea at the end of the 19th century. Philosophical education and professional research did not begin, however, until the 1920s. The first institution in which Koreans could study philosophy as a major at college level was Keijō Imperial University, which was founded by the Japanese in 1924 in Seoul, Korea. The first graduates from this school produced their research in Korean and contributed to the settlement of philosophy on the Korean peninsula. They were joined by Koreans who had returned from study in Austria, Germany, France, and the United States. I call these the “first Korean philosophers.” In order for an individual to belong to this group, three conditions had to be met: first, he or she should have studied philosophy as a major at college level; second, he or she should have read Western philosophical texts in original or in translation; third: he or she should have written a treatise in the contemporary Korean language. Against this background, I am going to deal with three questions. The first question concerns their attitude towards philosophy. The second question concerns their conception of philosophy. The third question concerns the method of doing philosophy. Through this study, I have shown that the first Korean philosophers foreshadowed the struggle between the Marxist and liberal understandings of the world and of humanity, even though they lived in the time of Japanese occupation.

In this paper, I propose an interpretation of the Confucian concept of li or Ritual Propriety, and suggest a new philosophy of action and mind on the basis of the concept. To achieve this aim, I focus upon and analyze passages in The Analects, and try to establish major Confucian theses on human action. By comparing Confucian views on human action with Western ones, I shed light on the originality of the concept of li.

Major theses on li in The Analects are as follows: (1) As an essential characteristic of human behavior, li is ordinary and ubiquitous. (2) Li is a socialized form of our mind, is the outside of an inside, and as such presupposes the unity of the mind and body. (3) Li is a social medium through which we interact with others in order to achieve common values and to turn our society into a harmonious and aesthetic space. To argue for the above theses, I focus on the centrality of language in our life, and utilize Russian psychologist Vygotsky's theory of language learning as well as Wittgenstein's concept of language game, together with the Confucian theory of correct names.

Childhood innocence has often been treated by scholars as an empty, idealised signifier. This article contests such accounts, arguing that innocence is best regarded as a powerfully unmarked training in heternormativity, alongside class and race norms. This claim will be demonstrated through attention to two recent films addressing childhood: Celine Sciamma's Tomboy and P.J. Hogan's Peter Pan. The films characterise young femininity as an ‘impossible space’, in which subjects face the contradictory, schizoid demands to simultaneously show both childhood innocence and heteronormative femininity – or else face the threat of a spoiled identity. The plot of each film traces how the protagonist attempts to manoeuvre in the face of and precisely using this contradiction. In dramatising such manoeuvring, the films reveal the surprising forms of subjectivity (e.g. the tomboy) that can be inhabited for a time in the interstices between age and gender norms, and which might have lasting value. Both films thus dramatise how an interstitial space can offer possibilities for negotiating the terms under which a subject is inserted into dominant, recognisable forms of subjectivity.

In 1989 mass democratic – and later nationalist – movements rose up against governments in Eastern Europe and all communist regimes fell like overripe pears. The very speed and ease of this collapse gave rise to speculations and conspiracy theories in the general public, as well as among those who had taken part in the movements themselves. Why did this all happen at once – so suddenly, why did it all go so smoothly, and who organized it all…?!

The “staging” of the democratic revolutions (Central Europe) and their subsequent national ethnic conflicts (Yugoslavia, post-Soviet Caucasus), was blamed on diverse causes: the dark political forces of USA, Russia, EU, Germany, international capital, power-hungry politicians, the secret police, and so forth…

In this article I wish to record my own experience, as a student activist during the Czechoslovak Velvet Revolution, and as a social anthropologist and war journalist working for several years during the ethnic wars in Yugoslavia and in the Post-Soviet Caucasus.

I address the main reasons that prevented understanding the post-communist mass movements and open a space to popular myths and conspiracy theories: 1. tendencies to political theatre, 2. spontaneity and self-organization of mass movements, 3. “mass intoxication” and the internal transformation of the ecstatic actor – activist. Exploring question marks and speculations about these key moments of these mass movements contributes to their understanding.

This paper outlines some key ideas of the twentieth-century Buddhist monk Han Yong-un, or Manhae. It focuses in particular on Manhae's social engagement under the Japanese occupation. It underlines the role played by Manhae's doctrine in reviving a national sentiment and culture in Korea. It elaborates on his doctrine of the Loved one, or nim, sketches the mutual influences of Buddhism and Confucianism in his thought, and builds on his critique of imperialism, militarism, and Korean “self-ruination.”

The study presents popular conspiracy theories spread within the Czech and Slovak language milieu. Along with the growth in the number of internet portals disseminating this type of texts, their reflection in public opinion is also visible in the way almost every major foreign policy issue or domestic case is commented upon in public internet discussions. The authors seek to identify the narrative and rhetorical sources of conspiracism in these countries since the rise of modern nationalism in the 19th century, focusing on the events accompanying the creation of the common state of the Slovaks and Czechs, the period of the Second World War, the rule of the Communist regime, the events related to the fall of the Iron Curtain and the “Velvet Revolution” in 1989 up to the present. The paper focuses attention on group-shared images of the enemies and on mutual interactions between the interpretations of local events and global conspiracy theories, as well as updates or later reinterpretations of older conspiracy motifs.

Most conspiracy theories exist as part of “stigmatized knowledge” – that is, knowledge claims that have not been accepted by those institutions we rely upon for truth validation. Not uncommonly, believers in conspiracy theories also accept other forms of stigmatized knowledge, such as unorthodox forms of healing and beliefs about Atlantis and UFOs. Rejection by authorities is for them a sign that a belief must be true. However, the linkage of conspiracy theories with stigmatized knowledge has been weakening, because stigmatized knowledge itself is growing more problematic. What was once clearly recognizable as “the fringe” is now beginning to merge with the mainstream. This process of “mainstreaming the fringe” is the result of numerous factors, including the ubiquity of the Internet, the growing suspicion of authority, and the spread of once esoteric themes in popular culture. Only a permeable membrane now separates the fringe from the mainstream. Thus conspiracism is no longer the province only of small, isolated coteries. It now has the potential to make the leap into public discourse. This, of course, does not apply to every conspiracy theory, but it happens enough to suggest that we are at an important transition point. The recent controversy in the United States over whether a conspiracy existed to hide President Obama's alleged foreign birth – a claim that years earlier would never have emerged beyond small radical groups – suggests the nature of the change. It also suggests the dangers that political cultures may face in the future.

This essay describes the emergence of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon as an object of conspiratorial intrigue and imagination, offering a snapshot of the “9/11 truth movement” and its various theories as they began to reach full bloom. Theories about the attacks have come to constitute the dominant conspiratorial present – a present that looks remarkably like the mid- and late-twentieth-century past, despite significant changes in information technology and the continuing institutionalization and ironization of conspiracy theory as an influential form of popular politics. In addition to the 9/11 conspiracy community, the essay considers the battle over the 9/11 Commission's review of the government's failure to anticipate the terrorist attacks. The Commission engaged in knowing and savvy efforts to respond to conspiracy theories and to preempt popular belief in them, offering an authoritative narrative (or, more precisely, set of narratives) to explain what occurred. Meanwhile, the 9/11 truth movement made equally knowing and savvy efforts to critique the official account, responding with its own efforts to reinterpret and re-narrate the attacks, their causes, and what they signify about the contemporary world. While the 9/11 Commission may have criticized the federal government and its intelligence services for their failures of imagination prior to the attacks, the truth movement criticized the Commission either for a failure of imagination – an explanation for the attacks that could see through the “official” account – or for a quite imaginative cover-up of the hidden truths of 9/11. By considering the clash between official authorities and an active conspiracy community, this essay considers how the movement attempted to form a collective political and scholarly community, producing a blizzard of texts offering narratives that compete with the ones told by the Commission that seek the impossible grail of conspiracy theory: the truth. The essay also considers the effects, if any, of the state's attempt to preempt and respond to conspiracy theories.

Truth claims pervade the world: assertions that a speaker wishes to persuade an audience are true or at least plausible. But how to judge? Much proposed knowledge has uncertain legitimacy, evaluated through assumptions of how the world operates or by the reputation of its sponsor. In other words, plausibility and credibility shape our judgments. As students of conspiracy theories recognize, many “facts” are available, too many to be easily judged as to their accuracy. Facts are promiscuous. As judges of likelihood, we conclude that some are false, others true, and still others taken out of context. Further, knowledge is never complete and so we must consider error and ignorance (a field of epistemology labeled agnotology) as well as accuracy and awareness. In this article I examine four critical allegations made about United States President Barack Obama: that he was born in Kenya, that he is Muslim, that he engaged in oral sex with another man, and that he is a socialist. While each of these claims may be false, they are false in different ways in light of the different criteria and strategies by which we weigh uncertainty.